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THE CONSTITUTION IN AN ERA OF
SUPRANATIONAL ADJUDICATION
BRIAN F. HAVEL*
Since the establishment of the World Trade Organization,
Americans have become increasingly aware of supranational
forms of governance. But there has been little scholarly effort to
understand the implications of increasing economic and legal
interdependence for America's constitutional order. In this
Article, Professor Brian Havel analyzes whether the United States
Supreme Court would sanction supranational courts, endowed
with obligatory jurisdiction, outside the conventional order that
has evolved under Article III of the Constitution. To address this
question, Professor Havel applies the insights of Chomskyan
structural linguistics, a field that legal scholars largely have
neglected despite renewed interest in textualist interpretation.
Using Noam Chomsky's core concepts, Professor Havel explains
that the text of Article III (its surface structure) reflects the
Framers' deep structure understanding that judicial power would
not be exercised under the Constitution exclusively by judges
appointed under Article III. Thus, the Article traces how
supranational tribunals can be considered, along with state courts
and legislative courts, to "share" in the exercise of the
Constitution's judicial power in a way that is consistent with the
fundamental deep structure idea of the separation of powers.
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[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent
act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must
realize that they have called into life a being the
development of which could not have been foreseen
completely by the most gifted of its begetters.
-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes (1920) 1
INTRODUCTION
This Article probes the Constitution of the United States to see
whether the founding document will accept a jurisprudential idea-
the transfer of judicial power to supranational tribunals-that the
Framers did not explicitly anticipate, but that they tacitly may have
1. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (Holmes, J.). Not surprisingly,
Justice Holmes's dynamic view has been used as the basis for a historical, evolutionary
metric of constitutional analysis. This evolutionary view consciously transcends the time-
bound conceptual and textual choices that the Framers made in drafting the Constitution.
See, e.g., Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1068
(1981) (concluding that constitutional law should be viewed "not as exegesis, but as a
process by which each generation gives formal expression to the values it holds
fundamental in the operations of government"). While respecting Justice Holmes's
endorsement of constitutional evolution, this Article always places the conceptual and
textual choices made by the Framers at its center. Thus, while the Framers may not have
foreseen supranational adjudication completely, I argue that the creation of supranational
tribunals is a type of governmental action that is contemplated in the structural design of
their Constitution. In this sense, this Article explores the abiding tension between
governmental innovation and constitutional limitations.
2000] 259
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foreseen in the structural imperatives of their revolutionary creation.2
The notion that the Constitution embraces both a surface and a deep
structure3 is an insight of classical Chomskyan linguistic theory that
may have some analogical application to constitutional interpretation.
The deep structure of the Constitution naturally confirms the well-
understood idea of the separation of governmental powers, which this
Article treats as the fundamental principle of constitutional integrity
in the Constitution. The Constitution's deep structure, however, also
supports the more startling conclusion that the judicial power, as
organized in Article III, has a fragmented composition that allows it
to be shared with tribunals established without the presence of
Article III judges. Accordingly, the deep structure of the
Constitution not only supports courts created pursuant to Congress's
authority under Article 1,4 but also may support global tribunals
exercising jurisdiction over the United States, its business
corporations, and its citizenry.5
Despite focusing on supranational governance, this Article does
not promise readers yet another excursion aboard one of
international law's celebrated (but, sadly, mythical) arks.6 Its purpose
2. To foresee an event or circumstance, in this sense, does not necessarily mean to
"fore-know" that it will happen. It can simply mean to "exercise foresight," where
"foresight" refers to "care or provision for the future," "provident care," or "prudence."
THE RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DIcrIONARY 750 (2d ed. 1987). In the reasoning
adopted here, while the Framers did not explicitly anticipate a supranational system of
adjudication, they nonetheless created the structural conditions for its future emergence.
The idea of supranationalism dates to the early twentieth century, but the first use of the
word "supranational" in a treaty did not occur until 1951. See HENRY G. SCHERMERS,
INTERNATIONAL INsTrTUTIONAL LAW § 41, at 27-28 (2d rev. ed. 1980) (discussing the
Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S.
140). This Article argues that the Framers' constitutional structure, notably the
importance they attached to the foreign commerce and treaty powers, reveals a
providential concern for the emergence of imaginative ideas for international governance.
See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 262
(2d ed. 1996).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 62-65 (defining these terms).
4. On congressional authority to create specialized courts under the enumerated
legislative powers of Article I, see generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION 207-11 (2d ed. 1994).
5. Dispute settlement, after all, "has become a central preoccupation of the public
international law field." David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and
Policy, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 7,70.
6. The ark in this sense refers to the propensity of Professor Hans Kelsen and his
acolytes, in the evolution of Kelsen's seminal theories of public international law, to seek
the grandiloquent, all-embracing, institutional solution. See Kennedy, supra note 5, at
102-03. In Kennedy's cosmos, Professor Kelsen serves as the slightly musty ark-builder,
the utopian who imagines a world made peaceful and prosperous by the benign hand of
multilateral and international institutions. Kelsen's "metropolitanism" contrasts with the
presumably more canny figure of the "cosmopolitan" international lawyer, the technocrat
[Vol. 78
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is resolutely a matter of hard constitutional law. This Article steps
back from recent work concerning the functional cartography of
supranational adjudication 7 and examines the debate on an emerging
constitution for the global trade system from the perspective of the
United States Constitution.8 To borrow a coinage popularized by
who urges government and business into a vigorous transnational process of open and
deregulated market bargaining, tries to deflect the parochial disruptions of politics, and
shows a certain disdain for the formalistic metropolitan sensibility. Id. (summarizing this
argument and suggesting Georgetown's John Jackson as representative of this kind of
lawyer). As might be surmised, the metropolitan/cosmopolitan dyad smacks of caricature,
and Kennedy himself seems to concede that each of his chosen exemplars might exhibit
some characteristics of the other style. See id. at 52-54, 70-71. John Jackson, ironically,
has been acknowledged most for his work in interpreting the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs, now retooled into one of the most seaworthy arks (the World Trade
Organization (WTO) regime) that the Kelsenians could ever have conceived. See
generally JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1997) (placing the WTO at the fulcrum
of the emerging global trade framework).
7. See Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 287 (1997) (presenting a checklist of
criteria for effective supranational adjudication without explicitly accommodating
American constitutional concerns). By focusing on adjudicative power, this Article leaves
for another time an evaluation of the juristic implications of an entire supranational order.
Nevertheless, some of the broader questions already can be anticipated. Would the
United States Constitution permit a wholesale transfer of any of the enumerated
legislative powers in Article I to a supranational authority? Could the United States agree
to a currency union with Canada and the states of South America that would assign
coinage of money and regulation of "the value thereof' to a new Central Bank of the
Americas? See generally Caren Bohan, In Dollars We Trust: Argentina May Test
Currency-Bloc Idea, SEATrLE TIMES, Feb. 7, 1999, at A19 (discussing a proposed single
currency area for North America); No More Peso?: Argentina Says It Is Thinking About
Replacing Its Currency with the American Dollar. The Step Would Be Logical but Not
Necessarily Correct, ECONOMIST, Jan. 23, 1999, at 69, 69 (explaining the difficulties of
merging the United States and Argentine currencies). While these questions are vital and
perplexing, the task here is doubly specific: to define a generally applicable constitutional
rile of recognition for supranational adjudication of a particular class of private disputes
and to do so in the domain of international commerce. The analysis attempted in these
pages will have trans-substantive application in discussing legislative and executive
transfers of power and in evaluating other species of supranational judicial power, such as
the new International Criminal Court. See generally INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF PENAL
LAW ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVATIONS AND ISSUES
BEFORE THE 1997-98 PREPARATORY COMMITTEE; AND ADMINISTRATIVE AND.
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS (1997) (compiling a documentary record of preparatory work
to create the new International Criminal Court).
8. See JACKSON, supra note 6, at 81-89; see also GATT Implementing Legislation:
Hearings on S. 2467 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 103d
Cong. 285, 292 (1994) (Sup. Docs. No. Y4.C73/7iS.Hrg.103-823) [hereinafter Uruguay
Round Senate Hearings] (statement of Professor Laurence H. Tribe) (emphasizing that the
WTO agreement, if adopted, would "significantly affect" the law-making sovereignty of
the United States and the 50 sovereign states of the Union). International trade has had a
profound impact on the evolution of public international law. The traditional Grotian
apparatus of world law, regulating the laws of war and peace, has evolved into elaborate
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Yale's Bruce Ackerman, this inquiry may reveal whether America's
embrace of the new international economy and of global dispute
settlement could trigger a "jurisgenerative" event in the country's
constitutional history.9 If the United States wants to extend the peace
of the marketplace to all comers, it must confront the implications for
its own constitutional order that are presented by growing economic
and legal interdependence. 10
Nevertheless, the theories presented in this Article face a high
burden of persuasion. We should not assume that the United States
Supreme Court, even if beguiled by the promise of global integration,
would sanction establishment of rival courts, endowed with obligatory
jurisdiction, outside the conventional constitutional order. Justice
commercial treaties that establish institutional frameworks that eventually may break free
of the discretionary control of their masters, the contracting parties to the treaty. As the
European Union has demonstrated, multilateral economic relations supply a motive for
this kind of international constitutionalization of treaties that traditional bilateral trade or
alliance compacts could never supply. For example, Arie Reich applied a theory of
"ramification" to the growth of the European Union, stressing the expansion of integrated
regimes outward from pure trade toward policy issues encompassing investments,
transportation, taxation, social policy, and monetary policy. Arie Reich, From Diplomacy
to Law: The Juridicization of International Trade Relations, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS.
775, 831-32 (1996-1997). See generally Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic
Law Revolution, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 33, 36 (1996) (describing traditional public
international law as the "default structure" on which to build constitution-like treaties that
contain the basis for further legislation and adjudication).
9. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (FOUNDATIONS) 40 (1991) (adapting
the word "jurisgenesis" used in Robert Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword:
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (1983)). The portmanteau adjective
"jurisgenerative," in the sense of an event or normative consensus that eventually creates
legal meaning, has been gaining some academic currency. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
"The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 35
(1997) (discussing the idea that the Rule of Law may include a jurisgenerative effect,
reflecting societal morality); Judith Resnik, Rereading "the Federal Courts:" Revising the
Domain of Federal Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1021, 1054 (1994) (noting the jurisgenerative power of communities).
Harold Koh has captured the same thought in more pointed language, noting that
commentators have queried whether, "over time, America's constitutionalism has grown
increasingly incompatible with its globalism." HAROLD HONGiU KOH, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 209
(1990).
10. See Boris Kozolchyk, NAFTA in the Grand and Small Scheme of Things, 13 ARIZ.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 135, 137 (1996). As previously observed, see supra note 7, a different
question is presented by the evolving constitutionalization of the global project itself,
including the creation of new forms of supranational organization and the elaboration of
transnational legal codes. See SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN
AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 22 (1996).
11. An unreflective faith in the Supreme Court's likely support for supranational
adjudication would transfer to the realm of international policy the kind of hopeful finger-
crossing that Robert Nagel has identified in the operation of domestic constitutional law:
"[Miuch can be tolerated if left unspoken that might destroy if spoken." ROBERT F.
[Vol. 78
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Sandra Day O'Connor stated as much in a recent symposium address,
even though she prefaced her remarks with the judiciary's traditional
deference toward the political branches in foreign policy.12 Justice
O'Connor asserted that the vesting of supranational adjudicatory
authority in international tribunals would present "a very significant
constitutional question in the United States."' 3 Specifically, citing
Article Ill, she contended that Congress generally should not
delegate "'the essential attributes of judicial power' " to tribunals
outside the Constitution. 4 Although delivered off the bench, Justice
O'Connor's caveats alert us to the likelihood that the Supreme Court
eventually will be called upon to evaluate the domestic authority of
the judgments of various international tribunals and may or may not
concede the jurisdictional reach of its rivals.' 5
NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1989). See generally JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY OF AND THE RELATIONSHIP TO THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1 (1991) [hereinafter JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE REPORT] (reminding scholars and political leaders that their "conclusory
pronouncements" on the viability of an international criminal court have neglected the
constitutional limitations "unique to the United States").
12. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L &
POL. 35,36-40 (1995-1996). Justice O'Connor accepted that legislation consenting to the
creation of international tribunals would represent a judgment by the political branches
that tribunals of this kind "further America's foreign interests." Id. at 40. This Article also
stresses the history of judicial tolerance of congressional innovation. See, e.g., infra text
accompanying note 116.
13. O'Connor, supra note 12, at 42.
14. Id. (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851
(1986)). This Article addresses the constitutional questions implicated by Justice
O'Connor's statements. Preliminarily, it should be noted that this Article proposes that
supranational tribunals exercise judicial power under the Constitution and are not (as
some have argued) a unique species sustained outside the usual constitutional order. For
arguments rejecting the notion of a "quarantined" form of international judicial power,
see infra note 337.
15. See O'Connor, supra note 12, at 43; infra note 337 (discussing the political
question doctrine). To date, no case of the kind imagined by Justice O'Connor has come
before the Court. The President and Senate, exercising their Article II treaty powers,
might agree to a treaty creating supranational tribunals. Such a treaty might face a future
constitutional challenge, for example by an aggrieved party forced to abandon a significant
commercial opportunity-perhaps a corporate merger-because of an unfavorable
tribunal opinion. Until such a challenge occurs, however, the American constitutional
system makes it impossible to predict the jurisprudential destiny of an unratified treaty or
unadopted statute: the Supreme Court cannot give the kind of pre-enactment advisory
opinions found in state practice and in several European constitutions. See Steven G.
Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1377, 1394 n.69 (1994).
Ireland, France, and Spain, for example, permit another branch of government to request
an authoritative judicial opinion on the constitutionality of proposed legislation. See Allan
Randolph Brewer-Carias, General Report on the Domestic Constitutional Implications of
Participation in a Regional Integration Process 75 (July 30, 1998) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author) (Proceedings of the XVth International Congress of
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
To weigh the constitutionality of supranational adjudication, this
Article uses three analytical devices, which are introduced in Parts I
through IIl. Part I outlines a proposed model for specialized
supranational tribunals to serve the global airline industry. Part II
explains certain principles of Chomskyan linguistic theory, including
Chomsky's ideas of the deep and surface structures of language, that I
will use as analogical guides to understanding the Framers'
Constitution. Part III sets forth the principle of constitutional
integrity, a restatement of the theory of separation of powers, which
will serve as the fundamental structural principle that ultimately
controls all other exercises of interpretation that occur in this Article.
Thereafter, Part IV uses the principles of Chomskyan linguistics
as a powerful analogical tool to integrate state courts, legislative
courts, and supranational tribunals into the broad grant of judicial
power contemplated by the Framers in Article IlI of the Constitution.
Finally, in Part V, I conclude that the proposed tribunals, even though
they remove access to final review by an Article III judge, do not
impermissibly distort the alignment of the judicial and political
powers in the American government and therefore do not, within
their limited jurisdiction, offend the principle of constitutional
integrity.
I. A PROPOSAL FOR A SYSTEM OF SPECIALIZED SUPRANATIONAL
TRADE COURTS
Professor Louis Henkin, who has led perhaps the most extensive
modern reconnaissance of the foreign relations landscape of the
Constitution, displays impatience with abstract, quixotic speculation
Comparative Law, Bristol, England). The epithet "advisory" understates the power of the
opinion because a finding of constitutional incompatibility probably will prevent the
proposed statute from becoming law. On the failure to incorporate advisory opinions into
the American Constitution, see generally Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of
Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 741,769-72 (1984); Robert P. Deyling, Free Trade Agreements and the
Federal Courts: Emerging Issues, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 353, 376 (1996). The propriety of
assigning an advisory role to federal judges resurfaced in the international trade context
when then-Senator Robert Dole proposed the appointment of Article III judges to a
commission that would evaluate retroactively cases in which the United States was a losing
party before the dispute panels of the World Trade Organization. See Kendall W. Stiles,
The New WTO Regime: The Victory of Pragmatism, 4 DET. C.L. J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 3,
38-39 (1995); see also Fred L. Morrison & Robert E. Hudec, Judicial Protection of
Individual Rights Under the Foreign Trade Laws of the United States, in 8 STUDIES IN
TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 91, 110-11 (Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann eds., 1993) (noting that the standing doctrine has prevented the emergence of
an actio popularis in American jurisprudence, thereby disabling public interest plaintiffs
from challenging legislation or treaties solely on the ground of unconstitutionality).
[Vol. 78
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about the constitutional threat posed by supranational adjudication.
6
Henkin, a dauntless pragmatist in his international law writings, 7
prefers to work with "a particular proposal and context."' 8  He
believes that only from such a process of reification can we properly
assess whether innovative arrangements can spark constitutional
controversy.' 9 To anchor my argument and to honor Professor
Henkin's prescripts, this Article rests on precisely the kind of specific
proposal that he might accept for scrutiny.
My argument assumes that a supranational order of things will
arrive incrementally, with specialized tribunals responsive to
micropressures applied by domestic and transnational constituencies
and interest groups.20 In 1998, for example, the international
community established a new international criminal court.2' In the
services sector, it makes sense to imagine the appearance of
sectoralized tribunals to facilitate specific wealth-generating segments
of the global service economy?2 The following is a synoptic account
16. See HENKIN, supra note 2, at 273.
17. It is tempting to speculate how Henkin might be assimilated into the archetypal
style labels that David Kennedy has assigned to the great modem international law
scholars. See supra note 6. Henkin, in any event, laid independent claim to a sort of
cosmopolitan pragmatism with his epigrammatic remark that "almost all nations observe
almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of
the time." LOuIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d
ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted).
18. HENKIN, supra note 2, at 273.
19. Proposals infringe upon the Constitution, in Henkin's view, "if they distort[]
domestic institutions or impinge[] substantially and directly on individuals in the United
States, [and] particularly if they deprive[] persons of civil rights and liberties." Id. at 272.
20. Professor John Jackson, while praising the General Agreement on Trade in
Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1167, as the highwater mark of trade liberalization in
services, speculates that the sheer number of service sectors (perhaps 150) presages at
least 50 years of sector-by-sector negotiating. See JACKSON, supra note 6, at 307. The
complexity of the service sector mirrors, to some extent, the fragmentation of the
discipline of public international law itself into a rich mix of new legal specialties that
includes international contracts for the sale of goods, international tort and criminal law,
international resource law, international human rights law, aviation law, law of the sea,
communications law, space law, unfair business practices, international antitrust and tax
law, and many others. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INSTITUTIONS 5 (1995). In Franck's opinion, international law has entered its "post-
ontological era," when its existence is no longer under challenge, and its content has
become the sole object of assessment. Id. at 6.
21. For prescient insights into the emergence of this new court, see M. Cherif
Bassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an International Criminal Court in the
New International World Order, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 151 (1992).
22. See JACKSON, supra note 6, at 307. For example, public comments on the United
States Department of Transportation's recent draft predatory pricing guidelines for the
domestic airline industry included an argument by the Washington Airports Task Force
that the worldwide dimension of airline alliances, with the risk of anti-competitive levels of
concentration, have begun to create "a supranational situation" with respect to
2000]
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of how constitutional issues associated with supranational
adjudication might surface in "the world's most visible service
industry,"' the international air transport industry.2 4
Chicago, December 2000: The delegates to a new global air
transport conference have crafted a proposed multilateral "open skies"
agreement that would supersede the mercantilist Chicago Convention,
originally signed in 1944. The new dispensation would transform
commercial access to the world's airspace, eliminating the government
domination of routes, prices, and market access that has limited the
expansion of the world's airlines for more than fifty years. As part of
the effort, the delegates have proposed establishing two supranational
26
institutions to monitor international airline competition, an Open Skies
Commission and an International Court of Air Transportation.27 The
Commission and Court, applying a new code of international
competition policies for the first time. In the view of the Task Force, issues created by
these far-flung alliances will be increasingly difficult to resolve through the prevailing
network of bilateral aviation agreements. See Washington Airports Task Force, Response
to the U.S. Department of Transportation's Request for Comment on Proposed Predatory
Pricing Enforcement Policy, DOT Docket No. OST-98-3713-717 (July 22,1998).
23. BRIAN F. HAVEL, IN SEARCH OF OPEN SKIES: LAW AND POLICY FOR A NEW
ERA IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, jacket cover (1997).
24. For an overview of the global air transport passenger industry, see id. at 17-23.
25. The model used in the main text is based on an earlier proposal that I developed.
See id. at 427-33. The regulatory order that governs the international airline industry has
been an object of scholarly interest since the signing of the Chicago Convention on
International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. See HAVEL,
supra note 23, at 31-34. During the following 50 years, the rapid technological advances in
air transport have been subordinated to diplomatic maneuvering among nations, a kind of
grand zero-sum game to negotiate where airlines fly, how often, with how many
passengers, and at what price. No other modem transnational industry is so buffeted by
the conflicting demands of diplomacy and business enterprise, although in many countries
the two interests coincide to suppress competition. See id. at xix.
26. For the definition of "supranational" used in this Article, see infra text
accompanying note 35.
27. These institutional innovations are consciously modeled on the template of the
European Commission and the European Court of Justice as they operate to administer
the European Union's competition policy. See HAVEL, supra note 23, at 430. The
European Commission provides centralized executive review of interstate antitrust
disputes with established procedures to ensure fairness. The Court of Justice has a broad
appellate mandate to ensure that "in the interpretation and application of [the founding
treaties] the law is observed." TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 164, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 73 [hereinafter EC TREATY];
TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE
TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AND CERTAIN RELATED Acrs,
Oct. 2 1997, art. 220, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, 269, 37 I.L.M. 56, 124 [hereinafter EC TREATY
CONSOLIDATED VERSION] (renumbering the EC TREATY, supra). See generally HAVEL,
supra note 23, at 249-51 (examining the jurisdictional ambit of the European Court of
Justice).
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competition law,28 would exercise exclusive supervision over the legal
relations between private citizens, between private citizens and
sovereign states, and between sovereign states, in connection with the
operation of international air transport routes. Accordingly, for
example, a United States airline seeking to merge with a European
Union airline could find the proposed deal blocked by the Open Skies
Commission as anti-competitive, but would have a right of appeal to
the International Court of Air Transportation. Decisions of the
Commission and Court would have the status of domestic law within
each contracting party's jurisdiction, and no further domestic appeals
or challenges would be allowed. To facilitate this regime, private
citizens would be granted standing29 before the Commission and the
Court.3 The United States delegation has demurred; in its view, the
United States Constitution precludes the assignment of obligatory and
28. For a discussion of historical efforts to multilateralize competition rules, including
more recent WTO initiatives, see Competition Policy in the New Trade Order:
Strengthening International Cooperation and Rules, Report of the Group of Experts,
COM(95)359 final at 10. See generally Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda
for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1
(1995) (proposing a common international antitrust code). Substantively, for example, the
observed linkages between the Sherman/Clayton paradigms of United States antitrust law
and Articles 85 and 86 of the EC TREATY, supra note 27, 298 U.N.T.S. at 47-49; EC
TREATY CONSOLIDATED VERSION, arts. 81, 82, supra note 27, 1997 O.J. (C 340) at 208-
09, 37 I.L.M. at 93-94, point unmistakably to a unified transatlantic code on inter-carrier
agreements and abuse of market dominance. "It is striking that, on paper, the similarities
in the competition laws of major trading nations are much greater than the differences. It
is only sensible therefore to build upon this developing consensus ... in the interests of
more open markets and the reduction of trade friction." Sir Leon Brittan, Competition
Law: Its Importance to the European Community and to International Trade, Address
Before the University of Chicago Law School (Apr. 24, 1992) (transcript available in the
Library of the European Union Delegation, Washington, D.C.).
29. For an explanation of the use of the familiar American juridical term "standing"
in an internationalized setting, see infra note 39.
30. Thus, unlike the dispute panel structure created under the WTO agreements in
1994, the direct access procedures of the model proposed here would no longer compel
nongovernmental complainants to lobby their national governments to raise unfair
competition issues-and, failing agreement, to enter into formal dispute-with foreign
governments. On the presentation of claims against foreign governments, see generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 902, cmt. 1 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (discussing the responsibility of
the President and the executive branch for claims against foreign governments, including
those on behalf of private persons). For a critical evaluation of democratic weaknesses in
the new WTO dispute system, see generally Robert F. Housman, Democratizing
International Trade Decision-Making, 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 699 (1994) (discussing how
current international trade agreements undercut principles of democratic governance even
in democratic states). Conversely, of course, ouster of domestic jurisdiction would enable
governments to implead private parties directly-and obligatorily-before the proposed
new tribunals. For a reflection on how the proposed tribunals could transform the role of
private parties in international trade disputes, see infra text accompanying note 412.
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exclusive adjudicative powers over private party relationships-and
possibly even over the sovereign actions of the United States itself-to
supranational tribunals and judges.3'
The above scenario assumes permanent institutions of
adjudication and compliance, operating prospectively to accept a
contingent and unknowable docket." The new tribunals would not be
31. This constitutional dimension of supranational institutions is not solely an object
of American constitutional concern. The European Court of Justice, for example, recently
reiterated that it has the power-and responsibility-to scrutinize European Union
participation as a party in international arrangements that involve judicial control
machinery that may impinge on the Court's own jurisdictional competence under the
Treaty of Rome. See Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1996 E.C.R.
1-1759, 1-783 to 1-1786, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 265, 287-89 (1996). But see Opinion 1/91, Draft
Treaty on the European Economic Area, 1991 E.C.R. 1-6079, 1-6084, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
245, 270-72 (1992) (recognizing that in certain circumstances the Union has power to
submit to decisions of an international court if the autonomy of the Union "legal order,"
including the paramount position of the Court of Justice, would not be compromised).
32. To this extent, much of the historical evidence from specially constituted
"international" claims tribunals is simply irrelevant. These entities, among them the
claims commissions established between the United States and Mexico in 1868 and 1923,
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, § 902, reporters' note 8, and the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal set up under the Algiers Declaration of 1981, Jan. 19, DEP'T ST. BULL.,
Feb. 1981, 1, 1-4, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 230-33, were truly ad hoe in nature, forming a
closed and predictable set of litigants, timeframes, and causes, so that the limits of
jurisdiction ratione personae, ratione temporae, and ratione materiae were always fixed and
ascertainable. Their existence relied more on judicial deference to the foreign policy
prerogatives of the political branches and to the need for diplomatic comity, and the few
reported cases did not dwell upon potential ramifications for the judicial power. See
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, § 902, reporters' note 8 (discussing cases
approving the international claims practice of the United States); 2 CHARLES CHENEY
HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE
UNITED STATES § 504, at 24-26 (1922) (arguing that the United States may
constitutionally agree to refer to an international tribunal future controversies that may
not prove susceptible to amicable adjustment by direct negotiation); Thomas Raeburn
White, Constitutionality of the Proposed International Prize Court- Considered from the
Standpoint of the United States, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 490, 491 (1908) ("[T]he power of the
United States to provide by treaty for the establishment of international courts and the
adjustment of international differences therein is free from doubt."). The scope of this
general treaty power, it would appear, reaches settlement of international claims where
the claimants, as private parties, have already commenced suit against a foreign
government in United States federal court proceedings. See Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654, 669-74 (1981) (authorizing the President to order claims settlement by
executive agreement, thereby terminating legal proceedings and nullifying all orders of
attachment pending in United States courts against Iranian governmental interests and
transferring them to binding arbitration before an international claims tribunal). The
desirability of this kind of settlement is enhanced by the existence of legal doctrines that
permit foreign nations to disclaim legal responsibility in United States courts (notably the
act-of-state doctrine, see generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, § 443
(discussing the principle that American courts will not pass judgment on internal acts of
other states), and, frankly, by "a tradition of presidential involvement in settling foreign
claims," William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Positive Political Theory and Public
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integrated components of the domestic appeals systems, perched atop
or alongside national supreme courts. At the beginning of the
twentieth century, in fact, hopes were high that the project for an
International Prize Court, designed originally as a lineal superior to
the national court systems, would usher in a gilded age of global
adjudication.34 Under true supranational governance, however, all
domestic jurisdiction is ousted. As usually understood,
supranationalism35 requires that a quantum of judicial power is, in
effect, transferred out of the nation-state to the supranational agency.
The judicial power later re-enters the state in the form of absolute
decrees to which the nation-state, including the judiciary, must give
plenary and unconditional effect.36 In the metaphorical construct of a
Law: The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.. 523,559 (1992)). Eskridge and Ferejohn
maintain that the President must have "at least some inherent powers to settle claims
under Article II of the Constitution." Id. at 562. With respect to the special contexts of
international military and criminal tribunals, see Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without
Borders: The Constitutionality of an International Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 106-07, 127-32 (1995).
33. Though the project seems unfeasible today, it is an interesting question whether
the United States Constitution, if it were to permit a specialized supranational system of
the kind proposed in this Article, would also permit an additional (supranational)
appellate structure that allowed discrete appeals of decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. As Henry Brown pointed out in a 1908 article, the Constitution raises no
textual impediment that would prohibit the Supreme Court itself from accepting the
jurisdiction of a higher court. See Henry B. Brown, The Proposed International Prize
Court, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 476,478-79 (1908).
34. See id. Prize law concerns the rights of belligerents to seize the ships and cargo
both of other belligerents and of neutrals during wartime. It is a true juristic anomaly:
although prize law is a branch of international law, it has always been administered by
special national courts known as prize courts. See generally D.H.N. Johnson, Prize Law, in
3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1122-28 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed.,
1997) (tracing the historical evolution of wartime prize law). For obvious reasons,
domestic judicial administration frequently was open to bias and unfairness toward the
nationals of the seized vessel. The proposed International Prize Court would have had full
power to review decisions of a national court of justice as to both facts and law, to affirm
or reverse, and to certify its judgment to the national court for proceedings in accordance
therewith. See 2 HYDE, supra note 32, § 504, at 25-26. The United States objected on the
ground that the Supreme Court was the constitutional court of final appeal in prize cases,
see id. at 26, but not, it will be noted, on the ground that the Court must be the final court
of appeal for all federal cases, which it demonstrably has never been, see infra text
accompanying notes 154-55. White emphasized that, in the unusual context of prize law,
the United States federal government recognized international commissions that did not
technically "reverse" the Supreme Court, but did reach contrary conclusions to prior
Court holdings. United States recognition was premised on the principle of international
law that the judicial power of the belligerent captor did not comprehend a final decision of
international questions arising in prize cases. See White, supra note 32, at 499.
35. But cf. Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 7, at 287 (suggesting that supranational,
strictly speaking, has no "canonical" definition); supra note 2 (commenting on the
provenance of the term "supranational").
36. See generally G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations
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recent article by Professors Heifer and Slaughter, supranational
tribunals have the ability "to penetrate the surface of the state." 37
The acts of supranational institutions-whether they wield legislative,
executive, or judicial powers, or a blend of all three-receive direct
and immediate application, without formal re-incorporation, in the
domestic constitutional order.38 The aviation model adopts this
supranational construct in the judicial sphere.
More significantly, in its emphasis on the standing of private
citizens, the supranational aviation model contains an unexplored
constitutional novelty.39 In all previous incarnations of transnational
adjudication that have been accepted by the United States
government, United States citizens either could appear before the
relevant tribunals only by the sovereign consent of the United States
or were represented by the United States in its sovereign capacity °
The aviation model anticipates that various party configurations
would emerge, in addition to the classical international law sovereign-
to-sovereign contest, that would reject the traditional view of the
Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 885 (1995)
(describing how awards of international tribunals might convert into domestic law with
only "minimal substantive scrutiny").
37. Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 7, at 289. These authors used the term
"supranational" to nominalize a particular type of international organization that is
"empowered to exercise directly some of the functions otherwise reserved to states." Id.
at 287. In this perspective, the European Union is today the maximal example of a
transfer of state sovereign power to an international organization. See id.
38. See id. at 287.
39. The unexplored novelty considered here is a procedural one, for which the U.S.
jurisprudential term "standing" is used metonymically. See generally RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 30, § 906 (discussing the general principle that private persons,
natural or juridical, are generally prohibited from bringing claims in international fora).
The Framers, contrarily, would hardly be surprised by an engagement of individual
responsibility at the international level. It was precisely their governmental purpose to
attach the individual's participation to the enterprise of federal administration. See
generally JACK N. RAKOvE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 153 (1996) (suggesting that the involvement of the
individual countered the solecistic notion of a sovereignty over sovereigns). Alexander
Hamilton, in a similar vein, took "the people" to be "the only proper objects of
government." THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 149 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick
ed., 1987).
40. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 687 (1981) (involving an executive
agreement transferring all claims of United States nationals against the Iranian
government to international arbitration); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 211-13
(1942) (involving an executive agreement settling claims of American nationals against
Russia and its nationals arising out of the United States's recognition of the Soviet
government); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 326-27 (1937) (involving an
American government action in order to complete the settlement of claims of United
States nationals made by previous executive agreement with the Soviet government); see
also HENKIN, supra note 2, at 56 (discussing the Pink and Belmont cases).
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individual as lacking an autonomous right of access to international
tribunals.4'
Thus, while the model contemplates that the United States might
press a claim against France because of an allegedly illegal public
subsidy paid to Air France, that jurisdiction alone might not seem a
remarkable advance on present World Trade Organization (WTO)
dispute settlement procedure.42 The authentic innovation comes in
granting private parties a direct right of appearance, or standing,43
before the international tribunals in two prototypical party
configurations. First, a private party could bring suit directly against
a foreign government because participation in the founding treaty
would require an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity.44
41. Thus, Heifer and Slaughter suggest, potential new conflicts include cases directly
involving private parties-"whether between a private party and a foreign government, a
private party and her own government, private parties themselves, or, in the criminal
context, a private party and a prosecutor's office." Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 7, at
289. On international law's traditional reluctance to accord standing to individuals at the
international level, see Marek St. Korowicz, The Problem of the International Personality
of Individuals, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 533, 558 (1956) (describing the "[r]epugnance" felt by
international law jurists at making an individual a subject of international law (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based
Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 CoLuM. L. REv. 1082, 1084 (1992) (interpreting
the customary position of the individual in international law as "lack[ing] the power to set
in motion the machinery of international law for enforcing treaty obligations"). For a
broad summons to expand standing in international trade tribunals, see Shell, supra note
36, at 838 (calling for "places at the table," including standing to litigate cases, for all trade
policy stakeholders).
42. See Shell, supra note 36, at 898 n.325 (describing the WTO, in this specific sense,
as a "contract organization" that adopts the classic public international law contractual
model of bilateral relationships between states); cf. Glen T. Schieyer, Note, Power to the
People: Allowing Private Parties to Raise Claims Before the WTO Dispute Resolution
System, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275, 2277-78 (1997) (proposing the extension of standing
before WTO tribunals to nongovernmental parties in the context of a challenge before
WTO tribunal to U.S. legislation punishing foreign companies that trade with Cuba).
In contrast, European Union treaty law allows natural and juridical persons to
contest trade norms promulgated by European Union institutions before the
supranational European Court of Justice. See EC TREATY, arts. 173, 175, supra note 27,
298 U.N.T.S. at 75-76; EC TREATY CONSOLIDATED VERSION, arts. 230, 232, supra note
27, 1997 0.1. (C 340) at 272, 273, 37 I.L.M. at 125, 126; see also Hefer & Slaughter, supra
note 7, at 276-77 (adding the tribunals established by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to a select category of
supranational adjudication involving private parties litigating directly against state
governments or against each other). On the so-called direct effect of European Union
treaty and legislative rights, see Andrea K. Schneider, Democracy and Dispute Resolution:
Individual Rights in International Trade Organizations, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 587,
600-02,606-09 (1998).
43. See supra text accompanying note 41.
44. States are generally not immune from liability for commercial activities, but might
argue that regulation of their airspace and international air transport routes, despite
commercial ramifications, falls properly within the sphere of governmental activity (de
2000]
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Accordingly, the treaty would allow a United States airline, for
example, to sue a foreign government to remove capacity restrictions
unilaterally imposed by that government on air traffic routes served
by the United States complainant. 45 Second, any individual airline
could sue, and be sued by, its commercial peers.46
The model of supranational aviation tribunals presented in this
Part not only satisfies Professor Henkin's requirement of specificity,47
but also can serve as a template for interpreting the constitutional
status of supranational tribunals as a class. Next, in Part II, I turn to
the features of Chomskyan linguistics that comprise the intellectual
wellspring of this new project of interpretation.
II. THE ANALOGICAL POWER OF STRUCTURAL LINGUISTIC
THEORY
A. Chomskyan Linguistics and Constitutional Interpretation
Surprisingly, Noam Chomsky's insights into language, although
jure imperii) and, thus, attracts the plenary protection of classical sovereign immunity. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, § 451 cmt. a; see also Jurisdictional Immunities of
Foreign States Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994) (granting and governing the scope of
jurisdiction to be exercised by federal district courts in civil cases involving claims against
foreign states).
45. Under the proposed model, for example, Northwest Airlines could have brought
suit directly against the Japanese government in 1993 to remove unilateral capacity
restrictions imposed by Japan on Northwest's Tokyo-Sydney services. See HAVEL, supra
note 23, at 188 (describing Northwest's complaint against Japan, pursued under the U.S.
Department of Transportation's statutory administrative investigation procedures for
international air transportation). Northwest would also be able to bring suit against the
American government if, for example, the United States were to issue rules setting fare
ranges that violated the new principle of open price competition on international routes.
In this context, the proposed supranational aviation tribunals would supersede any
potential jurisdiction of the U.S. Claims Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994). This result
would not only be consistent with the scenario outlined in the text, but would also be
mandated by an existing statutory provision that denies the court jurisdiction over claims
against the United States that "growl out of or [are] dependent upon" an international
agreement-here, the open skies treaty. 28 U.S.C. § 1502 (1994). But cf. Dames & Moore,
453 U.S. at 689-90 (preserving claims before the U.S. Claims Court that are founded upon
the Constitution).
46. For example, a U.S. airline might challenge two European competitors or an
alliance of United States and European competitors for alleged price-fixing on a major
United States/European route. It is likely, in fact, that most disputes in a deregulated
international airline industry would be private in nature, especially as governments
continue to withdraw from public ownership of their flag carriers. See generally HAVEL,
supra note 23, at 85-89 (discussing the trend, especially in the European Union, of
government withdrawal from public ownership of flag carriers).
47. See supra text accompanying note 18 (discussing Professor Henkin's insistence
that the constitutionality of supranational adjudication be tested in the context of specific
proposals).
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difficult to penetrate and seemingly in a constant state of
abandonment and reform,4 have left virtually no mark on the
practice of constitutional interpretation.49 While the reason for this
neglect might itself be an enterprise for another day, ° the task here is
48. The worst offender in this respect may be Noam Chomsky himself. This Article is
grounded in what I call "classical" Chomskyan linguistics, the theories of
transformational-generative grammar that Chomsky introduced nearly four decades ago.
Lately, however, Chomsky, has abandoned what he apparently views as the rococo
trappings of his earlier work in favor of a simplified, but still inchoate, linguistic inquiry,
dubbed the "Minimalist Program." See Margalit Fox, A Changed Noam Chomsky
Simplifies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1998, at B7. Lacking the principles of deep and surface
structure and the dynamic transformational device discussed in this Article, the new
"Program" carries no analogical weight for our present analysis. Its effort at extreme
concision also has alienated many linguists, some of whom claim to find it
incomprehensible. See id. at B9. For a useful sketch of Chomsky's new inquiry, see V.J.
COOK & MARK NEWSON, CHOMSKY'S UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR: AN INTRODUCTION
311-44 (2d ed. 1996).
49. The neglect of Chomskyan linguistics seems especially puzzling given recent
attempts to revive textualism as a method of statutory and constitutional interpretation.
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3,23-25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
(sketching a theory of textualism as an explicitly formalistic analysis). But cf. infra note 88
(discussing Laurence Tribe's hermeneutic view). This is not to say that Chomsky is
ignored in the legal literature. To the contrary, his notions of language are always
interesting to scholars who envisage a realm of neoteric endeavor that joins the insights of
law to those of the science of linguistics. See, e.g., Jim C. Chen, Law as a Species of
Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263, 1283-90 (1995) (comparing law students to
second-language learners, noting the strong reliance of legal thinkers on non-textual
terms, and arguing that the apparent division between legal rhetoric and legal reasoning
suggests that the law's underlying syntax observes the Chomskyan distinction between
surface structure and deep structure); Judith N. Levi, "What is Meaning in a Legal Text?"
A First Dialogue for Law and Linguistics, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 771, 775-83 (1995)
(discussing the formation of a lawyer/linguist collaboration to study the unconscious
values of language); M.B.W. Sinclair, Plugs, Holes, Filters, and Goals: An Analysis of
Legislative Attitudes, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 237, 240 (1996) (using Chomsky's syntactic
theory to defend the idea that in metaphors speakers generally modify "underlying
declaratives" in ways that make "complex sentences to suit our social purposes");
Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases,
1997 WIS. L. REv. 235, 257 (basing an argument in small part on Chomsky's distinction
between knowledge and use of language to explain why Justice Scalia's use of textualism
fails because of an inherent "inability to recognize the range of sensible interpretations
that come to light only after we have looked at context as an initial matter").
50. Some legal scholars, after all, have shown intense dislike for linguistics and the
ideas of Chomsky in particular. See, e.g., Francis J. Mootz III, Desperately Seeking
Science, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1009, 1009-18 (1995) (warning against the junction of law and
linguistics being degraded into an "intellectual colonization" whereby each discipline
merely attempts to gain value or importance through integration with the other, without
utilizing the other in any valid effort to increase its own self-conceptualization). See
generally Marc R. Poirier, On Whose Authority? Linguists' Claim of Expertise to Interpret
Statutes, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1025, 1035-37 (1995) (arguing that interpretive expertise
involves an explicit claim to a social position which is unwarranted for linguists attempting
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to identify some elemental principles of Chomsky's classical universal
grammar that can be used in the present analysis to give a more
textured reading of Article Ill of the United States Constitution.5' A
cross-pollination of law and classical Chomskyan linguistic theory is
not in the least strange. Both disciplines use the same fundamental
assumption, that the activity they explain is governed by identifiable
rules.5 2
Nevertheless, I will not stretch the analogy too far. I do not
purport to set out a universal theory of the juristic properties of world
constitutions, although such an enterprise would have some value in a
world that manufactures new states with some regularity.54 Nor do I
statutory interpretation because the use of language in law is far different from its relation
to "ordinary speakers"). George Fletcher has challenged semantic theory as a medium to
explain "law." In Fletcher's reasoning, both law and language are quintessentially social
facts, because both enable human beings to live and work in close consort. Fletcher
sunders the analogy at that point: "The theory of meaning cannot help us understand the
nature of the truth in law, for meaning and truth have little to do with each other."
George P. Fletcher, Law, Truth, and Interpretation: A Symposium on Dennis Patterson's
Law and Truth. What Law Is Like, 50 SMU L. REV. 1599, 1607 (1997); see also Peter W.
Schroth, Language and Law, 46 AM. J. ComP. L. 17,27-28 (1998) (discussing Chomskyan
linguistic theory and concluding that "scientific linguistics has very little assistance to offer
to statutory construction").
51. On Chomskyan linguistics, see NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF
SYNTAX (1965) (presenting a comprehensive theory of syntactic relations in language); see
also ADRIAN AKMAJIAN ET AL., LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE AND
COMMUNICATION 135 (4th ed. 1995) (applying Chomskyan theories of syntax); COOK &
NEWSON, supra note 48 (providing a comprehensive introduction to Chomskyan linguistic
theory); OsWALD DUCROT & TZvETAN TODOROV, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF
THE SCIENCES OF LANGUAGE 235 (Catherine Porter trans., 1983) (analyzing Chomskyan
ideas of deep and surface structure in language relations); VICTORIA FROMKIN &
ROBERT RODMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE 105-48 (6th ed. 1998) (examining
Chomskyan ideas to understand sentence patterns in language); RANDY ALLEN HARRIS,
THE LINGUISTICS WARS 35-73 (1993) (recounting the Chomskyan "revolution" in
linguistic analysis); GEORGE A. MILLER, THE SCIENCE OF WORDS 213-22 (1996)
(explaining the concept of syntactic rewriting as fundamental to structural linguistics).
52. See AKMAJIAN ET AL., supra note 51, at 6.
53. Perhaps the analogy cannot be stretched too far; linguistic rules, in the sense
preferred by modem linguistic science, are promoted as rules of description rather than
prescription. They express "generalizations" and "regularities" about the structure and
function of language, rather than establish norms for proper linguistic behavior. See id. at
7. Whether this distinction holds true seems open to question; linguistics routinely tests
the conventional grammaticality of utterances, an operation that is inescapably
prescriptive, even if no pretense of judgment is intended.
54. Comparative constitutional law may have been given new impetus by a few
members of the present Supreme Court. Justice O'Connor recently exhorted United
States judges to look "beyond American borders in our search for persuasive legal
reasoning." Sandra Day O'Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American Judges
and Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, 4 INT'L JUD. OBSERVER 2,2 (1997); see also
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (inviting the
majority to consider the relevant experience of the federal systems of Switzerland,
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wish to present an unduly formalist reading of the United States
Constitution s5 for that would weaken the premise of structural
resilience that is the interpretive lodestar of this Article.5 6 Rather,
from my first acquaintance with his work, I have considered
Chomsky's theory of knowledge to be a likely source for an elegant
theoretical solution to some aspects of the incompleteness of
exposition within the United States Constitution. Chomsky conceded
that his classical theory was, as others have described it, an
"implicational universal" because it derived virtually entirely from
the study of English.57 Similarly, I make no claim that the analysis
presented here is more than a rebuttable, but robust, projection of the
scope of the judicial power contemplated in Article III of the
Constitution. 8
B. A Summary of Chomsky's Transformational Grammar
To appreciate better the analogical richness of Chomskyan
linguistic theory, the reader may find a quick overview of Chomsky's
terminology helpful. According to Chomsky, speakers of a language
have internalized its grammatical rules. Chomsky labeled this
internalized knowledge the speaker's "competence, '59 in contrast to
the speaker's potentially infinite actual utterances, which he called
"performance."' 0 Because most speakers have learned their native
languages intuitively and are not trained in grammar, Chomsky
Germany, and the European Union). But see Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 n.11 (Scalia, J.)
(disagreeing with Justice Breyer's suggestion on the premise that comparative analysis is
"inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite
relevant to the task of writing one").
55. This Article has a neo-originalist focus, arranging the words and ideas of the
Framers' Constitution so that innovations in government can be accommodated, but with
due regard to underlying postulates of constitutional integrity. This Article, however,
seeks to avoid outcome-blind scholarship that pivots the entire meaning of a text on, for
example, the presence or absence of a comma in the Exceptions Clause in Article III, or
the caesura in the litany of "alls" in the Cases and Controversies Clause of the same
provision.
56. See infra note 186 (providing an overview of the structuralist values underlying
this Article's interpretive method).
57. COOK & NEWSON, supra note 48, at 29.
58. Cf. Fletcher, supra note 50, at 1604 (recognizing that Chomsky's universal
grammar provides "many seductive metaphors and analogies for other fields"). Fletcher's
tone is faintly disapproving, which I deduce from his footnoted citation to a LEXIS search
on the number of occurrences of the phrase "deep structure" in legal scholarship. See id.
at 1604 n.22 (reporting that a search in March 1997 revealed 247 usages of the phrase
"deep structure"). A search of this kind, however, actually reveals the paucity of
Chomsky's influence in constitutional scholarship.
59. CHOMSKY, supra note 51, at 4.
60. Id.
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conceptualized a universal theory of competence that sought to
explain a speaker's creative facility to produce new but
comprehensible language performance.6'
The terms "deep structure" and "surface structure," coined by
Chomsky,62 are the intellectual mainstays of this theory. The deep
structure is a fixed domain of archetypal phrase forms,63 such as the
simple declarative sentence "John likes Peter."64  The "surface
structure" is the actual uttered speech-the performance-that the
speaker presumably has derived from implicit knowledge of the
grammar (including deep structure). Chomskyan linguistics holds
that the speaker "maps" the deep structure to the surface structure by
means of dynamic operations that Chomsky called
"transformations." 65 For the passive transformation, for example,
Chomsky devised a series of instructions (resembling lines of
computer code) that convert deep structure sentences like "John likes
Peter" into the surface structure passive form "Peter is liked by
John. '66  In Chomskyan theory, the transformations generate (i.e.,
produce) surface structures through their specific recursive
operations on the deep structure phrasal forms.67 The words to be
inserted into these various structures are drawn from what Chomsky
61. Chomsky, who focused his theoretical lens on competence rather than
performance, see infra text accompanying note 75, assumed an "ideal speaker-listener, in a
completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly and is
unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations,
distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors... in applying his knowledge of the
language in actual performance." CHOMSKY, supra note 51, at 3.
62. CHOMSKY, supra note 51, at 16-17 (explaining the syntactic roles of deep and
surface structures).
63. See id. at 17 (describing these phrasal forms as "the elementary units" of the deep
structure).
64. The determination of which phrasal structures belong to the deep structure is a
complexity that need not be addressed here. It is clear, for example, that active sentences
are more likely to be deep structure phrases than passive sentences, because the number of
verbs that do not permit a passive form is, at least in English, a tiny subset of the number
of verbs that do. See JEAN AITCHISON, LINGUISTICS 115 (2d ed. 1978). Chomsky's
grammar prizes economy, and a grammar that puts passive sentences into the deep
structure could hardly expect to respect that ideal. See id. at 110, 115. In any event, the
elements of the deep structure are generally identified through empirical observation of
the language. See AKMAJIAN ET AL., supra note 51, at 162-63 (discussing how
"constitutent structures" are used to determine basic phrase types).
65. CHOMSKY, supra note 51, at 17.
66. See id. at 103-04, 128-31; AKMAJIAN ET AL., supra note 51, at 177. Note that, in
classical theory, the transformations should not change meaning. A separate deep
structure would therefore underlie the interrogative form "Does Peter like John?" See
HARRIS, supra note 51, at 83 (discussing the efforts of Chomsky and others to control
semantic changes potentially caused by transformations).
67. See CHOMSKY, supra note 51, at 135.
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called the "lexicon," or the list of the words in a language." The
lexicon includes specific information as to the part of speech each
word occupies (for example, whether it is a proper or common noun,
an animate or inanimate noun, and so forth).69
C. Theoretical Foundations of Chomskyan Grammar
The core insight of classical Chomskyan structural linguistics70 is
that the spoken utterances of language, however random they appear
to be, conform to predetermined rules. The recursiveness of these
underlying rules allows a speaker to invent and utter comprehensible
sentences that neither the speaker, nor anyone else, has ever before
heard or spoken.7' In this way, Chomsky identified a specific
principle of structure dependency in human language. According to
this principle, "knowledge of language relies on the structural
relationship in the sentence, rather than on the sequence of words."'72
68. See id. at 84. Chomsky described the words in more orotund language as "lexical
formatives." Id.
69. Chomsky developed passive transformations that would "rewrite" the deep
structure phrase form through a series of instructions involving substitutions, deletions,
and embeddings. See id. at 128-33. Thus, one of Chomsky's favorite sentence examples,
"Sincerity frightens the boy," has a deep structure that combines lexical items ("the boy"
and "sincerity") and grammatical category symbols (S for sentence, NP for noun phrase
("the boy"), and V for verb ("frightens")). Chomsky's passive transformation writes
instructions in the generalized form S -- ("rewrite S as") that substitute the first NP
("sincerity") with the second NP ("the boy"), and add an adverbial particle ("by") that
"passivizes" the active verb form "frightens" into the verb auxiliary form "is frightened."
At the surface structure, therefore, the generated sentence reads, "The boy is frightened
by sincerity." See id. at 65,103-04.
70. Chomsky's 1965 work, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, supra note 51, is generally
regarded as the classical exposition of his theory of transformational generative linguistics.
See HARRIS, supra note 51, at 89. Aspects was a synthesis and reconceptualization of
theoretical developments since his groundbreaking earlier work, Syntactic Structures
(1957), which is regarded as the inspirational source for all of modem generative grammar.
See HARRIS, supra note 51, at 81. Chomsky's structural insights were an absorbing
departure for linguistic science, which formerly aped Einsteinian physics by obsessively
slicing language into tinier and tinier particles of speech and meaning. See generally id. at
95 (viewing deep structure as a formalistic explanation of the "'intuitively appealing
notion that sentences have an underlying logical form that differs from the surface
arrangement of words' "(quoting Eric Wanner, Psychology and Linguistics in the Sixties, in
THE MAKING OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GEORGE A. MILLER 143,
147 (William Hirst ed., 1988))).
71. See COOK & NEWSON, supra note 48, at 24. The alternative, of course, would be
to attempt the incomprehensibly prodigious feat of memorizing all of the possible
sentences that one might need to describe any new event or thought, or to re-describe any
prior event or thought. See AKMAJIAN ET AL., supra note 51, at 135-36 (suggesting that it
would be impossible to understand an unmemorized sentence).
72. COOK & NEWSON, supra note 48, at 4.
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Particularly in English, which has a highly structured syntax, 3 simply
moving words around in a phrase or sentence will not produce correct
speech. For example, the rules for English passives and questions, or
for the subject-predicate form of English sentences, "are structure-
dependent, not based on the linear order of elements." 74
Competence, a speaker's internalized knowledge of these relational
rules of structure, is possibly a genetic facility that Chomsky thought
vastly more susceptible to formal description than the utterances of
individual speakers, their language performance. 75
Importantly, Chomsky's idea of grammar was not intended to
model how a speaker actually thinks about the creation of a linguistic
utterance. Indeed, speakers clearly do not assemble their linguistic
utterances with this level of cognition.76 In Chomsky's construct, the
grammar "can be regarded only as a characterization of the intrinsic
tacit knowledge or competence that underlies actual performance. '77
In other words, inherent structural knowledge must be the initiator of
as-yet unformed and unuttered language performance.78
Analogically, if there is implicit structural knowledge within the
Framers' Constitution, this structure may help to reveal the unformed
and unuttered idea of supranational adjudication to a generation two
hundred years removed from the original drafters.
Chomsky's theory of syntax assumes that at the base level, or
deep structure, the elements of structure remain fixed and finite.79
The study of transformations from this fixed base became the
signature of Chomsky's theory, giving it the characteristic of a
73. See MILLER, supra note 51, at 213.
74. COOK & NEWSON, supra note 48, at 9. As Chomsky himself recognized, it is not
at all clear whether the semantic component of language needs to be embedded in
syntactic analysis. See CHOMSKY, supra note 51, at 75-76 (attempting to incorporate some
rules of semantics into the syntactic component so that nonsensical sentences, such as "the
boy elapsed," can be rejected by the grammar); see also HARRIS, supra note 51, at 49
(explaining how syntax is itself an important contributor to semantic meaning, because
words by themselves are thin signifiers without a structural context).
75. See CHOMSKY, supra note 51, at 4. See generally AKMAJIAN ET AL., supra note
51, at 137 (analyzing competence as an "intuitive judgment" of "grammaticality").
76. See CHOMSKY, supra note 51, at 139 (describing as an absurdity the idea that a
system of generative rules could serve as a "point-by-point model for the actual
construction of a sentence by a speaker"). Thinking of a generative grammar in this way,
Chomsky argued, would be to take it as a model of performance, rather than of
competence, "thus totally misconceiving its nature." Id. at 140.
77. Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
78. See AKMAJIAN ET AL., supra note 51, at 6. Hence, a wonderful structural irony
exists in language-although it is governed by strict principles, "speakers nonetheless
control a system that is unbounded in scope, which is to say that there is no limit to the
kinds of things that can be talked about." Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
79. See CHOMSKY, supra note 51, at 17; COOK & NEWSON, supra note 48, at 27.
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dynamic "generative grammar. ' '8 The efficiency of this grammar is
that it can use common syntactic principles to characterize phrases
and sentences that might seem related but obviously.carry distinct,
and sometimes ambiguous, semantic loads-He likes people, People
like him, Does he like people?8' The transformational rules
themselves, which "map" the deep structure phrases to the surface
structure of language to allow actual multiple utterances
(performance), 82 are the product of the "interaction between the
[deep structure] principles and the lexicon." 83 These rules, in effect,
specify how the deep structure phrases are to be "rewritten" to
generate a potentially infinite surface structure of grammatically
conditioned performance. 84 When Chomsky described a "generative"
grammar, however, he did not mean literally a grammar that could
limitlessly generate words and phrases; he meant precisely that the
grammar is explicit and formal, so that the deductive process from
deep to surface structure is capable of reliable and replicable
description.'
D. Using Chomskyan Theory to Read Article III
From the sketch presented of Chomsky's deep/surface
dichotomy, I have derived three principles to apply in my exposition
of Article III. First, the principle of deep structure (or "competence,"
in Chomskyan terms) contends that the Constitution rests on
underlying structural principles, such as "constitutional integrity,"
80. CHOMSKY, supra note 51, at 4. As noted above, Chomsky postulated that the
deep structure comprised a set of underlying model phrase structures. See id. at 17; supra
note 63 and accompanying text.
81. Because I am adopting an analogical approach to some key concepts of
transformational grammar, I do not consider further the prevailing debate about the
ultimate generative power of Chomsky's original grammar.
82. See CHOMSKY, supra note 51, at 135,141. Grammatical functions and relations, as
we commonly understand them, are defined in the base phrases of the deep structure. See
id. at 136. Thus, as Chomsky summarized, "one major function of the transformation rules
is to convert an abstract deep structure that expresses the content of a sentence into a
fairly concrete surface structure that indicates its form." Id.
83. COOK & NEvSON, supra note 48, at 35. In Aspects of the Theory of Syntax,
Chomsky remodeled his generative theory to include specification of lexical information
(such as proper and animate nouns) in the deep structure. See CHOMSKY, supra note 51,
at 86-88,164-66.
84. See CHOMSKY, supra note 51, at 66. Chomsky, in his 1965 exposition, seemed to
treat the transformational operations themselves as part of the deep structure phrase
forms, rather than as an independent connection to the surface structure. See id. at 138-
39. Here, in the elaboration of the transformations, Chomskyan grammar is at its most
formal, and the analogical refraction of our present enterprise of constitutional analysis at
its most faint.
85. See COOK & NEwSON, supra note 48, at 36.
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that can be explicitly described and that are capable of recursive
application to changing circumstances. 6 Second, the principle of
surface structure (Chomsky's theory of "performance") is reflected in
the textual matter of the Constitution, itself a performance by the
original Framers that was controlled by the principles embedded in
the deep structure of their document. The constitutional text is but
one performance in a series of extended or enhanced performances
that are sanctioned by the deep structure and revealed through
iterated acts of interpretationY The third and final principle adopts
the popular (and, frankly, intuitive) meaning of the word
"generative" in place of Chomsky's non-intuitive usage, proposing
that the surface structure of the Constitution, in all of its
performances, has been generated, or produced, by a series of
transformational operations upon the deep structure.88  These
transformations initially derive from the "lexicon" of the Constitution
itself, comprising primarily its surface structure and its legacy of
judicial exegesis.89
III. THE DEEP STRUCTURE PRINCIPLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTEGRITY
A. Respecting the National Constitutional Order
Before beginning a close reading of Article III, it is important to
note the profound limiting directive that constrains the entire
86. The deep/surface dichotomy has reverberated in other fields of linguistics. In
some forms of generative semantics, for example, it has been thought that the multiplicity
of meanings of words can actually be reduced to a core conceptual set of primitive
meanings, from which all other more nuanced or complex meanings ultimately would be
generated. As Miller explained this process, for example, the word "move" would
function as a core concept for verbs of motion, "see" would serve as central to verbs of
visual perception, and so on. See MILLER, supra note 51, at 226-27. This kind of
componential analysis, however, has serious analytical limitations as a descriptive theory
of language. See id. at 227.
87. Unlike the universe of potential linguistic utterances, however, the Constitution's
performances have perceptible limits because the Constitution's universe of textual matter
is demonstrably finite.
88. There is a discernible deep structure resonance in Laurence Tribe's contribution
to Justice Scalia's recent Festschrift of commentaries on textualism. See Laurence H.
Tribe, Comment, in A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW, supra note 49, at 65. According to Tribe, the challenge of deciding which provisions
of the Constitution to regard as "generative of constitutional principles broader or deeper
than their specific terms might at first suggest, and then of deciding just what principles
such provisions, read alone or in combination with others, should be taken to enact, lies at
the core of the [constitutional] interpretive enterprise." Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
89. See infra page 301.
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interpretive task of my analysis. At its most abstract, this deep
structure principle requires that a supranational transfer of power
must respect the national constitutional order. This principle of
constitutional integrity is proposed here as the primordial principle,
or proto-principle, of deep structure in the United States
Constitution.9° Application of this principle is intended to ensure that
supranational adjudication, or any species of supranational
transmission of powers, cannot corrupt the vision of the constitutional
order adopted and perpetuated by "We the People." Thus, if the
national polity rejects a supranational transfer of judicial power, that
power surely cannot be exercised in defiance of the domestic
Constitution merely by resorting to one of international law's most
reflexive, yet suspect, canons: that international obligations remain
binding even if internal constitutional limitations or supervening
national law prevent them from being given effect domestically.91
Ironically and inescapably, therefore, the legitimacy of a
supranational transfer of power ultimately depends on reception of
the specific exercises of that power into the domestic order.9 Some
academic opinion in the United States, for example, seems alarmed
90. Assigning primacy to one principle of deep structure might not seem, at first
glance, analogically consistent with the work of Chomsky. Chomsky, however, did not
doubt that some universality connected languages in their deep structure, countering the
great diversity apparent in their surface structures. See CHOMSKY, supra note 51, at 117-
18. In the search for universality among languages, therefore, it might be plausible to
propose some "deepest" component of the deep structure. The concept of the deepest
component of the deep structure gives coherence to the very idea of a language qua
language or to the ontological integrity of a language.
91. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, § 115 cmt. b (setting forth the
doctrine of continuity of international legal obligation). Indeed, to concede that the
United States can be bound outside its borders but not within them is to sanctify
international law as a kind of mystic Lberrecht in the sense condemned by Justice Holmes
in The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432 (1922) (stating that maritime law "derives its
whole and only power in this country from its having been accepted and adopted by the
United States" because the sovereign power has "take[n] up a rule suggested from without
and ma[de] it part of its own rules"). Rejection of the continuity doctrine, however, does
not imply rejection of supranational transfers of sovereign authority, provided that such
transfers operate consistently with domestic constitutional law.
92. The constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, see hifra text accompanying
note 103, includes what appears to be a prototypical rule of constitutional integrity:
"Legislation is subject to the constitutional order; the executive and the judiciary are
bound by the law. All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seeking to abolish
this constitutional order, should no other remedy be possible." GRUNDGESETZ
[Constitution] [GG] art. 20 (F.R.G.) (paragraph numbers omitted). The principle, thus
stated, seems broad enough to legitimate the restrictive view of supranational transfer of
powers that the German Federal Constitutional Court gladly embraced in its opinion on
the European Union's proposed treaty of union in 1992. See infra text accompanying note
103 (showing that the court preferred to rely on other, less apocalyptic constitutional
provisions as a basis for its opinion).
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by an expected confrontation between the United States Constitution
and a globalizing economic system.93 As one commentator has asked,
"has the movement toward the [Rule of Law in international trade]
proceeded at the expense of U.S. constitutional integrity? '94  The
germane constitutional inquiry, however, is not whether
supranational institutions can bind states and enforce obligations-
the old preoccupation with the "bindingness" of international law95-
but whether it is constitutionally permissible in the first place for the
state to bind itself and to accept the consequences of self-limitation."
If a national constitution so permits, explicitly or because
supranationalism does not disturb or destroy the structural integrity
of that constitution, the binding force of supranational law is arguably
no more mysterious than the binding force of a domestic statute; what
changes is that there is a new, constitutional source of legal authority
that, within its proper sphere, is not capable of being trumped by the
edicts of existing constitutional organs.97
93. See, e.g., Demetrios G. Metropoulos, Constitutional Dimensions of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 141, 169-71 (1994) (warning that
the "constitutional implications" of transnational trade law have not been properly
considered).
94. Yong K. Kim, The Beginnings of the Rule of Law in the International Trade System
Despite U.S. Constitutional Constraints, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 967, 970 (1996); see also
Metropoulos, supra note 93, at 142 (noting that the "hard choices" presented by the
conflict between domestic constitutions and the world trade system); Matthew Schaefer,
National Review of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: In the Name of Sovereignty or
Enhanced WTO Rule Compliance, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 307, 322 (1996)
(speculating "that international trade rules can serve constitutional functions," provided
that private parties have access to the global dispute settlement system).
95. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV.
181, 184-86 (1996) (offering a legal realist appreciation of the "normativity" that creates
positive international law).
96. See Patrick Tangney, The New Internationalism: The Cession of Sovereign
Competences to Supranational Organizations and Constitutional Change in the U.S. and
Germany, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 395, 399 (1996).
97. But cf. infra text accompanying note 98 (stating the European view that formal
constitutional amendment is a prerequisite to any supranational exercise of power). Bruce
Ackerman, in a recent article, tries to upset a certain academic conventional wisdom that
has looked only to the European Union for insights on supranationalism. See Bruce
Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771,775-76 (1997) (using
a narrative of the early American constitutional republic to describe "a group of states
[that] delegate[d] a set of functions to an embryonic center by means of a treaty. But this
'treaty' turn[ed] out to be different from most, ... [because it became] increasingly
difficult to evade the commands of the emergent center," especially as courts accepted the
primacy of the treaty over later inconsistent laws enacted by individual states). While
Ackerman's interpretation of United States history between the Revolution and the Civil
War is instructive, the European Union remains the more remarkable exemplar because it
has achieved authentic interstate supranationalism without the benefit of an express
supremacy clause in its founding treaties. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION COMMUNITY LAW 192 (1993).
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B. A Comparative Example: The Principle of Democracy in
Germany's Constitution
How do constitutions permit supranational law to trump the laws
of a domestic legislature? European jurists have argued that courts
cannot merely reinterpret existing constitutions to legitimize the
transmission of governmental powers to supranational agencies. 8 As
a political matter, therefore, European governments felt the need to
sponsor constitutional amendments to explicitly authorize the
transfer of power to the European Union institutions.99 But, even the
adoption of an explicit constitutional amendment does not necessarily
mean that the principle of constitutional integrity has been respected.
In this Section, I will consider how the German Federal
Constitutional Court narrowed Germany's constitutional license to
accept supranational adjudication in order to preserve Germany's
parliamentary system from being completely corrupted by the
supranational European Union. I will explain that the German
experience is valuable to the present discussion because it focuses
attention on the need to shape a specific principle of constitutional
integrity for each national constitutional circumstance. In the
American experience, considered in Section C, the ruling intellectual
seduction of the Constitution has been its susceptibility to competing,
and even complementary, schools of interpretation. 100 Accordingly,
the absence of any explicit constitutional sanction for supranational
authority in the United States Constitution requires an especially
careful appraisal of the scope and content of the principle of
constitutional integrity.
In a 1993 opinion, the German Federal Constitutional Court
98. See generally Brewer-Carias, supra note 15, at 2 (concluding, after a survey of the
constitutions of the European Union member states, that the current status of the
European Union could not have been achieved if the member states' constitutions had not
included explicit provisions limiting the powers of state bodies in favor of the European
Union supranational institutions, as well as clauses granting supremacy to European
Union law).
99. See id. at 15.
100. For a more detailed examination of this proposition, see Brian F. Havel, Forensic
Constitutional Interpretation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2000)
(constructing an eclectic model of constitutional analysis). Louis Henkin, rejecting as
"uncongenial" the use of the United States Constitution's complex amendment process to
resolve issues of supranationalism, urged legal creativity to bring innovative governmental
arrangements within a "dynamic, flexible, hospitable Constitution." HENKIN, supra note
2, at 273. This Article responds to Henkin's challenge, but articulates also a theory of
limitation, the principle of constitutional integrity, to set bounds to the hermeneutic
exercise. There is a point beyond which the interpreter's art will corrupt the basic
character of the national government and the amendment process (if not a new
constitutional writing) must be triggered.
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offered a rare and compelling insight into how a national supreme
court manages the boundaries of legitimate supranational incursion. 10 1
The court delivered a densely plotted opinion on the legality under
German federal constitutional law of the supranational transfer of
some German governmental powers under the Treaty on European
Union, popularly known as the Maastricht Treaty."~ The
complainants included academics, members of the German Federal
Parliament, and members of the European Parliament representing
the German "Green" party. They alleged inter alia that Germany's
accession to the Maastricht Treaty, by transferring additional
decisional authority from the domestic constitutional order to
undemocratic European Union institutions, would undermine their
constitutional rights to democratically legitimate representation in the
Federal Parliament and to participate in the exercise of Germany's
state power.
The opinion performed a kind of recombinant genetic operation,
resembling the deep structure exploration in this Article, to splice and
rebuild three provisions of the German federal constitution (the Basic
Law) into a holistic "principle of democracy" that limits dilution in
the value of each individual citizen's right to vote. The provisions
that the court manipulated were the right of suffrage in parliamentary
elections, the declaration that the Federal Republic of Germany is a
democratic state in which all state authority emanates from the
people through their right to vote, and the inviolability of these basic
principles even by constitutional amendment. From these provisions,
the court constructed the judicial coda that transformed the simple
right to vote, in its "fundamental democratic content,"103 into the right
of any German citizen "to participate in the election of the German
Federal Parliament, and thereby to cooperate in the legitimation of
101. See Decision Concerning the Maastricht Treaty, Brunner v. European Union
Treaty, 89 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] [Federal
Constitutional Court], 155 (1993), translated in 33 I.L.M. 388, 395 (1994); see also Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing to the German
federal experience as a possible source of comparative juristic enlightenment for the
United States Supreme Court); Ackerman, supra note 97, at 772-73 (criticizing the
"emphatic provincialism" of American judges, who typically "would not think of learning
from an opinion by the German or French constitutional court"); supra note 54 (discussing
Justice Breyer's dissent in Printz and Justice Scalia's response).
102. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7,1992,1992 O.J. (C
224) 1, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992). See generally J.H.H. Weiler & Ulrich R. Haltern,
The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order- Through the Looking Glass, 37 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 411, 429 (1996) (concerning the constitutional ontology of the European
Union).
103. Decision Concerning the Maastricht Treaty, 33 I.L.M. at 409.
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State power by the people at a federal level, and to influence the
implementation thereof."'' 4
In this juristic setting, the "principle of democracy"'10 5 required
that a transfer of any powers of the Federal Parliament to one of the
governmental institutions of the European Union must respect the
"minimum inalienable requirements of democratic legitimation."'"
The court insisted on this interpretation even though the German
constitution, unlike its United States counterpart, explicitly provides
that "[t]he Federation may, by legislation, transfer sovereign powers
to international institutions. ''" °" Thus, when the European Union
exercises sovereign powers that properly have been assigned by the
German parliament through "a sufficiently precise specification of the
assigned rights to be exercised by the [European Union] and of the
proposed program of integration," the value of the citizen's vote has
not been diluted because "the legitimation and influence which
derives from the people will be preserved."'' 8 On the other hand, if
too many functions and powers were placed in the hands of the
European Union institutions, the present embryonic stage of their
democratic development would present a serious constitutional
obstacle. Democracy within the individual member states would be
so enervated that the national parliaments would be constitutionally
unable to transfer any "legitimation" of the sovereign power
purportedly exercised by the European Union institutions.
10 9
The German court's opinion was a remarkable judicial rebuke to
proponents of the idea that the European Union already had evolved
into a self-powered engine for expanding supranational integration.
The court expected that further integration within the Union would
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 417. The phrase "principle of democracy" does not appear anywhere in the
German constitution. In that sense, the German court manifested itself as a true exponent
of the deep structure theory presented in this Article.
106. Id. at 410.
107. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 24 (F.R.G.) (emphasis added). The
court, however, omitted any discussion of the implications of this provision. See Brewer-
Carias, supra note 15, at 75-76.
108. Decision Concerning the Maastricht Treaty, 33 I.L.M. at 419, 422.
109. Id. at 421. The principle of democracy also would require that local parliaments
retain their own areas of significant responsibility to give legal recognition to matters
concerning the spiritual, social, and political life of the local citizenry on a relatively
homogenous basis. See id. This principle of "subsidiarity," which expects that certain
responsibilities will be (and, in the German court's view, must be) discharged at the local
level by locally franchised parliaments, is one of the fundamental principles of the modern
European Union. See generally MARGOT HORSPOOL, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 93-95
(Nicola Padfield ed., 1998) (explaining the origin and evolution of the principle of
subsidiarity in European Union jurisprudence).
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have to comply with the principle of democracy as a superintending
rule of constitutional integrity. This principle would require that any
enhancement of supranational powers occur in an organic sequence
stemming from the simple exercise of the franchise by each German
citizen in a parliamentary election. 10
C. The Principle of Constitutional Integrity in the American
Constitutional Order
The democracy principle, at least as the German Federal
Constitutional Court sought to articulate it, is unlikely to transfer
cleanly to the American experience. One telling example will suffice
to demonstrate the difference. In the American conception of
government, the very fact that federal judges are not subject to
periodic election and are therefore truly the "remote choice" of the
people"' has been an acknowledged mark of their legitimacy.1 2 The
jurisprudential curiosity of the American system, in fact, is that it
relies on a theory of fragmented governmental powers, rather than on
an undiluted (and overly metaphysical) progression from the polling
booth to the presidential signature, to assure United States citizens
that theirs is a government of laws. Given the so-called democratic
deficit in the European Union,"3 it is hardly surprising that a local
110. See Decision Concerning the Maastricht Treaty, 33 I.L.M. at 421-22.
111. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 255 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
112. See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
312,317 (1997) (reflecting on the paradox that it is "precisely the nondemocratic nature of
[U.S. federal] courts that is assumed to provide their legitimacy"). There are deep
skeptics, however. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 52-54 (opposing the appointive
system as an antidemocratic process of constitutional amendment); see also Gordon S.
Wood, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW, supra note 49, at 53 (describing as propaganda the idea of convincing people that
judges appointed for life are an integral and independent part of America's democratic
government, equal in status and authority to popularly elected executives and
legislatures).
113. The German federal court's unflinching emphasis on democracy must be
understood more narrowly as a function of the particular evolutionary state of the
European Union institutions. The court probably feared that an executive-dominated
European Union could not reliably claim legitimacy through the actions of the national
parliaments, partly because of the European Union Parliament's lack of any power of
legislative initiative. See BUTTERWORTH'S EXPERT GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN UNION
92-93 (Jirg Monar et al. eds., 1996). On the presence of a so-called democratic deficit,
focused primarily on the European Union's byzantine and non-transparent legislative
process, see Dennis J. Edwards, Fearing Federalism's Failure: Subsidiarity in the European
Union, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 537, 575 (1996). The persistence of the deficit explains the
court's understandable resort to the (by now probably quixotic) proposition that
Germany's membership of the Union could be terminated simply "by means of an
appropriate act being passed." Decision Concerning the Maastricht Treaty, 33 I.L.M. at
425; see also Tangney, supra note 96, at 423 (arguing that an "executive-dominated"
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constitutional court would educe the idea of a democracy principle in
hopes of deterring new transfers of broadly drawn substantive power.
In contrast, the United States Constitution is sophisticated enough to
offer democratic protection in a "top-down" rather than "bottom-up"
configuration. In the American constitutional order, the constant
democratic value of each citizen's vote derives not primarily from the
act of voting itself, but from the constitutional guarantee that the
elected political bodies must compete with one another for power and
influence in a system of divided government." 4 Confronting the
democratic shortcomings of a weak European Union Parliament and
an unelected executive Commission,"' the German court sought to
make the abstraction of a democracy principle serve as a conceptual
simulacrum for the more subtle and flexible operations of the
American separation of powers.
Moreover, the United States judiciary, when called upon to
scrutinize the work of its political compeers, has been careful to weigh
the importance of innovation and even anomaly"6 and to read clauses
of the Constitution, and even entire articles, within their proper
context."7  This utilitarian approach might be described as
European Union could not meet the German court's requirement for democratic
legitimacy). But cf. Weiler & Haltern, supra note 102, at 422 (asking, in light of the
overwhelming practice of the European Union for 40 years, "if the Community order is
treated as constitutional who cares what it 'really' is?").
114. These ideas were especially vivid in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), in which the Supreme Court upheld a
constitutional challenge to the so-called Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692 (Supp.
III 1997). In Justice Kennedy's analysis, the Framers used the principles of separation of
powers and federalism precisely as a means to secure fundamental political liberty and not
merely with the mundane purpose of protecting the citizenry from intrusive governmental
acts. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 450 (Kennedy, J., concurring). "The idea and the promise"
were that the popular delegation of some measure of power to a distant centralized
authority meant that one branch of government must not hold the power to influence
citizens' destiny without a countervailing check by the competing branches. Id. at 450
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Separation of powers, in other words, "operates on a vertical
axis as well, between each branch [of the federal government] and the citizens in whose
interest powers must be exercised." Id. at 452 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
115. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing the European Union's so-
called democratic deficit).
116. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1989) (accepting that even
"peculiar institutions within the framework of our Government," such as a judicial
sentencing commission including federal judges that is not a court and does not exercise
judicial power, need not necessarily violate the principle of separation of powers). After
all, the present field of study is the Constitution, in which interpretive inquiry by the
courts is "always open." Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 592 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); see also Clinton, 524 U.S. at 472 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (calling "attention to
the genius of the Framers' pragmatic vision, which this Court has long recognized in cases
that find constitutional room for necessary institutional innovation").
117. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,
2000]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Hamiltonian in deference to Alexander Hamilton's careful distinction
between the diffuse objects of governmental authority (the very fear
expressed by the German federal court) and the structural
mechanisms by which the government exercises that authority. In
The Federalist Papers, Hamilton reasoned that a government ought to
contain in itself "every power requisite to the full accomplishment of
the objects committed to its care, and to the complete execution of
the trusts for which it is responsible, free from every other control but
a regard to the public good and to the sense of the people."118 But if
the government enjoys such ecumenical flexibility in the range of the
legislative and executive powers it needs to achieve its objects, then
what guards against what Hamilton called "the danger of
usurpation"?119
In reply to this question, Hamilton would argue that all
observations founded upon the danger of usurpation "ought to be
referred to the composition and structure of the government, not to
the nature or extent of its powers."2 0 Indeed, Hamilton's emphasis
on the structure of government is the centripetal motor of integrity in
the United States Constitution.
The preservation of constitutional integrity in this American
understanding, and in the context of this Article, has two mutually
reinforcing dimensions. First, the system requires that the special
character of the United States government, a working mechanism of
divided and interacting powers, must not be compromised or
J., concurring in the judgment and opinion). See generally WOODROW WILSON,
CONSTITTIoNAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56-57 (paperback ed. 1961)
(warning against treating the Framers' work as though it were a kind of Newtonian
machine-a miracle of legal science that could turn politics into mechanics in just a few
paragraphs of numinous prose).
118. THE FEDERALIST NO. 31, at 217-18 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987). Administrative law theory would say that Hamilton was expounding a "wide" view
of the government's powers, in that the existence of a legislative goal or object implies the
existence of a power necessary to accomplish it. See generally CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EUROPEAN UNION COMMUNrrY LAW, supra note 97, at 31 (discussing a wide view of
implied powers in European Union administrative law). In this sense, the word "power"
carries a double signification-evident in Hamilton's essays-that references both the
object of governmental action and the authority used (for example, a law or treaty) to
accomplish the object.
119. THE FEDERALIST NO. 31, supra note 118, at 219.
120. Id. at 219; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 290 (James Madison) (Isaac
Kramnick ed., 1987) (indicating Madison's support for a theory of wide powers, see supra
note 118, by his assertion that "wherever the end is required, the means are authorized,"
and that "wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power
necessary for doing it is included").
121. See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); see also Barbara Bucholtz, Sawing
off the Third Branch- Precluding Judicial Review of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
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defeated by congressional acquiescence in new forms of supranational
administration.' Second, the Constitution must raise an articulable,
specific objection to the proposed exercise of the power.1" In the
vivid metaphor of Justice Holmes, the actions of government are not
to be inhibited "by some invisible radiation from the general terms"
of any constitutional provision.U Neither the power to create
supranational tribunals nor the objective of using these tribunals to
advance foreign commerce is in tenns denied by the Constitution.
125
As I move to an argument that supranational tribunals would not
infringe upon, but rather would share in the exercise of, the judicial
power of the United States Constitution, this tempered understanding
of the principle of constitutional integrity will be manifest.
Duty Assessments Under Free Trade Agreements, 19 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 175, 200
(1995) (concluding from a review of cases that agreements between the United States and
other nations must respect the United States's constitutional order). For a new essay on
the American constitutional tradition, see Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in
CONSTrrTUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 16, 21 (Larry Alexander ed.,
1998) (noting that the structural division of powers in the United States Constitution both
enhances and circumscribes public discussion and action, complementing the more direct
limitations of power contained in "bills and declarations of rights").
122. I will investigate the content of this limiting principle infra in Part V. See Clinton
v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (insisting that,
despite arguments that the political branches have a "somewhat free hand" to reallocate
their authority, the Constitution's structure nonetheless "requires a stability which
transcends the convenience of the moment").
123. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). Though aspects of Justice
Holmes's reasoning in Holland have been questioned implicitly, see, e.g., Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 18, 26 (1957), his opinion offered two benchmark tests that are helpful in
framing the substantive reach of any governmental power: first, the pragmatic test of
experience (i.e., does the proposed legislation respond to some public need that has arisen
and that requires the action of government?); and second, the test of textual fidelity (i.e.,
does the legislation contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution?).
See Holland, 252 U.S. at 432-33. Constitutional scholars see these questions as reflecting
the venerable interpretive doctrine of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421
(1819) ("Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.").
As we have seen, both Alexander Hamilton and James Madison subscribed to this theory
of a wide assignment of powers to meet the Constitution's stated objects. See supra notes
118-20 and accompanying text.
124. Holland, 252 U.S. at 434.
125. Were Chief Justice Marshall applying himself to the challenge of supranational
adjudication, he might very well content himself with his minimalist premise, expressed in
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 408, that the words of the Constitution do not
imperiously proscribe it.
2000] 289
290 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78
IV. ARTICLE III AS THE TEST-SITE FOR AN IDEA OF
SUPRANATIONAL ADJUDICATION
A. Overview: The Performances of Article III
Here, at the analytical center of this endeavor, we turn to the site
of the judicial power in the United States Constitution, Article MII.126
If the concept of supranational tribunals can be incorporated into the
Framers' statement of the judicial power in Article III, an argument
for application of supranationalism to transfers of legislative and
executive power may have an improved chance of suasion. 127 This is
because, in the past, Article III has not been typically considered as
one of the "foreign" provisions of the United States Constitution.
Thus, it is not so obviously subject to ideological capture by global
law enthusiasts as, for example, the Foreign Commerce Clause or the
treaty power.12
A central premise of the present discussion is that the structure
of the United States Constitution exhibits at least an analogical
126. Article III states, in relevant part:
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive
for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.
Section 2. [1] The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction; - to Controversies to which the United States shall
be a Party; - to Controversies between two or more States ....
[2] In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2.
127. See supra note 7 (discussing the question of transfer of legislative and executive
powers to supranational institutions).
128. Moreover, the enumeration of judicial business in Article III-specifically, the
cases that "arise under" the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States-defines
a scope of power that is arguably coterminous with the vast potential reach of the
legislative power in Article I, including its multiplier feature, the Necessary and Proper
Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 18 (granting Congress the power "[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper" for carrying into effect the enumerated powers in
Article I); see also infra note 174 (discussing judicial support for coextensiveness of judicial
and legislative powers under the U.S. Constitution). A successful transmission of judicial
power to a supranational court, therefore, could be a template for the assignment of the
coterminous legislative powers to supranational agencies.
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similarity to the structure-dependency of human language presented
in Chomskyan grammar theory.1 29 As we have seen, Chomsky
expected multiple performances to be derived from the deep
structure of language.130 Using that model as a foundation for my
analogy, I intend to treat the surface features of the Constitution as a
performance that may, through repeated acts of interpretation,
potentially generate enhancements of a kind that the Framers might
have anticipated. That insight, further explored here, offers a
persuasive explanation of why supranational transfers of judicial
power-although not explicitly "seen" by the Framers-can be said
to have been "foreseen" by them in the deep structure principles by
which they organized the grant of the judicial power under Article III.
B. The Surface Structure of Article III: Status, Organization, and
Open- Textured Process
Chomsky arranged his theory to give primacy to deep structure,
but the act of deriving a deep structure begins with the surface
structure, linguistic performance, and examples of uttered speech.
Likewise, no description of the deep structure of the United States
Constitution can begin without explicit attention to its surface
features, in this instance the complex textual matter of Article III 1
In this Section, I examine the implications of how Article III
organizes the judicial branch. I begin with a discussion of the
protected professional status of judges appointed under Article III,
reflecting in the surface structure the deep structure principle of
judicial independence. Next, I contrast this professional security with
the broad power that Article III apparently gives Congress to shape
the federal court system and even to limit the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. Finally, I discuss how Article III, unlike the
provisions that establish the legislative and executive powers, fails to
specify the procedural nature of judicial "process" under the
Constitution. This open texture, combined with Congress's power to
distribute federal jurisdiction, provides an opportunity to enlarge the
potential sources of judicial authority under the Constitution. A
limiting condition, it would appear, must be to ensure that these novel
sources do not compromise the deep structure principle of judicial
independence.
129. See supra Part II. The analogy is made with Chomsky's theory, not with the
structure of human language itself.
130. See supra text accompanying note 59-60 (discussing Chomsky's competence/
performance dichotomy).
131. For the relevant text of Article III, see supra note 126.
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1. The Incidents of Judicial Independence
Article III, Section 1, organizes the judicial department. 32
Drawing from the Preamble's object to "establish Justice," 133 it
appears to vest the puissance de juger,"T the judicial power "of the
United States," in a thinly taxonomized system comprised of "one
supreme Court" and "such inferior courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.1 35 Although Article III does not
directly vest the judges of these courts with the federal judicial power,
the Constitution carries an explicit guarantee that judges appointed to
serve in Article III courts will have lifetime tenure and undiminished
compensation. 36 Thus, Article III focuses on both the professional
security of individual judges and the establishment of a system of
federal courts having original or appellate jurisdiction. The surface
feature of secure professional status can be mapped from a deep
structure constitutional principle-the independence of the
judiciary' 37-that appears to be distinct from the details of how the
judicial system is organized.138 The federal judiciary has described
132. See Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307,313 (1810).
133. U.S. CONST. preamble; see also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 465
(1793) (noting that the preambular formula points in a "particular manner" to "the
Judicial authority").
134. The phrase is from Montesquieu, who was "the Framers' idol." Steven G.
Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1155, 1197 (1992); see MONTESQUIEU, DE L'ESPRIT DES
LoiS, Livre XI, ch. VI (1748), reprinted in 4 OEUVRES COMPLtTES DE MONTESQUIEU 7
(tdouard Laboulaye, ed., Kraus Reprint 1972) (1877).
135. U.S. CONST. art. lI, § 1. See generally Durousseau, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 313
(suggesting that the judicial power of the United States vests in the Supreme Court and in
the discretionary inferior courts).
136. Article III, Section 1 provides that "The Judges... shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 1.
137. See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 533 (1933) (holding that the
tenure and salary privileges are awarded "not as a private grant, but as a limitation
imposed in the public interest"). The constitutional guarantee of tenure and salary is
critical to the Framers' notion of an independent judiciary. In fact, it would take a
constitutional amendment to supply judges appointed other than in accordance with
Article Ill with the tenure and salary privileges that Article III grants. See Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 593-94 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Without the Constitution,
Congress is free to revoke mere legislative grants of privileges. The guarantee of
undiminished salary allows Congress to keep judicial salaries punitively low-or to freeze
them in perpetuity-even at the risk of violating a deep structure principle. The
Constitution does not (and probably could not) hold in check all imaginable malversations
of the political branches. By the same token, presidential refusal to make judicial
appointments or Senate recalcitrance to ratify them could in equal measure emasculate
the federal bench.
138. As John Harrison has noted, the principle of judicial independence is more
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itself as the recognized medium for putting the "parchment
stipulations" of the Constitution into effect,139 with the tenure/salary
covenant as the mark of its independence. 40 In Chomskyan terms,
the Framers' constitutional value is not the surface feature that gives
judges appointed under Article III life tenure and unreduced salaries,
but rather the deep structure directive that they must be
independent.'
4'
2. Congressional Control of the Judicial System
The structure of Article III rests on two potentially contradictory
ideas: the insulated professional security of judges occurs within a
judicial system that is largely shaped by the will of Congress. 42 The
abstract than the protected tenure that actually appears in the Constitution. See John
Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text
of Article III, 64 U. CH. L. REV. 203, 253 (1997). Judicial independence also would be
consistent with requiring a simple majority vote in the Senate for impeachment or a three-
quarters majority, rather than two-thirds. See id. To say that there should be judicial
independence, in other words, is not to establish a quantum of independence. See id.
Harrison's theory of design assumes a Chomskyan conceptual recession toward higher
levels of abstraction, so that the principle of judicial independence would be traced
ultimately to a "fundamental meta-principle (a principle about the implementation of
principles)" holding in the starkest terms that "power is dangerous." Id. at 255. An
intermediate principle, one could suggest, would be the preambular object to "establish
Justice." U.S. CONST. preamble. The meta-principle that power is dangerous also yields
other constitutional ideas, such as the fixed terms of the President and members of
Congress. See Harrison, supra, at 255.
139. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,389 (1821).
140. In a system where many state judges are dependent on the will of the legislature
for office and salary, the Constitution's attachment to the principle of an independent
judiciary is all the more conspicuous. See id. at 387.
141. See generally Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and
Purposes, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 566 (1996) (attempting to define the content of the
principle of judicial independence and to explain its existence). As we will later explore,
see infra text accompanying note 343, the principle of independence may be viewed as part
of the doctrine of separation of powers and, therefore, as a component of the principle of
constitutional integrity.
142. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1868) (discussing the plenary
power of Congress); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (discussing the
plenary power of Congress and how courts created by statute only have the jurisdiction
that the statute confers). See generally Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362
(1953) (presenting a simulated Socratic dialogue on the broad scope of congressional
power to curb federal appellate jurisdiction, especially with respect to the Supreme
Court). While no record exists concerning the level of support for the general principle of
congressional control over the judiciary in two months of Constitutional Convention
debates, see Clinton, supra note 15, at 769, the textual "performance" of the Framers'
thoughts on the judiciary does award Congress at least two crucial channels of
discretionary control-to establish inferior federal courts and to shape the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction.
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surface, or text, of Article III expresses an effort to shield the
judiciary from the crassest of political influences (threats to income
and job security), but to permit congressional domination of the
organization and jurisdiction of the system of courts. Martin
Redish has observed that this structural dissonance is consistent with
the pragmatic balances of the Constitution but yields significant
doctrinal and theoretical uncertainty.'"
Article III's direct vesting of judicial power is remarkably
parsimonious, naming only a unitary Supreme Court. Indirectly, the
judicial power vests also in an undifferentiated subset of lesser courts
that Congress may, but manifestly need not, create. 45  This
incomplete vesting of authority betrays the mark of political
compromise, rather than a thoughtful theory of how to organize and
distribute judicial power. 46 Exiguous detail is also evident from the
143. The federal judiciary has recognized the contingency of its present structure. See,
e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMM. ON LONG RANGE
PLANNING, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 10 (1994)
[hereinafter JUDICIAL PLAN] (sustaining core values such as judicial independence, but
acknowledging that "specific elements of jurisdiction, structure, governance, and function
are not sacrosanct," and that adaptation to new conditions reflects a healthy institutional
character).
144. See Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political
Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 697 (1995).
145. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 550 (1962); see also Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997) (noting that the Framers made creation of lower federal
courts optional for Congress, "even though it was obvious that the Supreme Court alone
could not hear all federal cases throughout the United States").
146. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 (1973); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319
U.S. 182, 187 (1943); see also Glidden, 370 U.S. at 551 (noting the compromise nature of
Article III, Section 1). The wording smacks of compromise, although practical concerns
were also at play. See infra note 188 and accompanying text. The compromise suggests a
faction yielding on a supreme federal court only if the federal system as a whole remained
contingent on what the legislature might wish to do. Indeed, compromise was very much
in the air when the Framers discussed the judicial power. The antifederalist New Jersey
Plan, for example, contemplated a supreme court and no inferior federal courts, leaving
the state courts as the default system of inferior courts. See Clinton, supra note 15, at 760,
766; see also 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 517 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1896) [hereinafter
STATE CONVENTION DEBATES] (noting an expectation at the Virginia Convention debate
that Congress would appoint the state courts to have inferior federal jurisdiction for
reasons of general satisfaction and economy). James Madison's historic compromise
proposal, adopted into the Constitution, foreclosed the certainty that the state courts
would be the main engine for enforcement of federal law (perhaps even with an
independent right to determine the right of appeal to the supreme national court). See
Clinton, supra note 15, at 763. In presenting his proposal, Madison explicitly noted the
distinction between establishing the inferior federal courts absolutely and giving Congress
the discretion to create or not to create them. See id. In sum, Madison hoped to ensure
that, at least as a last resort, federal law would be ultimately supreme, even if (without a
national system of inferior federal courts) it could not be guaranteed to be uniform. See
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first clause of Article HI, Section 2, the Extending Clause, which
synopsizes nine categories of cases and controversies 14 7 to which "the
judicial Power shall extend.""48 Ranked first among those categories
id. at 753-54. But, compare Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), in
which Justice Story concluded that Congress had to establish inferior courts because
otherwise what he regarded as Article III's mandatory enumeration of cases and
controversies could not completely vest in a federal court. See id. at 330-33. The Supreme
Court, in Justice Story's reading, could enjoy only a narrow original jurisdiction, and state
courts might lack jurisdiction over one or more of the enumerated cases and controversies.
In those circumstances, the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court could not reach
those cases, and the injunction of the Constitution (as Justice Story interpreted it) that the
judicial power" 'shall be vested' "would be disobeyed unless lower federal courts existed
to hear the cases. Id. at 330 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1). Justice Story's view that
the whole judicial power of the United States should, at all times, be vested either in an
original or appellate form in some courts created under Article III did not survive as
Supreme Court doctrine. See infra note 195 (discussing later cases). But cf. Eisentrager v.
Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 967-68 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (holding a complete preclusion of
jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings to be unconstitutional where the Supreme Court
had no original jurisdiction, Congress had not awarded jurisdiction to any inferior federal
court with respect to prisoners held by U.S. military authorities overseas, and the Supreme
Court earlier had ruled that state courts cannot grant habeas to federal prisoners).
147. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Julian Velasco has advocated what Akhil Amar, his
former teacher, would regard as the apostatical view that there is measurable daylight
between the words "cases" and "controversies." See Julian Velasco, Congressional
Control over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Traditional View, 46 CATH. U.
L. REV. 671, 690-709 (1997). John Harrison, focusing on historic meaning and the fact
that the word "all" precedes cases but not controversies, argues that controversies includes
only civil proceedings, while cases could embrace both civil and criminal matters. See
Harrison, supra note 138, at 210. See generally Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42
STAN. L. REV. 227, 230-31 (1990) (endeavoring to formulate a coherent definition of
Article III's case requirement). I am happy to assume that the difference may be a
stylistic quirk, well known to the lawyerly craft of redundant repetition and to leave it at
that. As the Glidden Court observed, "[t]o derive controlling significance from this
semantic circumstance seems hardly to be faithful to John Marshall's admonition that 'it is
a constitution we are expounding.'" Glidden, 370 U.S. at 562 (quoting McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819)).
148. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. These categories are defined either by the nature of
their subject matter or the special position of the parties. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821). For the relevant text of Article III, see supra note 126. Thus,
the judicial power comprehends, inter alia, "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. On "arising under"
jurisdiction, see infra note 149. The judicial power also comprises (with a sudden caesura
in the use of the encompassing "all") cases "to which the United States shall be a Party,"
and various other controversies involving the states. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Beyond these categories of cases and controversies must lie a vast residual category of
cases that will be the sole province of the state courts. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note
134, at 1167. As to whether the variable use of the word "all" has measurable textual
power, see Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 218 (1985) (splitting the nine
enumerated categories into a mandatory three-the cases, prefaced by "all"- and a
discretionary rump of six-the controversies, which do not comprise the plenary federal
jurisdiction and can be entirely committed to the state courts).
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is general federal subject matter jurisdiction, which embraces all cases
"arising under" the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United
States.49
The second clause of Section 2 establishes the original and
appellate responsibilities of the Supreme Court.150 The Court holds
original jurisdiction only in cases affecting consular diplomacy and
when a state is a party,151 while appellate jurisdiction is conferred with
respect to "all the other cases before mentioned," a phrase that refers
back to the enumerated cases specified in the Extending Clause.
1 2
There is no mention of whether these several heads of jurisdiction are
inherent in the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and the
inferior courts or whether their exercise is contingent on some
jurisdiction-granting act of Congress. 53  Congress clearly is
authorized to act in the second clause, which "distributes" the heads
of jurisdiction previously described' 54 by giving Congress permission
to narrow the scope of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
"with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make."155
149. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 255
(discussing the "crucial issue" of defining "arising under" jurisdiction). This is potentially
an enormous category of cases. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in National Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 649 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting), identified the 18 divisions of legislative power in Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution as the "sources of federal rights and sanctions" to which the Article III
judicial power would extend. Thus, laws affecting revenue, war, foreign and domestic
commerce, offenses against the Law of Nations, as well as "the vast range of laws
authorized by the 'Necessary-and-Proper' Clause," would be the generating sources of
"'all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under ... the Laws of the United States.' " Id. at
649 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1).
150. See Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506,512 (1868).
151. See U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. 2. For relevant text of Article III, see supra note
126.
152. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 2; see supra note 147 (considering relevance of the
distinction between "Cases" and "Controversies").
153. As Lessig and Sunstein argued in relation to the executive power, however, if the
judicial power is actually conferred by the vesting clause (in "Websterian" terms) "in the
lump," the heads of jurisdiction might be viewed as being illustrative or even as mere
surplusage. Lawrence Lessig & Cass Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLLIM. L. REv. 1, 48 (1994). All of the vesting clauses, these authors have suggested,
should be accorded no substantive meaning beyond identifying who holds the respective
powers, with Congress empowered through the Necessary and Proper Clause to fill in the
details left unresolved in the Constitution. See id. at 52.
154. Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307,314 (1810).
155. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. 2. In the opening section of Article III, the Framers
described "inferior" courts that Congress "may from time to time" establish. Id., art. III,
§ 1 (emphasis added). Article III, Section 2 refers to exceptions and regulations that the
Congress "shall make." Id., art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). The may/shall
inconsistency is not atypical in the Constitution. See Clinton, supra note 15, at 782-86
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The Framers' contingent grant of appellate jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court'5 6 yields at least two readings that reflect substantially
different interpretations of the scope of the judicial power. In the
first reading, Congress passes legislation to create specific exceptions
to what otherwise is acknowledged as the Court's inherent appellate
jurisdiction under the Constitution.57 In an alternative reading,
Congress enacts legislation that affirmatively prescribes the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court and thereby implicitly forbids the exercise of
any appellate power not specifically described in the legislation. By
its affirmative description, therefore, Congress is by implication
exercising its power to make exceptions. 15 8
n.147 (discussing examples). On the exegetical art of comparing like words and phrases in
the Constitution, see generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REv. 748
(1999).
156. Clinton emphasizes that the Exceptions Clause appeared after agreement on the
Madisonian Compromise, which made the existence of inferior federal courts dependent
on the will of Congress. See Clinton, supra note 15, at 777. He therefore intuits an Amar-
like interpretation of the Exceptions Clause, understanding it as simply a mechanism to
allow Congress to transfer appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court to any inferior
tribunals that it might create. See id. at 778; see also Amar, supra note 148, at 255 (arguing
that Congress's power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction,
where it exists, requires creation of other "Article HI" tribunals with power to hear all
excepted cases). But why would Congress not have this power even without an
Exceptions Clause? If "[t]he judicial Power" is vested in inferior federal courts and
extends to all the enumerated cases in Article III, Section 2, why could those courts not be
invested with appellate jurisdiction in addition to the Supreme Court? The Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction was not granted exclusively or finally; indeed, that would
have been counterintuitive, because the inferior courts' jurisdiction might have been
declared final in some of the enumerated categories. Moreover, Clinton is unable to
overcome the suppleness of the text, since he asserts, pace Chief Justice Marshall, that
Congress could constitutionally authorize the Supreme Court to exercise its appellate
jurisdiction in original form. See Clinton, supra note 15, at 778. But cf. Amar, supra note
148, at 214 (disputing congressional power to expand the boundaries of the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction).
157. Justice Story, in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328 (1816),
read Article III's enumeration of cases and controversies as "mandatory upon the
legislature." Congress's duty to vest the judicial power of the United States, Justice Story
submitted, was a duty to vest the whole judicialpower. See id. at 330. Otherwise, Congress
could refuse to vest jurisdiction in any one class of cases, "and thereby defeat jurisdiction
as to all; for the constitution has not singled out any class on which Congress [is] bound to
act in preference to others." Id. at 330.
158. See Durousseau:
They [the first Congress] have not, indeed, made these exceptions in express
terms. They have not declared that the appellate power of the court shall not
extend to certain cases; but they have described affirmatively its jurisdiction, and
this affirmative description has been understood to imply a negative on the
exercise of such appellate power as is not comprehended within it.
10 U.S. at 314. In Durousseau, the Court considered a jurisdictional threshold of $2000,
for example, to be an affirmative description manifesting Congress's intent that all cases
decided in the circuits for a lesser value would not lie within the Court's appellate
2000]
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The latter reading, which requires a very broad conception of
congressional power under Article III, Sections 1 and 2,159 has been
endorsed by the Supreme Court since its early rulings such as
Durousseau v. United States" and Ex parte McCardle.161 The Court,
in other words, has made no claim to an inherent, residual appellate
jurisdiction, beyond whatever mixture of jurisdiction it has received
from Congress under the combined force of the Extending Clause
and the Exceptions Clause. 62 Justice Chase felt the Court's reticence
to be a consequence of the sheer political truth that the disposal of
the judicial power belongs ultimately to Congress.16 3 The appellate
jurisdiction. Id.
159. Article III, as scholars have noted, "contains no clear statement either way on the
scope of congressional power." Michael L. Wells & Edward J. Larson, Original Intent and
Article 11I, 70 TUL. L. REV. 75, 84 (1995). After all, Congress is given explicit organizing
and distributive power only with respect to the creation of inferior courts and the making
of exceptions and regulations to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Even under
the enumerated powers of Article I, only the creation of "Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court" is mentioned. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. The Court in Durousseau,
therefore, appeared to transcend the text when it asserted that Congress had the power
"of creating a supreme court as ordained by the constitution." Durousseau, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) at 313. Maybe this was true as a matter of practice; the Supreme Court could
hardly have been expected to spring, Minerva-like, from the mere words of vesting in the
Constitution. But congressional intervention is assuredly not a textual requirement in the
Constitution and indeed may not reflect the intent of the Framers. See Clinton, supra note
15, at 843-52. Justice Story, in Hunter's Lessee, argued that the mandatory grant of
original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in Article III, Section 2 also should govern the
succeeding words that grant the Court appellate jurisdiction "[i]n all the other Cases
before mentioned," subject to Congress's power to make exceptions to the Court's
appellate jurisdiction. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 332-33. There would be no necessity to give
Congress the power to make exceptions, in Justice Story's view, if the preceding words did
not appear in an imperative sense. See id. But cf. Turner v. President of Bank of N.-Am.,
4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 (1799) (noting the constitutional proposition that a cause of action is
"without" the jurisdiction of the circuit courts "until the contrary appears," the opposite of
what courts of general jurisdiction enjoy). Attorney Rawle, for the defendant in error in
Turner, argued that the judicial power is the grant of the Constitution and that Congress
"can no more limit, than enlarge, the constitutional grant." Id. at 10.
160. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810).
161. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
162. See id. at 514.
163. See Turner, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 10. As Justice Chase explained,
If congress has given the power to this Court, we possess it, not otherwise: and if
congress has not given the power to us, or to any other Court, it still remains at
the legislative disposal.... [Congress is not bound, and it would, perhaps, be
inexpedient, to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal Courts, to every subject, in
every form, which the constitution might warrant.
Id. at 10 n.1; see Amar, supra note 148, at 270 (noting the "virtual orthodoxy" rejecting
Justice Story's thesis that Article Ill required the entire quantum of judicial power to be
vested in the federal courts); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 450 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (stating that "the national legislature will have
ample authority to make such exceptions, and to prescribe such regulations as will be
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jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in sum, is inherently a limited and
limitable subset of the federal judicial power.
164
3. The Open-Textured Expression of the Judicial Power in
Article IH
Article III, in creating the judicial power of the United States
and in arranging categories of cases to which the judicial power
extends, provides no procedural signals to identify when this power is
being exercised. In this sense, as Paul Bator commented, it is hard to
posit an ontological essence that truly defines the exercise of the
judicial power.'65 This silence contrasts appreciably with how the
Constitution treats the other great constitutional powers-the
political powers-of the government. The legislative power, for
example, is guided by procedures that the Supreme Court has
extolled as "a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered"
protection against improvident laws. 66 We know, therefore, that a
bill must pass through the two chambers of Congress' 67 and must be
presented to the President for signature' 68 to become a law. 69 There
calculated to obviate or remove [any] inconveniences"); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note
134, at 1163 (arguing that any theory of mandatory vesting of federal jurisdiction "must
explain how Congress's twin jurisdiction-stripping powers [the Ordain and Establish
Clause and the Exceptions Clause] can retain some force if these powers cannot be added
together to trump the Article IlI Vesting Clause"). Scholars have noted how Congress's
authority to control federal jurisdiction may add democratic legitimacy to the judicial
power of constitutional review, which has been described as antimajoritarian, see, e.g.,
Velasco, supra note 147, at 757-58 (citing Charles L. Black, Jr., The Presidency and
Congress, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 841, 847 (1975)), and as the product of questionable
implications and history, see, e.g., Ralph A. Rossum, Congress, the Constitution, and the
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and the Spirit of the Exceptions
Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385,390-91 (1983).
164. As we will see, infra text accompanying note 346, the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction may even be vulnerable (textually) to wholesale congressional repeal.
Moreover, as discussed infra in note 339, Congress's control over the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction a fortiori confers power to circumscribe-or remove-the subject
matter jurisdiction of inferior federal courts.
165. See Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and
Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 265 (1990) ("[There can be no]
rigid logical scheme which purports in some mechanical way to define what 'is' the
exercise of the federal judicial power .... The judicial power is neither a Platonic essence
nor a pre-existing empirical classification."). For Bator, in fact, the judicial power was a
"purposive institutional concept, the product of history and custom, distilled in light of
experience and expediency." Id.
166. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1982).
167. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
168. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2,3.
169. See generally Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (sustaining a
constitutional challenge to the Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692 (Supp. III 1997),
by adhering to Chadha's principle of procedural exclusivity).
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are no other procedural routes provided in the constitutional text for
the creation of a law,70 and no other institution or combination of
institutions competes with the two Houses of Congress in this process.
Even the executive power, which lacks the precise lineaments of
bicameralism and presentment, at least offers a collateral procedural
restriction-the condition of Senate advice and consent-with which
the President must comply to make treaties or to appoint
ambassadors or judges .'7  Article III, however, wholly lacks
evaluative benchmarks of this kind-for example, a requirement that
a legal challenge to an exercise of the treaty power must obtain a two-
thirds vote of a federal appellate bench. In the absence of a single,
finely wrought procedure for exercise of the judicial power, no clean
lines of textual demarcation assign federal judicial power to the
federal courts and deny it, for instance, to the state tribunals.172
In sum, Article III fails to yield a dynamic, process-based
conception of judicial power. In its surface manifestation, the text
only reveals, for example, that the Supreme Court is probably
exercising judicial power when it hears a case concerning an
ambassador because the Court is named in Article III and is
adjudicating a case that is explicitly among the nine enumerated
heads of jurisdiction. The constitutional text yields no more refined
170. There are, however, four provisions in the Constitution (concerning House
initiation of impeachment, Senate conduct of impeachment trials, presidential
appointments, and the ratification of treaties) that contemplate one House acting alone
with the unreviewable force of law. These provisions are not subject to the President's
veto. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955.
171. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Admittedly, nothing in Article II insists that a
particular procedural route must be the sole mechanism for the exercise of presidential
power. The President, under various constitutional provisions, acts alone, acts in tandem
with the Congress, or acts with the Senate upon its advice and consent. Edward Corwin,
for whom Articles I and III were the models of constancy of method, wrote of an
"indefinite residuum" and the "plasticity as to method" that attach to the operations of the
Presidency. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at
3 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th rev. ed. 1984). To Corwin, the notion of the executive
was a term of uncertain content, located in a chapter of the Constitution that he
considered the founding document's "most loosely drawn" component. Id. The question
remains, however, as to whether there is any greater transparency in the "method" put
into Article III to engage and reveal the judicial function. In fact, the Framers prescribed
no "method" of judicial power and did not mandate that there be a federal structure at all
beyond the Supreme Court in its narrowest original jurisdiction.
172. To conclude that state courts might exercise federal judicial power is not to deny
that the Constitution established a system of dual sovereignty that defines federalism. See
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
457 (1991)). But, in the legislative context, for example, the Constitution enumerates the
powers of Congress and identifies a single procedure for exercising these powers to enact
laws. All residual legislative authority implicitly remains with the states, a conclusion that
is rendered express by the Tenth Amendment. See id.
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conceptualization of the judicial power than the identification of
tribunals and enumeration of cases. In the present investigation,
however, the open texture of Article III presents an opportunity, not
an obstacle. The absence of unique or required process, or of any
explicit procedural link to the work of the political branches, may
unlock a portal to interpretations that enlarge the sources of judicial
authority under the Constitution. For that exploration, however, I
need to extend my discussion into the deep structure of Article II1.
C. The Deep Structure of Article II." Implications of Open Texture
This Section presents my core thesis that the surface structure of
Article III derives from a deep structure that permits sources of
federal judicial authority, including supranational tribunals, in
addition to the courts and judges mentioned in Article III itself. The
argument develops in two stages. First, I use the open-textured
surface structure of Article Ill to show that the Framers did not
require the judicial power, whether original or appellate in form, to
vest only in the federal courts explicitly mentioned in Article III or to
be exercised only by federal judges appointed under Article Ill. This
deep structure principle of shared judicial power, I argue, explains
why Article III refers not only to "[t]he judicial Power of the United
States" but also to "[t]he judicial Power" generally. Second, I apply
Chomsky's concept of transformations to connect, or "map," the deep
structure principle of shared power to the surface structure of Article
III. I have selected three transformations, which I derive primarily
from surface features of the Constitution and doctrinal innovations of
the Supreme Court (just as Chomsky derived his transformations
from the surface features of the lexicon). The "transformational
sequences," as I call them, dynamically apply the deep structure
principle of shared judicial power. The sequences will show, in their
turn, how state courts, legislative courts, and specialized
supranational tribunals can each share the federal judicial power
using this deep structure principle.
1. An Implicit "Sharing" of the Judicial Power
In my theoretical and interpretive system, the surface structure
of Article M stems from a kernel set of underlying deep structure
principles, including the principle of judicial independence. In fact,
the organizational features of the surface structure of Article III,
considered in the preceding section, can be mapped from a second
principle in the deep structure, that of shared judicial power. As I
have shown, Article Ill requires a Supreme Court, comprised of life-
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tenured judges and possessing only the express appellate jurisdiction
conceded by Congress and very narrow original jurisdiction.
Moreover, the judicial power extends only to the enumerated heads
of jurisdiction, and there is no textual command to commit any, some,
or all of these nine categories to the jurisdiction of inferior federal
courts. 74 Finally, the judicial power in Article HI has an open
texture, unfastened to specific procedural or institutional action.
These features define a major structural consequence and a
principle of the Constitution's deep structure. Article III does not
require that the judicial power vest in federal courts of original
jurisdiction, in federal appellate tribunals only, in both,75 or in
neither.176  Nor, for that matter, does Article III contain any
requirement that the enumerated cases be decided by judges who
enjoy life tenure and undiminished salary.177 Accordingly, for cases
not falling under the Supreme Court's narrow original jurisdiction,78
the constitutional text allows a tribunal without Article III judges to
hear, at least through original jurisdiction, any cases that arise under
173. The Supreme Court has affirmed that Congress cannot enlarge the original
jurisdiction of the Court. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,176-80 (1803).
174. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401
(1973). Nonetheless, the enumeration is helpful to measure the range of judicial power, if
not necessarily to predict its distribution. In Cohens v. Virginia, Chief Justice Marshall
declared the "axiom" that "the judicial power of every well constituted government must
be co-extensive with the legislative, and must be capable of deciding every judicial
question which grows out of the constitution and laws." 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 384
(1821). The Chief Justice was not quite ready to declare his "axiom" to be immutable
truth, but he offered it as an argument of constitutional construction that should not be
overlooked. Id. at 384-85. Nonetheless, Chief Justice Marshall did not complete the logic
of this reasoning: if there is a principle of co-extensiveness, then surely the Extending
Clause acts as a granting clause that requires no intermediate step to connect the courts to
their jurisdiction in the same way as the enumeration of powers in Article I. Just as the
legislative power "vests" immediately in Congress, the judicial power "vests," without
more, in the courts. Thus, arguably there might be a double vesting of the judicial power,
in both the Supreme Court and in the inferior courts, by force of the repeated word "in" in
Article III, Section 1. U.S. CONST. art. III. § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish."). The second "in," however, seems pleonastic.
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion eschewed Justice Story's reading a few years
earlier in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), see supra note 147,
which saw deliberate purpose in the enumeration of cases and controversies and would
have required Congress to distribute all of these categories to the federal courts, whether
at original or appellate level. But cf. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 153, at 47-52 (rejecting
the idea of mandatory vesting clauses).
175. See Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) at 333.
176. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 551 (1962) (noting the "continuous
possibility" that all inferior federal court jurisdiction can be withdrawn).
177. See Velasco, supra note 147, at 682-83.
178. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
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federal law or treaty law or that involve the United States as a
party.'79 As Justice Brandeis noted in Crowell v. Benson,180 the
judicial power of Article III is the power of the federal government,
not of any inferior tribunal: "There is in that Article nothing which
requires any controversy to be determined as of first instance in the
federal district courts. ' 181 From these propositions, I derive a deep
structure principle, mapped to the surface text of Article III, that
none of the categories of cases in Article III, Section 2, other than
those few cases for which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction,
must begin in a court with Article III judges."8
Further, the deep structure principle of "shared" judicial
authority explains the conceptual distinction between the phrase
"[t]he judicial Power" in Article III, Section 2, and the more
elaborate invocation of "[t]he judicial Power of the United States,"
which opens the first section of Article Il.113 "The judicial Power" is
179. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and
Article II1, 101 HARV. L. REV. 916, 916-17, 949-50 (1988) (arguing that "article III
literation" is untenable and that non-Article III courts should be able to hear matters
"that might have been assigned to an article III court other than the Supreme Court" as
long as there is adequate opportunity for appellate review by an Article III court of the
non-Article III court's decision). In other words, a tribunal without Article III judges
could entertain the jurisdictional matters that Fallon, for example, has described as core
federal concerns. See id.; see also Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) ("The
Constitution has defined the limits of the judicial power of the United States, but has not
prescribed how much of it shall be exercised by the Circuit Court."). Indeed, the
constitutional premise that federal issues could be litigated in the state courts prompted
the special leapfrog appellate process from state supreme courts directly to the Supreme
Court of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994) (providing, inter alia, that final
judgments rendered by the highest state courts are reviewable by the Supreme Court
when the validity of a federal treaty or statute is in question or if the validity of a state
statute is in question on ground of repugnancy to the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States); Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 351 (upholding this procedure as
consistent with the structure of the Constitution and, especially, Article III). In Hunter's
Lessee, Justice Story characterized the Article III judicial power as extending to cases, not
courts, so that the United States's appellate jurisdiction could reach state courts that heard
cases within the scope of the Article III judicial power. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 338. In
Justice Story's view, the Supremacy Clause revealed the Framers' expectation that cases
implicating the federal judicial power would also arise in state courts. See id. at 340.
180. 285 U.S. 22,86 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
182. The state courts are, after all, also bound by the Constitution as the supreme law
of the land. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause); Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat) at 340; see also Rossum, supra note 163, at 398 (noting that the Supremacy Clause
facilitates a determination of "how far judicial jurisdiction should be left to the state
courts"). See generally HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYsTEM 363 (Richard H. Fallon et al. eds., 4th ed. 1996) (implying that the
Madisonian Compromise, see supra note 146, precluded the argument that litigation of
federal claims in state courts would burden litigants in defiance of the Constitution).
183. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2. It is conventional constitutional practice that every
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a compact expression that references, in three words, the Framers'
anticipation that judicial authority might be exercised by courts or by
tribunals other than those constituted in accordance with Section 1.18
word is to be given meaning. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174
(1803). Similarly, I would argue, each absent word-including aposiopetic foreshortening
of like phrases used in an earlier, related context-should be considered.
184. Paul Bator, for example, condemned the
incoherent and unruly proposition ... that when a federal [legislative] court
adjudicates a case or controversy arising under federal law, it is not exercising the
judicial power of the United States, but when the Supreme Court decides that
very same case on appeal, it is exercising the judicial power of the United States.
Bator, supra note 165, at 242 (emphasis added). If a congressionally constituted tribunal
enforces rules that "obtain their force of law from the national government," Bator asked,
"whose judicial power is in play if not the judicial power of the United States?" Id. at 241
(emphasis added). But Bator neglected another potential reading of Article III, Sections 1
and 2: as noted in the main text, the term "[tlhe judicial Power of the United States" has a
discrete, specific application only to those courts established with judges appointed under
Article III, Section 1. The state courts-and, in a modem reading, legislative courts and
even supranational tribunals-arguably partake of "[t]he judicial Power" simpliciter that
the Framers declared in Article III, Section 2. For that precise reason, the present study
avoids the common epithetical descriptions "Article I courts" and "Article III courts" in
favor of the more simple distinction that some federally created tribunals have judges
appointed under Article III, Section 1 (the United States federal district courts, for
example), while other federally created tribunals and the state courts exercise judicial
power under Article III, Section 2, but do not have judges appointed under Article III,
Section 1. It is at best a misnomer, and at worst a constitutional solecism, to speak of an
"Article I court" as though legislative courts could exercise judicial power derived from
some ineffable constitutional source that is not Article III.
The phrase "[t]he judicial Power" in Article III, Section 2, incidentally, was
inserted by the Committee on Detail in place of the more restrictive expression "The
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court." See Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157, 163-64 (1960). And,
while it is true that the intended meaning of the change was to incorporate the inferior
courts into the specified jurisdiction, it is also true that the use of a much broader phrase in
Section 2 (although the change was made without debate, see Clinton, supra note 15, at
792-93) weakens the argument for a structural distinction between the "arising under"
jurisdiction of the state courts and that of the Supreme Court or the contingent inferior
federal courts. The potential distinction between the two phrases, "[t]he judicial Power"
and "[t]he judicial Power of the United States," has not, however, kindled debate among
the constitutional law clerisy. See, e.g., id. (treating the phrases as identical). Much more
attention has been paid to the question of whether the Vesting Clause in Section 1 should
be read as mandatory or non-mandatory, on the assumption that the answer to that
question might determine to what extent tribunals without Article III judges legitimately
could exercise any portion of the judicial power of the United States. Thus, for instance,
the word "shall" in the Vesting Clause of Article III and in the opening of the
Enumeration Clause suggests a command to Congress to vest the federal courts with at
least some jurisdiction and correspondingly limits discretion to transfer jurisdiction to
tribunals without Article III judges. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 134, at 1162. The
distinction made here in the main text, however, eliminates the need for dispute. Whether
or not the Article III Vesting Clause is mandatory, the judicial power is manifestly
exercisable by tribunals that lack judges appointed under Article III. Moreover, the
determination of whether it is mandatory by itself will not answer whether the
Constitution requires final federal appellate review in all the enumerated cases and
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As Steven Calabresi has noted, the phrase "[t]he judicial Power shall
extend to" in Article III, Section 2, describes a power, but "'fails to
make clear who may exercise that power, thus leaving open the
possibility that the judicial power in question could be exercised [for
example] by the states.' ,8 In this reading, the phrase "[t]he judicial
Power" in Section 2 has no textual antecedent, which it would have
had, for instance, if Section 2 had mentioned "the foregoing judicial
Power" or "the judicial Power heretofore vested in accordance with
Section 1.''116
Thus, the separate references to "[t]he judicial Power of the
United States" and "[t]he judicial Power" simply confirm a deep
structure idea of a shared judicial authority under Article III. In
controversies in Article III, Section 2. See infra text accompanying note 339. After all, if
the judicial power is exercisable by state courts, then the Exceptions Clause might be used
to vest final appellate jurisdiction in the state courts, whether or not the Vesting Clause
might be mandatory. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 134, at 1161.
185. Calabresi, supra note 15, at 1383 (quoting A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial
Presidency's New Vestments, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1346, 1355 (1994)). Calabresi infers a
quite different conclusion from this textual lacuna. In his view, the absence of any
reference to the institutions being empowered to act must imply that Article III, Section 2,
while itself not a "power grant," must refer to a power already granted, namely " 'the
judicial Power of the United States.' " Id. at 1383 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1).
186. Calabresi, for example, has not explained how his "power grant" reading, see
supra note 185, which disregards the absence of an expressed antecedent to the words in
Article III, Section 2, might displace a neutral reading that opens the possibility of judicial
power exercised by the states. As noted in the main text, Calabresi himself raises the state
court reading. See Calabresi, supra note 15, at 1383. Calabresi's true riposte, of course,
would not be textual at all, but polemical. Eliminate the first section of Article III, he
argues, and "all you have is a vague guarantee that something called 'the judicial Power,'
exercised by who knows whom, could reach a whole lot of cases ... [and] could
presumably be given wholesale by Congress not only to the state courts, ... but also to
Article I courts, to the White House Counsel's office, or even to the Senate House and
Judiciary Committees." Id. at 1383. In other words, Calabresi, like Justice Brennan in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co., 458 U.S. 50,73 (1982) (plurality opinion), would insist
upon some kind of limiting principle to prevent a wholesale supplantation of courts with
Article III judges.
While my intent certainly is not to read Article III out of the Constitution, neither
do I intend to suppress attention to the manifest structural principles of Article III.
Scholars may criticize the Framers for not giving the judicial power the mono-institutional
trappings of its competitor governmental powers, but that is how the Constitution is
written. If a wholesale grant to state courts is allowed by the text and is supported by deep
structure design, then the judicial power can be exercised credibly in that manner. Article
III permits wide congressional discretion in arranging the federal court system, and that,
too, in combination with the enumerated powers of Article I, opens up the exercise of
judicial power by tribunals other than those mentioned in Article III itself. We cannot
promote textual fidelity and then pick and choose which parts of the text we will honor
and which we simply will ignore. The important work of Article III jurisprudence,
therefore, is to construct theories that acknowledge the existence of other sources of
judicial authority, while defining the proper constitutional place of the very few tribunals
that the Constitution itself explicitly anticipates.
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contrast, Article I and Article II do not reference the legislative or
executive power of the United States. Neither of those Articles
contemplates rival sources, such as state legislatures or executives,
which have a constitutionally assigned role in the creation of federal
law. It is not yet manifest, however, precisely which sets of
complementary (or even rival) tribunals might enjoy the privilege of
exercising federal judicial authority. To resolve this question, I next
apply a series of three transformational sequences to the deep
structure principle of shared judicial power. The sequences will
demonstrate that classes of tribunals that are not identified in Article
III, Section 1-state courts, legislative courts, and supranational
tribunals-can nonetheless lay claim to a share in the federal judicial
power.
2. Three Transformational Sequences, Three Tribunals Sharing
Article III Power
Transformations are the dynamic elements of classical
Chomskyan linguistic theory. They connect the deep structure to the
potentially multiple performances of the surface structure. The
Constitution's deep structure comprises a fixed base of principles,
including the idea that the judicial power in Article III is not
exclusively exercised by judges appointed under Article III. The
transformational rules comprise an array of textual and
jurisprudential ideas, shaped primarily by Articles I and III of the
Constitution and by doctrinal innovations of the Supreme Court,
which "map" the deep structure idea of shared judicial power to a set
of surface structure performances. These performances amplify the
actual performance-a limited number of courts staffed exclusively
by Article III judges-that we know from the familiar surface
structure of Article III.
Three transformational sequences are discussed here. The first
sequence maps state courts to the surface structure of Article III by
synthesizing four elements: the discretionary nature of Article III's
court system, the Framers' awareness of a "redundant" system of
state courts, their explicit recognition of state courts in the Supremacy
Clause, and the logical proposition that the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction could apply only to cases from the state courts if
Congress had declined to use its power to create inferior federal
courts. The source of the second sequence, which maps legislative
courts to Article III, is the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of public
rights. Under this jurisprudence, the Court gradually has accepted
that Congress can use its Article I legislative powers to create federal
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tribunals to administer specialized statutory schemes of regulation.
Legislative tribunals also share the federal judicial power because
their dockets "arise under" federal law, an enumerated category of
judicial power in Article M, Section 2. Finally, the third sequence
maps supranational tribunals to Article III through a specific foreign
relations vision of the Constitution. This final sequence synthesizes
modem interactive conceptions of sovereignty, the Framers'
expansive view of the scope of the treaty power and of the centrality
of foreign commerce, and the public rights jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court. The result is a powerful transformation that would
allow supranational tribunals-if the principle of constitutional
integrity can be accommodated-to share exercise of the federal
judicial power.
a. First Transformational Sequence: The State Courts
The surface structure of Article HI provides categorically for
only a single federal tribunal, the Supreme Court.187  This
organizational sparseness reveals at least two aspects of the Framers'
expectations for the new judicial order. First, and rather prosaically,
the broadness of congressional discretion in the organization of the
court system does not appear to have troubled the architects of the
Constitution. The great diversity in state systems pointed to no single
superior model, and the Convention did not relish the task of creating
prolix organizational charts for the new tribunals.188 Secondly, and
more pertinently, the Framers were acutely conscious of the parallel
and a priori existence of the state systems of justice. Surely they did
not expect that the entire work of the federal judicial branch would
burden a single national tribunal, yet that is the only court for which
they explicitly provided. From these premises, I add an additional
level of interpretive detail to the deep structure principle of shared
judicial power: if Congress had chosen not to establish inferior
federal courts, then by default the state courts would have become
the tribunals of first resort and would thereby exercise judicial power,
although not necessarily the judicial power of the United States, in all
federal matters.'89
187. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also supra text accompanying note 135 (discussing
court structure under Article III).
188. See Wells & Larson, supra note 159, at 84; see also Amar, supra note 148, at 259
(indicating the complexity of building a plenary court structure into the Constitution).
The genius of the Framers was to create a constitutional document without the numbing
prolixity of a legal code. Public understanding, after all, was critical to the success of the
revolutionists' enterprise. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
189. See infra note 339 (suggesting that the power to strip Supreme Court appellate
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State courts do not exercise their judicial authority upon grant
from the Constitution of the United States, but by favor of their own
state constitutions.190 The federal Constitution, however, recognizes
the exercise of judicial power by the state courts.191 Moreover, the
idea of the state courts as the "redundant" system in the Framers'
judicial machine cannot be confuted as a matter of simple logic: if
there had been no inferior federal courts, from which courts could the
Supreme Court have enjoyed appellate jurisdiction if not the state
courts?192 The structural complementarity between the federal and
state systems, in fact, is even more complete than first appears. Both
systems can declare finality in matters of federal law. The state
system does so whenever a decision of a state supreme court,
implicating a matter of federal law, is not appealed or is denied
certiorari. 193
Accordingly, Article III in its deep structure requires that the
state court system shares judicial power with federal courts created
under Article III, Section 1. Article III's deep structure also
recognizes that this shared exercise is a legitimate center of judicial
authority under the Constitution.
b. Second Transformational Sequence: The Legislative Courts
The first transformational sequence, while acknowledging the
historical fact of the Madisonian Compromise, is primarily a text-
driven derivation of a deep structure idea. But the recognition of a
jurisdiction a fortiori confirms Congress's power to deny compensatory or collateral
jurisdiction to the inferior federal courts).
190. See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 515-16 (1858) (stating that judicial
authority must be conferred "by a Government or sovereignty"); see also Calabresi &
Rhodes, supra note 134, at 1161 (noting that state courts take jurisdiction over Article III
categories of federal jurisdiction by virtue of their own state constitutional grants of
judicial power).
191. If the Constitution did not recognize this alternative source of judicial authority
over federal laws, the Supremacy Clause would likely be nugatory.
192. This view reflects the scholarly insight of Herbert Wechsler. See, e.g., Amar, supra
note 148, at 211-13. Wechsler's reading of the plan of the Constitution for the courts was
that "Congress would decide from time to time how far the federal judicial institution
should be used within the limits of the federal judicial power; or, stated differently, how
far judicial jurisdiction should be left to the state courts, bound as they are by the
[Supremacy Clause]." Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L.
REv. 1001, 1005-06 (1965).
193. Neither the Constitution nor Congress has provided for a "reverse certiorari"
process, whereby the Supreme Court could itself subject selected cases from the state
system to mandatory high court review. The system of Supreme Court review of state
application of federal law is not a constitutional requirement; rather, it was created by
Congress to avoid the possibility that the states simply would ignore governing federal law.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 570-72.
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shared, open-ended judicial power in the Constitution's deep
structure suggests that this power also might be accessed by bodies
other than the pre-constitutional state courts. The Framers certainly
could "see" the state court system and, perhaps, they also might have
"foreseen" that other kinds of tribunals might evolve in appropriate
circumstances.194  The question, therefore, is whether further
transformational sequences discernible in the surface structure of the
Constitution and in the Supreme Court's interpretive canon will
generate these tribunals.
(1) New Tribunals for the Administrative State
The paradigmatic example of a non-state court authority
generated from the deep structure of Article III is the sequence of
transformative Supreme Court cases that recognized the power of
Congress to locate some of the federal judicial power in tribunals
created by Congress's Article I powers and staffed with non-Article
III judges.195 Since its 1932 ruling in Crowell v. Benson,96 the Court's
194. See supra note 2 (explaining how the Framers' "foresight" might be reflected in
the structural design of their Constitution). The expansion of shared judicial power can be
linked, in a historical sense, to the broad expansion of governmental responsibilities. The
legislative courts were an outgrowth of the vast expansion of the administrative-
bureaucratic state that began before World War II. Similarly, in the wake of the Cold War
and in an era of globalized trade opportunities and challenges, the judicial power may be
extended to new fields of supranational endeavor. See Reich, supra note 8, at 839
(emphasizing the importance of juridical stability to a trade system that is fundamentally
anarchic).
195. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, Justice Story argued that Congress must vest all of
the judicial power "either in an original or appellate form" in a federal court. 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, 331 (1816); see also Jim C. Chen, Appointments with Disaster: The
Unconstitutionality of Binational Arbitral Review Under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1455, 1467 (1992) (noting the rejection of Justice
Story's thesis by the first Judiciary Act); supra note 146 (discussing Justice Story's
opinion). The beginnings of a crack in the monolithic view of Article III appeared as early
as 1828, in American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828), in which Chief
Justice Marshall analyzed the vesting of admiralty jurisdiction in courts created by the
Florida territorial legislature (as Florida had yet to be admitted to the Union). The fact
that the Florida superior court judges held their offices for four years, in Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion, meant that their courts were not "constitutional Courts, in which the
judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general government, can be
deposited." Id. at 546. But, if not constitutional courts, what were they? The Chief
Justice appeared to have detected an entirely new strain of Article III jurisprudence when
he denominated the Florida courts as "legislative Courts, created in virtue of the general
right of sovereignty which exists in the government." Id. The wider premise (and the new
categorization) was unnecessary; Chief Justice Marshall was equally able to rest the
jurisdiction of the Florida administration on Article IV, Section 3, clause 2 of the
Constitution, which gives Congress the power "to make all needful rules and regulations,
respecting the territory belonging to the United States." Id.
As commentators have noted, without proper constitutional principles the notion
2000]
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attitude toward these tribunals without Article III judges has slowly
become more pragmatic. This judicial attitude has developed in
tandem with the metastasizing of the post-New Deal administrative
state and its need for bureaucratic entities to administer statutory
schemes of federal regulation. Indeed, the administrative state
scarcely could operate without a degree of pragmatism on the part of
the Supreme Court, which early on established that not every
immigration hearing, workers' compensation hearing, or veterans'
benefits hearing merited ex ovo the panoply of Article III federal
judicial intervention. 19 This pragmatic approach 98 emerged in frank
deference to Congress's wide legislative jurisdiction under Article I
and to the multiplier effect of the Necessary and Proper Clause.199 As
I will show, the Supreme Court sanctions the so-called "Article I" or
legislative courts,200 most of which do permit some eventual appellate
of legislative courts could overwhelm the Article III judiciary. See Fallon, supra note 179,
at 923; infra text accompanying notes 213-14 (discussing need for a limiting principle in
establishing legislative courts); see also Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 546 (1962)
(concluding that the "historical background" of the Florida courts made Chief Justice
Marshall's decision "hardly surprising").
196. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). In Crowell, the Court made its first explicit attempt to define a
sphere of specialized governmental functions that would allow Congress (in tandem with
the executive) to establish regulatory schemes outside the domain of Article III. See id. at
50. These schemes would regulate the relationship between the federal government "and
persons subject to its authority." Id. In Crowell, the Supreme Court was asked to
consider the administrative authority of the U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission,
a New Deal entity that offered maritime workers under Congress's constitutional
jurisdiction the same workers' compensation remedies that were provided by virtually all
states. The Commission processed 138,788 cases in the four years the legislation was in
operation. See id. at 45 n.10.
197. See Bator, supra note 165, at 235-39. Bator viewed the validation of the
administrative state as an inexorable historical phenomenon that the courts can no longer
impugn. See id. at 239 ("And I do think that the fact of this consistent judgment is
impressive and ought to have weight."). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's acquiescence
in the creation of legislative courts has drawn the ire of formalist scholarship. The
formalist view has read Article III wholly to "precludefl legislative courts from exercising
federal judicial power." Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 134, at 1189. Similarly, Martin
Redish has argued that "[a]lthough most of the Constitution's provisions leave substantial
room for modernizing interpretation, Article III does not." MARTIN H. REDISH,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 75 (2d
ed. 1990).
198. See Bator, supra note 165, at 254 (identifying as "instrumental" Congress's
reliance on the expedient of legislative courts constituted outside the formalities and
limitations of Article III, Section 1).
199. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 134, at 1172; see also National Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 649 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (accepting
the generative effect of congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to
expand areas of federal jurisdiction).
200. See Fallon, supra note 179, at 921; see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 32, at
533 (discussing the changes to the Framers' vision of the Republic wrought by the growth
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recourse to an Article III judge, when Congress establishes these
courts to occupy " 'specialized areas having particularized needs and
warranting distinctive treatment.' 201
(2) Rationalizing Legislative Courts: The Field of Business Approach
In discovering the deep structure origin of Article I tribunals, it is
interesting to consider how the Supreme Court came to extrapolate a
second occurrence of shared "arising under" jurisdiction from Article
III °2 For a long time after Crowell, the Court clung tenaciously to
what it perceived as the traditional or historical prerogatives of the
federal judiciary, an approach that looked back to the kinds of actions
that were the quotidian work of the ordinary English and American
courts at the time the Constitution was adopted °3
This field of business approach was reflected thirty years after
Crowell in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok.2°4 In Glidden, the Supreme Court
held that two new federal tribunals, the Court of Claims and the
of the modem administrative state). The tribunals established under Congress's Article I
powers have provided troublesome problems of nomenclature. The variety of tribunals
that Congress has established precludes a single all-encompassing term. Nomenclature, in
any event, is not important to the structural analysis that this Article undertakes. Here, I
am investigating the extent to which matters arising under federal law can be "committed
for final determination to courts non-Article III tribunals, be they denominated legislative
courts or administrative agencies." Glidden, 370 U.S. at 549. The terminological choice I
have made, in any event, is to refer always to "legislative courts."
201. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 72 (1982)
(plurality opinion) (quoting Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 408 (1973)); see also
Bator, supra note 165, at 235-36 (arguing that Article I tribunals developed because of
special institutional needs, not as an attempt to subvert the ideal of Article III by creating
a cadre of subservient judges). The pragmatic approach, in fact, suffused the opinion in
Crowell, 285 U.S. passim. The Court could find no constitutional objection to Congress
availing itself of a method that experience had shown to be essential to tame a burgeoning
caseload, relieving the burden of the courts, but preserving their complete authority to
ensure the proper application of the law. See id. at 54. Three times in its opinion, the
Court mentioned pragmatic volume of business considerations, describing the large intake
of cases before the commission and the likelihood that challenges to the application of the
statute would be few. The Court explained that review by the courts had been sought in
only a small number of the many thousands of cases and that very few of those cases had
implicated the constitutional jurisdictional issues of whether the injury occurred within the
maritime jurisdiction or whether the relation of employment existed. See id. at 65.
202. The "arising under" jurisdiction under Article III, Section 2, which is by far the
largest category of federal cases, is likely to be the most fruitful source of business for state
and legislative courts. Supranational tribunals also likely would exercise jurisdiction in
cases in which the United States is a party, another category mentioned in Section 2. See
infra text accompanying note 337 (discussing categories of Article III jurisdiction involving
the United States as a party).
203. See Glidden, 370 U.S. at 563 (quoting United Steelworkers v. United States, 361
U.S. 39, 60 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
204. 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
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Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, had been created under
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, thereby allowing their
judges to serve by designation on United States District Courts and
Courts of Appeals. 5 The Court accepted that tribunals that
predominantly deal with "cases and controversies" under Article III,
even if their docket includes some nonjudicial or administrative
business that does not technically come under that rubric, could
nevertheless qualify as courts established under Article 111.106 The
Glidden decision included a laborious exposition of how the
boundaries of the judicial power were framed in the phrase "cases
and controversies," which thereby defined the work of courts with
Article IlI judges."° Given that the work of both legislative courts
and courts with Article III judges could be said to "arise under" the
common source of the federal law of the United States,08 the Glidden
Court's attempt to distinguish judicial and nonjudicial business by a
quantitative rather than a qualitative test foundered rapidly on the
reef of a startling reductio ad absurdum 09 Thus, the Court appealed
to "the 'expert feel of lawyers,' "rather than to any innate ontological
distinction between judicial and nonjudicial activity, to rationalize
why Article III cases and controversies must nonetheless remain the
exclusive province of courts with Article III judges.210  Although
205. See id. at 584.
206. Id. at 583 (internal quote marks omitted).
207. Id. at 572-73 (internal quote marks omitted). In Glidden, the Court ruled that
tribunals constituted without regard to the tenure and salary limitations of Article III can
nonetheless entertain judicial business that is encompassed in Article III, but that such
business will necessarily be "beyond the range of conventional cases and controversies."
Id. at 545. To that extent, the Glidden Court specifically rejected the implications of Chief
Justice Marshall's remark in American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546
(1828), that courts created under Congress's Article I powers were " 'incapable of
receiving' "federal question jurisdiction. Glidden, 270 U.S. at 545 n.13 (quoting Canter, 26
U.S. (1 Pet.) at 546).
208. As the Court later explained in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products
Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985), "'[n]either this Court nor Congress has read the
Constitution as requiring every federal question arising under the federal law ... to be
tried in an Article III court before a judge enjoying life tenure and protection against
salary reduction.' "(quoting Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407 (1973)).
209. As used here, this phrase (meaning, literally, "reduction to absurdity") indicates a
proposition that disproves itself by the absurd outcome that it implies.
210. Glidden, 370 U.S. at 574 (quoting United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S.
39, 60 (1959) (Frankfurter and Harlan, JJ., concurring)). In seeking to legitimate the
Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals as Article III courts, the
Glidden Court explained why certain highly discrete aspects of these courts' jurisdiction,
although not technically "cases and controversies" as traditionally understood,
nonetheless did not disqualify them as tribunals established under the second section of
Article III. The distinction for the Supreme Court was not so much qualitative and
analytical as simply numerical. In the case of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
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dialectically consistent with the majority's opinion, Justice Douglas's
dissent in Glidden nonetheless reached the spirited conclusion that
legislative courts, like courts with Article III judges, "exercise judicial
power. '211  Justice Douglas's conclusion reflects the deep structure
principle of shared authority.
(3) The Emergence of a Public Rights Doctrine
In addition to the Glidden Court's functional approach, the
Supreme Court later employed a formalist "public rights" approach
to explain how tribunals constituted without Article III judges could
share in the exercise of judicial power. While the functional approach
in Glidden simply collapsed from its own incongruity, the categorical
formalism of public rights was introduced twenty years after Glidden
in the plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co.2" and has survived to the present day.
Recast in pragmatic terms, the notion of public rights has remained
part of the Court's later theoretical cartography and is the source of
the transformation that maps legislative courts to Article III. The
for example, tariff appeals jurisdiction represents only an insubstantial portion of the total
judicial docket. See id. at 583. The Court held, therefore, that the status of a district court
or court of appeals would not be changed by a "congressional attempt to invest it with
insignificant nonjudicial business." Id. In the Court's view, "it would be equally perverse
to make the status of [the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals]
turn upon so minuscule a portion of their purported functions." Id.
211. Id. at 605 n.11 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas concluded that "the only
relevant question here is whether a court that need not follow Article III procedures is
nonetheless an Article III court." Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting). Notably, his opinion did
not resolve the ontological implications of his question, whether courts that exercise
judicial power in federal cases and controversies are part of the structural understanding
of Article III. Instead, Justice Douglas castigated the majority for making its decision turn
on the "false standard" of whether the courts in question performed judicial functions
because courts established under both Article I and Article III performed functions of that
character. Id. at 597 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas proposed an alternative
standard, namely, "the manner in which that judicial power is to be exercised." Id. at 598
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Unfortunately, this standard turned out to be the functions
standard by a different name because Justice Douglas devoted the bulk of his opinion to
trying to isolate specific activities (i.e., distribution of federal largesse, zoning, territorial
administration, and giving of advisory opinions) that only courts created under Article I
performed. He also interposed the distinctly odd stipulation that only courts with Article
III judges were bound by the plenary standards of due process in the Bill of Rights. See id.
at 598-601 (Douglas, J., dissenting). This latter proposition appeared grounded on the
traditional view of the jury as a popular check on life-tenured judges. See id. at 602
(Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 82-83 (1989)
(White, J., dissenting) (noting that the role of the jury as a restraint on life-tenured judges
is "inapt" in the context of non-traditional specialized tribunals such as the bankruptcy
courts); infra note 249 (considering legislative courts in relation to the Seventh
Amendment).
212. 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion).
2000] 313
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Court's new jurisprudence of public rights also features prominently
in the transformation that maps supranational adjudication to Article
III.
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. essentially was a search for a
"limiting1213 or "unifying 2 1 4 principle to explain how legislative courts
could co-exist with the Article III judiciary without potentially
displacing Article III courts. In his plurality opinion, Justice
Brennan's formalistic analysis generally proscribed courts created
without Article III judges,2 5 but recognized a trio of purportedly
narrow, historically validated exceptions: territorial courts, military
courts, and courts specializing in public rights.1 6 Justice Brennan's
formalism, however, was conceptually weak. Given the breadth of
legislative action contemplated in Article I, the plurality's approach
did not explain how the purported limiting principle of three
exceptions could sanction courts under certain Article I powers
without licensing Congress to use the plenary range of Article I
powers to create any courts of its choosing. What made the creation
of military courts or courts for the District of Columbia2 7 so
213. Id. at 73 (plurality opinion).
214. Id. at 105 (White, J., dissenting).
215. See id. at 73 (plurality opinion).
216. See id. at 64-70 (plurality opinion). The initial two exceptions were so easily
drawn that they lacked almost any explanatory power. These categories were, first, the
special territorial courts sustained by Chief Justice Marshall in American Insurance Co. v.
Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828), see supra note 195, and second, the military courts
established under Congress's Article I power to regulate the defense forces. See Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 64-66 (plurality opinion).
In Glidden, Justice Harlan had taken the view that the absence of a federal
structure in the territories produced problems not anticipated by the Framers of Article
III, so that the realities of territorial government made it less urgent that judges there
enjoy the independence from Congress and the President envisioned by Article III.
Glidden, 370 U.S. at 546. The territories, in other words, were not ruled directly from
Washington, and "Congress left municipal law to be developed largely by the territorial
legislatures, within the framework of organic acts and subject to a retained power of veto."
Id. The "protections deemed inherent in a separation of governmental powers" could
therefore be dispensed with. Id. To make the Constitution work, as Justice Harlan put it,
Chief Justice Marshall in Canter avoided dogma and doctrinairism and allowed practical
considerations to supervene. See id. at 547. Other courts of limited tenure mentioned by
Justice Harlan had similar provenances. For example, the Court of Private Land Claims
had the power to settle claims under treaties to land in the territories, while the Choctaw
and Chickasaw Citizenship Court had the authority to resolve questions of tribal
membership relevant to property claims within Indian territory under the exclusive
control of the national government. See id. (citing Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415 (1907);
Ex parte Joins, 191 U.S. 93 (1903); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899)).
The touchstone of the Canter decision, in Justice Harlan's summary, was "the need to
exercise the jurisdiction then and there and for a transitory period." Id.
217. In O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933), Justice Sutherland explained
the very wide jurisdiction of the federal courts for the District of Columbia (picking up a
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exceptional that they merited distinct ontological treatment from the
power of Congress to regulate foreign commerce? The answer, in
Justice Brennan's reasoning, seems to have been mere historical
practice 18 But this basis for predicting the constitutional validity of
legislative courts was precisely what the Court itself found wanting
after Glidden.
It is the third Brennan exception, founded on agencies that
adjudicate cases involving public rights, that seems most relevant for
our present investigation. Through public rights, Justice Brennan
placed at the core of his opinion a formalistic idea that had a
potentially wide functional application. Originally, the doctrine
implicated matters arising between the government and others, rather
than the liability of one individual to another (the sphere of private
rights).219  As Justice Brennan noted in his opinion, the federal
government's exposure to lawsuits occurs because it chooses to waive
its right to sovereign immunity -0 The Constitution grants no natural
goodly share of typically state jurisdiction) through an exposition of Congress's "dual
constitutional right" to combine its explicit power in Article III to create federal district
courts with its power in Article I, Section 8 to legislate for the District of Columbia. Id. at
547. This power to legislate included the implied power to create a court system in the
District in the manner of a sovereign state. See id. The conceptualization of a "dual
power," combining an express and implied grant, was limited to the particular and unusual
circumstances of governing the District of Columbia. Id. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
failed to clarify why a similar constitutional duality could not flow from the combination of
any of the enumerated powers in Article I with the express grant of power in Article III.
See infra text accompanying note 229 (discussing Justice White's similar observation).
218. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 64-66, 70 (plurality opinion)
(considering how the Constitution, interpreted in light of "historical consensus," explained
the provenance of each of Justice Brennan's three exceptions).
219. Drawing on earlier authority in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856), the Court in 1931 attempted to
distinguish cases of private rights from those arising between the government and persons
subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions
of the executive or legislative departments. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1931).
Where public rights were implicated, the Court said, Congress may establish" 'legislative'
courts" to aid in the performance of governmental functions. Id. (quoting Canter, 26 U.S.
(1 Pet.) at 546). The jurisdiction of these specialized courts would include governance of
U.S. territories and the District of Columbia or serving as special tribunals to " 'determine
various matters, arising between the government and others, which from their nature do
not require judicial determination and yet are susceptible of it.'" Id. (quoting Ex parte
Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)). The mode of determining this class of matters
would be completely within congressional control. See id. The Court listed these
administrative agencies in connection with the exercise of the congressional power as to
interstate and foreign commerce, taxation, immigration, public lands, public health, post
office facilities, pensions, and payments to veterans. See id. at 51.
220. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 67 (plurality opinion). Thus, courts
have held that they do not have jurisdiction to hear a case against the U.S. government
unless the government has by law granted jurisdiction to the court or otherwise waived its
sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 30 (1953) ("[N]o
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right to sue the federal government, nor did the Framers intend it to
do so.221 Although there are no definitive boundaries between public
rights and private rights, m public rights tend to involve specialized
rights related to the performance of the constitutional functions of the
executive or legislative departments,m which the government could
commit completely to nonjudicial executive determination. 4 Private
rights, in contrast, have historical roots in traditional state-created
common law or equitable causes of action such as breach of
contract.P Accordingly, Justice Brennan reasoned, choosing the less
drastic expedient of committing public rights to the determination of
a legislative court or administrative agency does not fall afoul of the
separation of powers because the judicial monopoly over private
action lies against the United States unless the legislature has authorized it."); see also
Compulsory Jurisdiction, International Court of Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong. 1, 137 (1946) (Sup. Docs. No.
Y4.F76/2:In8/11) [hereinafter ICJ Hearings] (statement of Charles Fahy, Legal Adviser to
the State Department) (discussing the principle of sovereign consent in international
public law).
221. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987) ("The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience
of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force. They confer no right of
action independent of the sovereign will."); see also Glidden, 370 U.S. at 563-64 (stating
that "there was no surrender of sovereign immunity in the plan of the convention" and
concluding accordingly that "Article III's extension of judicial competence over
controversies to which the United States is a party" did not confer jurisdiction over suits to
which the United States is a defendant).
222. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 69 (plurality opinion).
223. See id. at 68 (plurality opinion). In Crowell, however, the Court concluded that
the compensation commission at issue fell within the category of private rights because it
addressed the liability of a private employer to its employee under the law. The Court
accepted that the commission, despite its administrative origin, could nevertheless exhibit
attributes of the federal judicial power. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51. The Court justified
this splitting away of some aspects of judicial power by noting how juries typically assisted
on "the common law side of the Federal courts" (a constitutional requirement) and how
masters and assessors assisted the courts of equity and admiralty without the consent of
the parties to state an account or to find damages. See id. The Court, avowing that
substance should prevail over form in determining constitutional limits, noted that the
application of the statute was limited to the relation of master and servant and that the
method of determining the questions of fact was necessary to the statute's effective
enforcement. See id. at 55.
224. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 68 (plurality opinion). As Justice
Brennan recognized in his concurrence in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products
Co., however, the legislature's freedom to dispose of entitlement claims in any manner it
deemed fit is itself subject to constitutional restraints of due process. See 473 U.S. 568, 596
n.1 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 553-54 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting
that administrative procedures could run afoul of the Constitution if unreasonably
delayed); Goldberg V. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (Brennan, J.) (noting that due
process applies to the withdrawal of various "public assistance benefits").
225. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 69-71 (plurality opinion).
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rights is not invaded. 6
As noted earlier, however, the difficulty with this superficially
neat dichotomy is that its implicit reversion to the idea of a discrete
field of business for Article III judges is hardly different from the
Glidden approach. The bankruptcy scheme challenged in Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. was almost entirely a creature of federal
regulation, enacted pursuant to Congress's Article I powers to create
uniform laws on bankruptciesl 7  As such, however, the scheme
necessarily implicated private, or state, contract and tort rights
because potential plaintiffs must sue the bankrupt debtor for common
law causes of action within the framework of the statutory
bankruptcy.? As Justice White emphasized in dissent, rather than
telling us that bankruptcy courts were not sufficiently like territorial
courts, military courts, or courts that adjudicated public rights, the
plurality needed to explain why bankruptcy courts could not qualify
as legislative courts in their own right2 29 Applying the Brennan
doctrine in all of its literalness, as the plurality did, allowed the mere
presence of some private rights to infect-and to doom-the
congressional scheme.23° And yet, despite the sweeping consequence
of its opinion, the plurality acknowledged that legislative courts can
and do exercise the judicial power as that term has been understood
in Article HI3 The distinction drawn in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co., therefore, seems to have been between exercises of
the judicial power that bear on so-called public rights and those that
bear on what the plurality perceived to be the protected core of
226. See id. at 68 (plurality opinion). In Northern Pipeline Construction Co., Justice
Brennan noted what he saw as "a critical difference between rights created by federal
statute and rights recognized by the Constitution." Id. at 83 (plurality opinion). When
Congress creates a statutory right, it has substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in
which that right will be adjudicated-including the creation of presumptions, assignment
of burdens of proof, and prescription of remedies-and to require parties to seek
vindication of that right before "particularized tribunals created to perform the specialized
adjudicative tasks related to that right." Id. at 80, 83 (plurality opinion). While such
provisions "affect the exercise of [the] judicial power, ... they are also incidental to
Congress' [sic] power to define the right that it has created." Id. at 83 (plurality opinion).
Justice Brennan's cautious embrace of novel fora for the judicial power piqued Justice
White into remarking that "the plurality itself breaks the mold" through its acceptance of
Congress's "substantial discretion" in framing remedies for new federal substantive rights.
Id. at 104 (White, J., dissenting) (internal quotes omitted).
227. See id. at 72 (plurality opinion); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (authorizing
Congress to establish national bankruptcy laws).
228. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 96-97 (White, J., dissenting).
229. See id. at 105 (White, J., dissenting).
230. See id. at 100 (White, J., dissenting).
231. See id. at 63 n.14 (plurality opinion).
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Article III judicial power, 2 the historical corpus of actions that were
customarily dealt with in the courts according to "the law of England
and the States at the time the Constitution was adopted."'233 The
Court, in other words, had regressed full circle to the exhausted
tenets of Glidden's functionality test.
(4) A New Pragmatism-and a New Public Rights Jurisprudence
Three years later, in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Products Co., the Court replaced the theoretical discourse from the
plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. with a new
canon of pragmatism based on Justice White's bold dissent in
Northern PipelineP-5 In Thomas, the Supreme Court upheld as
constitutional an arbitration procedure to fix compensation for
manufacturers of pesticides who registered their products under a
federal pesticide statute and whose data were used by "follow-on
registrants. ' 26  The issue in Thomas was whether Congress could
assign this ostensibly private dispute to a court comprised of non-
Article Ill judges. The majority opinion, written by Justice
O'Connor, held that Congress, when "acting for a valid legislative
purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article I, may
create a seemingly 'private' right that is so closely integrated into a
public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency
resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary. ''237
To hold otherwise, Justice O'Connor reasoned, would be to erect a
needlessly formalistic restraint on Congress's ability to innovate.23 8
It is difficult to say why the premise of Justice White's dissent in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. ultimately held sway in Thomas,
other than to speculate that the Court's political nous told it that
formal categories would have to be endlessly and unsystematically
expanded to allow congressional innovation under Article I93 Justice
232. See id. at 70-71 n.25 (plurality opinion).
233. Id. at 68 (plurality opinion).
234. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
235. See id. at 583, 589 (O'Connor, J.) (holding that an absolute construction of Article
III is not possible, and that substance rather than form must prevail in interpreting Article
Ill).
236. Id. at 575. The manufacturers were required to register their pesticides with the
Environmental Protection Agency.
237. Id. at 593-94.
238. See id. at 594.
239. In its Article III jurisprudence, the Court has been anxious not to thwart
congressional innovation. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833, 851 (1986); Thomas, 473 U.S. at 594; supra notes 1-2 (introducing a theme of
governmental innovation in this Article). In his dissent in Northern Pipeline Construction
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White had been unable to find conceptual daylight between the
ordinary work of the legislative courts and what he called "the
general 'arising under' jurisdiction" of courts with Article HI
judges.2 °  In accordance with this reasoning, the post-Thomas
approach focuses on the intent of Congress and the reasons Congress
offers for not using a court with Article IH judges.24'
This non-categorical approach has been criticized for
indeterminacy242 and for exposing the separation of powers theory to
the whims of judicial intuition.243 While these arguments cannot be
overlooked, the development of the public rights doctrine
nevertheless has normative force in showing how the judiciary
assimilated, rationalized, and demystified the administrative state. As
a transformational concept, the doctrine is no longer merely a rigid
Co., Justice White faulted the plurality's opinion for trying to limit the scope of courts
created under Article I because the plurality failed "to add together the sum of [its
opinion's] parts." 458 U.S. 50, 105 (1982) (White, J., dissenting). In Justice White's view,
legislative courts already operated throughout the country, adjudicating both private and
public rights and matters arising from congressional actions in those areas in which
congressional control could be described as "extraordinary." Id. (White, J., dissenting).
240. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 105 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1).
241. See id. at 108 (White, J., dissenting). Oddly, however, Justice White attached his
thesis to Justice Harlan's analysis in Glidden, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). As Justice White
himself noticed, Justice Harlan came "dangerously close" to adopting the tautological
proposition that "Article III courts" were those with Article III judges, and Article I
courts were those without such judges. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 113
(White, J., dissenting); supra note 184 (discussing the avoidance of these epithetical
descriptions throughout this Article).
242. One of the strongest cases against the new method was made by Robert F. Nagel
in a compilation of his thoughtful essays. See generally NAGEL, supra note 11, at 62-63
(attacking Court for an even "balder" form of balancing than it has adopted in rights
cases). But the post-Thomas doctrine has at least escaped the dogmas of functionalism
that appear to have provoked Nagel's other attack on the "intellectual crabbedness" of
structural jurisprudence. Id. at 64; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in
the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE LJ. 943, 972 (1987) (expressing regret over the lack of a
true objective scale of values external to judges' personal preferences). Aleinikoff seems
to regard much of constitutional theory as an inferior discourse composed largely of
dilettantish social policy. See Aleinikoff, supra, at 992. As previously discussed, however,
the balances struck in Article III separation of powers jurisprudence should not look
outward to Aleinikoff's supposed calculus of social consensus. Instead, deep structure
analysis should occur within the Constitution, driven by the structural understanding that
Article III, Section 1 does not exhaust the organizational creativity that is within the
power of the United States federal government. Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
932 (1997) (holding that no comparative assessment of the various interests can overcome
a fundamental offense to the principle of separate state sovereignty).
243. See Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 70 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (assailing the use of "intuitive judgments" and
"multifactored 'balancing test[s]' " as ultimately harmful to preservation of a system of
separation of powers, a central feature of the Constitution).
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slide-rule to mark off areas of government and private controversy, a
purpose it manifestly failed to serve.244 Rather, public rights offer a
way to nominalize those actions of Congress, pursuant to its
enumerated powers, that create adjudicatory mechanisms in
specialized areas where the claims that may be asserted simply would
not exist but for the intervention of the legislature.245 As Paul Bator
explained, Congress's greater power not to create the claim or right at
all includes the lesser power to assign its jurisdiction to a legislative
court.246
This post-formalist conception of a public right, in other words,
stands on its own terms and not as part of some Saussurean artifice247
that defines a public right only by declaring that it is not a private
right.24 Because knowledge of the work of the ordinary courts comes
244. Thus, Paul Bator felt that the public rights doctrine was an imposture to cover up
the Northern Pipeline Construction Co. plurality's reluctance to cast doubt on the validity
of administrative adjudication. See Bator, supra note 165, at 248.
245. Thus, for example, the right to compensation at issue in Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agricultural Products Co. was created by the federal pesticide statute and did not depend
on or supersede any right to compensation under state law. 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985).
Indeed, the flexibility of the doctrine allows Congress to create ostensibly private rights-
as a right of compensation may seem to be-that are "so closely integrated into a public
regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited
involvement by the Article III judiciary." Id. at 594. The Thomas doctrine thereby casts
doubt on the outcome of Northern Pipeline Construction Co. As Justice White explained
in his dissent in that case, the "extreme specialization" of the non-Article III bankruptcy
courts should not be compromised by the fact that these courts also initially adjudicated a
raft of state law issues. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 96-97 (White, J.,
dissenting).
246. See Bator, supra note 165, at 250.
247. Ferdinand de Saussure's linguistic theory recognized the so-called "principle of
opposition," declaring that "the most precise characteristic [of linguistic signs] is in being
what the others are not." FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL
LINGUISTICS 118 (1959); see also DUCROT & TODOROV, supra note 51, at 18-19 (citing
Saussure as discussing how the linguistic "unit" is defined only by its differences, and as
such, is based upon nothing other than "its noncoincidence with the rest").
248. See Bator, supra note 165, at 250 (arguing that it is unintelligible and futile to
maintain rigid distinctions between questions of private and public rights, and mentioning,
inter alia, Title VII discrimination suits). The existence of a public right does not require
that the federal government be a party of record in the dispute. See Thomas, 473 U.S. at
586, 599. But see Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 38 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). In Justice Scalia's view, the public rights doctrine could not,
as a matter of definition, involve any claims that did not involve the federal government
either as plaintiff or defendant. Justice Scalia placed the origin of the doctrine in a waiver
of sovereign immunity, which is historically accurate, but attacked Thomas's extension to
non-government claims as a pronouncement "by sheer force of our office." Id. at 69
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). But Justice Scalia's
position is unduly formalistic: in the case of my proposed model of supranational aviation
tribunals, for example, the contest between two private airlines before a supranational
tribunal would be a private matter, but the assertion of the claim only could be made
because of federal government action (adoption of the global aviation treaty). In other
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largely from long centuries of practice, there is space for history in
this more focused definition, but only in the sense that we can more
certainly identify a public right by novelty and innovation.249
Administrative agencies or legislative courts that adjudicate new
public rights exercise judicial power under the Constitution because
of congressional innovation under Article I, but primarily by force of
the second section of Article IlI. Thus, the Supreme Court's public
rights jurisprudence has created a transformational sequence that can
incorporate innovative legislative courts into the judicial power of
Article Ill.
The final transformation, discussed below, maps supranational
aviation tribunals to Article H. In the context of a proposed scheme
of supranational aviation tribunals, the gradual legalization and
juridicization of trade law enforcement in the United States speaks
graphically to the idea of new public rights when the common law
provided nothing comparable, or at least offered only very narrowly
circumscribed rights."0
words, the "public" dimension of public rights must refer to the statutory origin of the
right, not to any aprioristic requirement of a claim by or against the federal government.
Cf. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 599 ("A bankruptcy adjudication, though technically a dispute
among private parties, may well be properly characterized as a matter of public rights.").
249. The idea of using novelty and innovation to identify a public right is not intended
to revive the Glidden Court's idea of "the expert feel of lawyers." See supra text
accompanying note 210. It merely directs us to look closely at innovative congressional
activity, especially in the field of international trade where the common law has had
limited influence. See infra note 331 (discussing the history of certain kinds of trade rule
enforcement in the United States).
A recurrent question has been the public rights doctrine's relationship to the
Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. While the Seventh Amendment applies
generally to suits at common law, the full power of the public rights doctrine would allow
precisely these kinds of suits to be adjudicated within a congressionally created regulatory
framework. A thorough treatment of this question lies outside the scope of this Article,
but it is important to recognize that the prevailing, if arguably dubious, judicial perspective
appears to turn Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, in this context, into a subset of
Article III analysis; in other words, a tribunal that fits an acceptable public rights profile
and therefore passes muster under Article III will ipso facto clear Seventh Amendment
objections. See generally Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 37 (holding that, if Congress may
assign the adjudication of a statutory cause of action to a tribunal created outside Article
III, Section 1, then the Seventh Amendment would pose no independent bar to the
adjudication of that action by a non-jury fact-finder).
250. See infra note 331 (noting congressional action to make justiciable antidumping
and antisubsidy determinations). See generally John H. Jackson, Perspectives on the
Jurisprudence of International Trade: Costs and Benefits of Legal Procedures in the United
States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1570 (1984) (discussing the costs and benefits of American
municipal legal procedures in light of the policy objectives sought in implementing
international trade laws).
Within the present discussion, I do not consider whether tribunals created outside
Article III, Section 1 also might exercise the judicial power of the United States in the very
2000]
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c. Third Transformational Sequence: Specialized
Supranational Tribunals
In its jurisprudence of legislative courts and public rights, the
Supreme Court uncovered a deep structure foundation to Article III
that has helped to endow the domestic administrative state with
normative coherence. The tacit knowledge of deep structure revealed
in the Court's jurisprudence-that Article III is capable of supporting
other court systems that share in the exercise of the judicial power-
enables us to consider whether the Constitution offers conceptual
support for a system of supranational aviation tribunals that meets
the nation's needs in foreign commerce. In fact, a transformational
sequence for such a supranational system may be more accessible
than the sequence for legislative courts, particularly in light of how
the Supreme Court has traditionally interpreted the Constitution's
fluid arrangement of foreign relations with great deference and has
avoided plotting fixed lines of scope and responsibility.251
I have attempted to show that state courts and legislative
tribunals can be generated as authentic repositories of Article Ill
judicial power by engaging the deep structure principle of shared or
fragmented judicial authority. Just as a pragmatic federal judiciary
has adapted itself to the rise of the administrative state, there is
significant evidence that Article III judges would not be
temperamentally or philosophically discomfited by supranational
adjudication' 2 The federal courts have shown great deference to the
specific sense that courts created under Article III have a well-recognized plenary power
to review political branch actions that may violate the constitutional order. See supra text
accompanying note 186; see also Thomas, 473 U.S. at 601 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(explaining that the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of judicial review may be what
restrains the exercise of legislative power). Paul Bator wrote of "multiform" agencies,
such as the National Labor Relations Board and the Occupational Health and Safety
Administration, which engage in policymaking, rule-formulation, and enforcement, as well
as adjudication. See Bator, supra note 165, at 238.
251. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, The United States Constitution in Its Third Century:
Foreign Affairs, Distribution of Constitutional Authority: Judicial Deference in Foreign
Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 805, 805-06 (1989) (discussing traditional judicial deference
toward interbranch allocations of authority in cases implicating foreign policy). But see
infra note 337 (noting skepticism concerning a so-called political question doctrine).
Indeed, from its inception, one of the most problematic features of the Constitution was
the Framers' failure to specify "who had sail and who had rudder, and, most important,
where is command" regarding international relations. HENKIN, supra note 2, at 314. The
balance struck, to the extent the courts have agreed to strike it, has tended to favor the
discretion of the political branches. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIURD), supra note 30,
§ 1, reporters' notes 3-4 (speaking largely to the political question doctrine, discussed infra
note 337).
252. But see supra text accompanying notes 12-15 (discussing Justice O'Connor's
wariness about the constitutional implications of supranational adjudication).
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metier of arbitrator in the field of international consensual arbitration
and have even tolerated arbitral dissection of that most laconic
business statute, the Sherman Act053 Justice Blackmun's borrowed
observation in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc.24 is typical of this apparent judicial open-mindedness: " 'The
expansion of American business and industry will hardly be
encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a
parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws
and in our courts.' "I
The Supreme Court's receptiveness to the application of complex
United States laws by foreign arbitral panels is certainly impressive.
It might even form part of an emergent federal Realpolitik that
concedes that "[w]e cannot have trade and commerce in world
markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed
by our laws, and resolved in our courts. 'z 6 If the Court will sanction
consideration of the law of the United States in this manner,
segregated entirely from Article III, it clearly does not expect the
federal judiciary to claim a presumptive monopoly on dispute
resolution under the United States Constitution. But while federal
judges may adopt a pose of internationalism when asked to honor the
decisions of global arbitrators, judicial sufferance might not embrace
the constitutionality of an obligatory supranational court system,
including a Court of International Air Transportation, permanently
seated outside Article Ill. Unlike virtually all legislative courts, after
all, this new tribunal system would contemplate no ultimate review by
a court with Article III judges.0
7
253. See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. MIV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 537 (1995)
(declaring that skepticism over the ability of foreign arbitrators to apply American
maritime law "must give way to contemporary principles of international comity and
commercial practice"); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 625 (1985); see also Shell, supra note 36, at 888 (suggesting that arbitral jurisdiction
effectively "privatizes" these public regulatory schemes by taking them out of the hands of
domestic judges and placing them in the hands of ad hoc international adjudicators). See
generally SASSEN, supra note 10, at 15 (concluding that international commercial
arbitration has become the "leading contractual method for the resolution of transnational
commercial disputes").
254. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
255. Id. at 629 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972)
(holding for the first time that mandatory forum selection clauses for foreign jurisdictions
should be enforced by American courts)).
256. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9; see also Thomas W. Bark, The Binational Panel
Mechanism for Reviewing U.S.-Canadian Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Determinations: A Constitutional Dilemma?, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 681, 706-07 (1989) (noting
the popularity of international commercial arbitration as an alternative to United States
courts).
257. It is important to emphasize again that Supreme Court deference to the political
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The prospect of supranational adjudication, therefore, presents
two distinct constitutional issues for deep structure scrutiny. First, I
will consider whether specific aviation tribunals like the Open Skies
Commission and the Court of International Air Transportation,
contained in my proposed working model s8 could be assimilable at
all to the United States constitutional order. And second, if such
tribunals would indeed rank with state and legislative courts in
wielding judicial power under the Constitution, I must examine the
harder question of whether these novel institutional forms could
displace the appellate hierarchy of Article III. The latter issue, as I
have suggested, falls ultimately within the province of the deep
structure principle of constitutional integrity and will, therefore, be
considered in Part V of this Article. The question of assimilation,
however, will be immediately explored using a third iteration of the
deep structure principle of shared judicial authority. In this context,
the transformational operation derives its "lexical" content from a
foreign relations vision of the Constitution, just as the Supreme Court
tethered the constitutional survival of the legislative courts to the
spiraling domestic agenda of the federal government.
(1) Sovereignty According to the Framers (and a New Paradigm)
Traditionally, the United States has responded with deep
recalcitrance to the basic question of conveying governmental power
to external institutionsP 9 Congressional debates on the new World
branches across a wide spectrum of innovative legislative activity has been common in the
United States constitutional system. See supra notes 1-2 (introducing this theme). A
provision that wins the approval of both Houses of Congress and the President requires
invalidation only for the most compelling constitutional reasons, especially if the statute
"confronts a deeply vexing national problem." Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736
(1986).
258. See supra text accompanying note 27.
259. Paul Stephan has written about a "deeply isolationist streak in United States
culture." Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and
Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 681, 734 (1996-1997). In a recent article on
international criminal tribunals, one author criticized a psychology of "reflexive
resistance" to international jurisdiction among the American judiciary. Bartram S. Brown,
Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and
International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 432 (1998). For an example of
legislative disfavor that long preceded the 1994 WTO debates, see generally Membership
and Participation by the United States in the International Trade Organization: Hearings on
H.R. Res. 236 Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 81st Cong.(1950) (Sup. Docs.
No. Y4.F76/1:In8/20) (rejecting United States participation in the proposed global trade
body). The most prominent recent example of recalcitrance was the President's decision
in 1985 to terminate American recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ). See U.S. Dep't of State, Letter and Statement
Concerning Termination of Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction, reprinted in 24
324 [Vol. 78
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Trade Organization, to take a still-warm example, protested the
imagined foreign knavery of the proposed organization by invoking
the Constitution as a cipher for national sovereignty.260 Sovereignty,
in this traditional understanding, means the state's "right to do as it
wishes, particularly within its own territory, free of external constraint
or interference."'261
Despite Americans' emphasis on protecting their sovereignty,
however, neither the American Declaration of Independence2 62 nor
the United States Constitution263 appeals explicitly to the traditional
I.L.M. 1742, 1743 (1985). For an analysis of American practice with respect to both the
ICJ and its predecessor, see generally Douglas J. Ende, Comment, Reaccepting the
Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: A Proposal for a New U.S.
Declaration, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1145 (1986).
260. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REc. 10,583 (1994) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms)
(describing the WTO as "a United Nations for world trade, combined with a world court"
and as "a potential assault on the sovereignty of the United States of America"). It has
also been emphasized that the Constitution, while making no direct reference to
sovereignty, includes no plan or provision for merging "the Union" with other nations.
See James H. Ramsey, Note, Relinquishing Domestic Sovereignty Through Polypolitical
Treaty in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, 3 WILLAMETrE BULL.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 143, 160 (1995). But cf. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (providing that
Congress may admit new states to the Union).
261. Richard B. Bilder, Perspectives on Sovereignty in the Current Context: An
American Viewpoint, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.. 9, 10 (1994). In this sense, the word "sovereignty"
serves as a surrogate for "statehood," "independence," "equality," "autonomy," and "self-
determination." Id. at 12; see also Ruth Lapidoth, Redefining Authority: The Past,
Present, and Future of Sovereignty, HARv. INT'L REv., Summer 1995, at 8, 9 (discussing
the emergence of an absolute conception of sovereignty).
262. The opening paragraph of the Declaration of Independence announced a
revolutionary people assuming among the powers of the earth "the separate and equal
station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them." THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 1 (U.S. 1776). The Declaration's embrace of a
sovereignty defined by reference to other powers suggests that the notion of state, rather
than popular, sovereignty, was intended. See infra note 263.
263. As an initial matter, we need to distinguish state sovereignty from its junior
sibling, popular sovereignty. As Anne-Marie Slaughter has argued, in the constitutional
democracy established by the Framers, "sovereignty lies with the people," who confer law-
making authority on the federal government. See Uruguay Round Senate Hearings, supra
note 8, at 287 (reprinting a letter from Anne-Marie Slaughter to Sen. Ernest Hollings
(Oct. 18, 1994)); see also Steven Lee, A Puzzle of Sovereignty, 27 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 241,
249 (1997) (mentioning the "familiar idea" that ultimate political power rests with the
electorate). Slaughter derives her assertion of popular sovereignty from the Constitution's
opening invocation, "We the People of the United States." See Uruguay Round Senate
Hearings, supra note 8, at 287 (reprinting a letter from Anne-Marie Slaughter to Sen.
Ernest Hollings (Oct. 18, 1994)); see also Calabresi, supra note 15, at 1377 (celebrating the
"majesty of the Preamble's ringing declaration of popular sovereignty"). Other
constitutions have conflated the ideas of state and popular sovereignty, on the probable
premise that the state's sovereignty is actually the external expression of the internal
sovereign authority already conferred by "popular" action. See, e.g., IR. CONST. art. I
("The Irish nation hereby affirms its inalienable, indefeasible, and sovereign right to
choose its own form of Government, to determine its relations with other nations, and to
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dogmas of state or national sovereignty. In keeping with its practical
bent, the Constitution features a terse preamble, heralding the perfect
Union, that yields quickly to the structural apparatus of the people's
government. Thereafter, the de jure incidents of an externally
conditioned sovereignty do appear-the sweep of legislative powers
to tax and spend, to raise armies and defend the territory, to make
treaties, and to regulate foreign commerce.264 The "powerful idea" of
sovereignty,2 65 however, makes no mark expressis verbis on the text,
not even as a polemical flourish.2ss
Thus, the Framers, keen acolytes of the Law of Nations, must
have felt secure that their new Union would enjoy a natural external
sovereignty.267 Since the time of the Framers, sovereignty has held its
place at the intellectual core of public international law.2 A subtle
mutation of meaning has occurred, however, particularly in the post-
Communist decade since 1989.269 Formerly freighted with the notion
develop its life, political, economic and cultural, in accordance with its own genius and
traditions.").
264. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)
(cataloguing the external powers of government, which would have vested even without
explicit enumeration in the Constitution "as necessary concomitants of nationality"); see
also Anthony Simones, The Reality of Curtiss-Wright, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 411, 412
(1996) (analyzing the distinctions drawn in Curtiss-Wright between domestic and foreign
affairs).
265. Martin A. Rogoff, Interpretation of International Agreements by Domestic Courts
and the Politics of International Treaty Relations: Reflections on Some Recent Decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 559, 623 (1996).
266. See id. at 625 (noting German political theorist George Jellinek's description of
sovereignty as a polemical idea). The Framers, moreover, were hardly unaware of the
word's polemical freight. The states had asserted precisely this kind of internecine
autonomy under the Articles of Confederation: Article 2 of those Articles provided that
"[e]ach State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence." ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION, art. 2, reprinted in MERRILL JENSEN, THE
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 263 (1976); see Raoul Berger, Jack Rakove's Rendition of
Original Meaning, 72 IND. L.J. 619, 636 (1997) (discussing the states' insistence on
sovereignty in framing the Articles of Confederation).
267. See generally Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 318 (attributing power to
exercise the incidents of external sovereignty, the "supreme will," ultimately not to the
Constitution but to the law of nations). In the time of the Framers, the law of nations was
thought to be (at least in part) the product of "natural law." See R.J. SMITH, THE
FACruAL GuIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 222-23
(1995) (discussing the works of classical international law scholars and publicists).
268. See, e.g., Jean Bethke Elshtain, Sovereign God, Sovereign State, Sovereign Self, 66
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1355, 1355 (1991) (commenting that sovereignty remains essential
for full membership in international society). But see Schaefer, supra note 94, at 329
(noting some international scholars' readiness to discard use of the term "sovereignty"
because of semantic confusion).
269. The coming of a new world order had been heralded much sooner, however.
Senator Wayne Morse, speaking on the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice, counseled his Senate colleagues in 1946 that "the narrow interpretations of
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of excluding all others 0 the newest version of the doctrine of
sovereignty rests on a paradigm of interaction.271 The globalization of
markets is only one among several keystones of the paradigm. The
reported demise of the nation-state, for example, has not occurred.
On the contrary, the global club of sovereigns has almost doubled
since the founding of the United Nations.27 2 The international system,
therefore, has a new morphology of rising trade activity among a
larger number of states.273 Transnational process,2 74 to modify Harold
Koh's useful term, has remodeled the sovereignty doctrine to
emphasize its neglected counter-side: sovereignty is not only a claim
of freedom from external interference, it is also the liberty to permit
some kinds of external interference.27 5  That insight revives a
timeworn pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court, which
stated in 1938 that international treaties and conventions necessarily
restrict to some extent the freedom of action that defines
sovereignty that have heretofore existed in international law are going to have to be
broadened." IC! Hearings, supra note 220, at 32 (statement of Sen. Wayne Morse).
270. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 1, 43 (Apr. 9) (separate opinion of
Judge Alvarez) (describing sovereignty as encompassing "the whole body of rights and
attributes which a state possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of all other states"
(emphasis added)).
271. As Richard Bilder has suggested, "this entire classical model of international
governance-for which the term 'sovereignty' appears in one sense to have become a
code-word or symbol-is under challenge." Bilder, supra note 261, at 12-13; see also
Lapidoth, supra note 261, at 10-11 (analyzing the decline of absolutist conception of
sovereignty provoked by worldwide interconnectedness, but also within traditional
monolithic state structures through diffusion of state power to substate ethnic, social, and
religious groups).
272. See Bilder, supra note 261, at 13.
273. But cf. FRANCK, supra note 20, at 477 (providing contrarian reference to an
"anarchic rabble" of states). Another recasting of traditional sovereignty has emphasized
its dispersal to transnational private regimes, new supranational organizations (such as the
WTO and the European Union), and the various international human rights codes.
Sassen has described a "decentering" of sovereignty, whereby all of these neoteric
institutions constrain the autonomy of national states through a "web of obligations." See
SASSEN, supra note 10, at 29, 31. In an extreme rendering of this paradigm, economic
citizenship is held not by citizens but by the new global capital markets, which exercise the
accountability functions associated with citizenship. See id. at 38-39. A decentered
reading of sovereignty, however, would be less an erosion of the traditional form than its
transformation to new locations and contexts. See id. at 31.
274. See Koh, supra note 95, at 183-84 (describing transnational legal process as a non-
traditional cumulative theory of how public and private actors-states, international
organizations, transnational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and private
citizens-"interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and international fora to
make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize rules of transnational law").
275. See SASSEN, supra note 10, at 27-28 (describing how the nation-state interacts
deeply with the global economy, especially in internalizing legal forms that implement
global processes).
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sovereignty 76  In other words, if sovereignty now expresses a
reanimated sense of autonomy, it does so in the guise of a perfectly
rational paradox: its existence also is defined by its capacity to be
given away277
The new insight is more accurately a shift in focal point rather
than a fundamental reconstruction of the image of sovereignty.278
Mutual consent by sovereign states was the catalyst for the entire
international political system. 9  For the purposes at work in the
present Article, the modem view places the accent on the trade value
of sovereignty rather than on its old association with consensual
statecraft. 28 It is a dynamic, purposive view, rather than the kind of
276. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 52 (1938); see also WERNER LEVI,
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 82 (1991) (arguing that the "conclusion of
treaties is the exercise of an attribute of sovereignty, not a limitation"); Jonathan T. Fried,
Two Paradigms for the Rule of International Trade Law, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 39, 40 (1994)
(commenting on the impossibility of complete and absolute sovereignty when states enter
treaties with other states); Farah Hussain, Note, A Functional Response to International
Crime: An International Justice Commission, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 755, 772 (1996)
(stating that the concept of an absolute sovereignty is obsolete and concluding that every
time a nation enters into a treaty it cedes some of its rights, but gains something in return
that better serves its people).
277. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27 (1995)
("Sovereignty, in the end, is status-the vindication of the state's existence as a member of
the international system.").
278. See Martii Koskenniemi, The Wonderful Artificiality of States, in THE AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 88TH ANNUAL MEETING:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY 22,23 (1994) (noting the sociological view that
sovereignty in the traditional sense has become illusory as states enter economic, military,
and ecological interdependence, and the ethical view that regards statehood as morally
indefensible egotism and an inessential, historical accident that should have no moral
significance in measuring our duties to people in general).
279. See Lee, supra note 263, at 256 (citing LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 16
(3d ed. 1993)).
280. See C. WILFRED JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 123 (1958) (observing
that the primary goal of "progressive thought in the field of international law since 1919
has been to subdue ... sovereignty in the interest of the rule of law"). The international
trade policy of the United States since the WTO negotiations has been focused by
congressional mandate toward substitution of a rules-based system, with disputes resolved
through common external institutions, for the power-centered, internal unilateralism
reflected in the sanctions apparatus of the trade statutes. See JACKSON, supra note 6, at
109-11.
Inevitably, there is an evolutionary aspect to the success of global rulemaking. If a
culture of compliance emerges, the organization will thrive, and the organization's
applications and declarations of law will bind the member states. "The resurgence of rules
and procedures in the service of an organized international order is the legacy of all wars,
hot or cold." Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations
Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 205 (1993). It was the sovereign will of
the United States, in fact, which appeared to promote this paradigm transformation in
preparation for a future in which American economic hegemony would no longer define
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zero-sum game of Mettemichian diplomacy. 8' In this modem view,
sovereignty is not history's defiant noli me tangere; in utilitarian
terms, it is meant for something. 8 Systems of open trade and non-
most of the vectors of international economic relations.
281. See Schaefer, supra note 94, at 332. Accordingly, except as bounded by the
Constitution, United States delegations are free to volunteer the nation's consent for
whatever diplomatic purpose they might have. The United States could, for example,
properly award privately owned airlines the right of standing before the institutions
proposed in the aviation model. See generally Steve Charnovitz, Participation of
Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 331 (1996) (proposing that nongovernmental organizations, including business
groups, should have standing before WTO dispute settlement tribunals); St. Korowicz,
supra note 41, at 533 (making a case for limited recognition of the legal personality of
individuals before tribunals applying international law).
282. Literally, "touch me not." According to the evangelist John, these were Christ's
words when he was approached by Mary Magdalene after the Resurrection. See John
20:17. On the growth of the nation-state, see generally HARRY G. GELBER,
SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH INTERDEPENDENCE 5, 7 (1997) (suggesting that states emerged
above all as organizations for the management of-primarily military-power and that
power politics, in turn, is "the politics of not being overpowered").
283. The idea of the new sovereignty as a master key to economic betterment is
scarcely threatening. Perhaps, however, it may have a Panglossian feel, the kind of thing
for which international lawyers are routinely chided by their realist colleagues. See
Stephan, supra note 259, at 733-34 (chastising international lawyers for their smug
confidence that "human progress marches in step with gains in the extent and significance
of settled international rules"). After all, states that solemnly intone pacta sunt servanda
in their relationships with other states have shown little hesitation in invoking a
countervailing sovereign right to sever those ties if their bargains threaten to sour. While
arguably the "prisoner's dilemma" equilibrium, see Shell, supra note 36, at 861, helps to
deter violation or renunciation of treaties, in practice states do exercise rights of
withdrawal in response to sudden domestic micropressures. The American air talks
delegation mentioned in my aviation treaty model, for example, see supra text
accompanying note 31, would be well aware of France's denunciation of its bilateral air
transport agreement with the United States in 1995, a tactic adopted to protect Air France
against rising market penetration by much larger American transatlantic carriers. See
HAVEL, supra note 23, at 181-82.
What response does the new sovereignty have to the old pattern of scofflaw
states? One response is the subject of this Article: in the interactive paradigm of
sovereignty, state consent can escalate to a level at which elements of the state's autonomy
are transferred to the supranational level, thereby checking the right-and the power-to
withdraw from the treaty system. See Weiler & Haltern, supra note 102, at 419 (arguing
that the constitutive act "may explicitly or implicitly extinguish the separate existence of
the constituent units"). The United States Constitution was itself a centralizing counter-
thrust to the foreign relations pusillanimity of the Articles of Confederation. See Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages, Tax Comm'r, 423 U.S. 276, 283 (1975) (noting that a "compelling
reason" for the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was that the Articles left the individual
states free to burden commerce with foreign countries "very much as they pleased");
Ronan Doherty, Note, Foreign Affairs v. Federalism: How State Control of Criminal Law
Implicates Federal Responsibility Under International Law, 82 VA. L. REV. 1281, 1285
(1996) (concluding that eliminating the states' ability to act on the world stage was a
"principal motivation" for replacing the Articles of Confederation); supra note 97
(discussing Bruce Ackerman's theory of post-Confederation Union).
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national adjudication are not established in defiance of sovereignty,
as some popular commentators like to assert; instead, they are
emanations of that sovereignty.85 And the interactive paradigm of
sovereignty, as we have seen, meets no impediment in the surface
structure of the Framers' Constitution.
(2) International Trade in the Constitution: Treaty and Foreign
Commerce Powers
The theme of constitutional flexibility in external trade relations,
introduced by the new paradigm of sovereignty, must now be pursued
more deeply. The Framers, for example, made treaties with foreign
nations co-equal to congressional laws without restricting treaties'
potential field of application.2 6 They mentioned foreign commerce
only iconically2 7 and did not seek to orient the specific commercial
policies of successive American governments toward either
protectionism or mercantilism. In building a transformation for
supranational tribunals, therefore, I will next consider the treaty and
the government's role in foreign commerce as the primary foreign
trade features of the Constitution's surface structure. In positing a
transformation that will map supranational tribunals to Article III, I
will look, in a phrase, to the transformational power of the
"International Trade Constitution."
(a) The Special Discourse of Treaties
The conceptual landscapes inhabited by legislative courts and
284. See, e.g., PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, THE GREAT BETRAYAL: How AMERICAN
SOVEREIGNTY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE ARE BEING SACRIFICED TO THE GODS OF THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY (1998) (arguing that liberal free trade affronts U.S. economic and
political sovereignty).
285. See Luzius Wildhaber, Sovereignty and International Law, in THE STRUCTURE
AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 425, 442 (R. St. J. MacDonald & Douglas
Johnston eds., 1983); see also David R. Pumell, 1993 International Trade Update: The
GATT and NAFTA, 73 NEB. L. REV. 211, 226 (1994) (arguing that the abstraction of
sovereignty is the supreme tautology and noting that sovereignty would be a "meaningless
shibboleth" if all it meant were that states could indefinitely resist supranational
settlement); Rogoff, supra note 265, at 623 (asserting that "auto-limitations" define the
existence of sovereignty).
286. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land
.... "); infra notes 290-94 and accompanying text (contrasting the procedural
requirements for approving treaties with those for enacting laws and noting that the
substantive scope of treaties is not defined by the enumerated powers of Article I).
287. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating Congress's power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations").
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supranational tribunals are not as distant from one another as might
first be imagined. Although we tend to think of two constitutional
fields of operation, a domestic and a foreign, the Framers did not
compartmentalize their thinking in this way. The foreign commerce
power, as they conceived it, contributed as much to domestic welfare
as the general powers of the Congress to tax and appropriate.2
Nevertheless, the constitutional design incorporates one
paradigm of process, the international treaty, that represents a
conscious departure from the domestic route to legislation. 8 9 Under
288. See THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 177 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987) (advocating a general power "to regulate commerce" and describing the commerce
power inter alia in terms of a capacity to form "beneficial treaties with foreign powers").
The Constitution, in its pragmatic way, grants Congress the right to regulate "foreign
commerce" as one of a dozen or so taxonomically undifferentiated external and domestic
powers of government. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 1-17.
289. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 705 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996
(1979) (mem.) (noting that a treaty is sui generis, not just another law). Similarly,
Alexander Hamilton conceived of the treaty as an entirely unique species of power-
neither legislative nor executive in nature, but partaking of both through the management
of foreign negotiations (executive power) and the importance of the operation of treaties
as laws (legislative power). See THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, § 302, cmt. c
(stating that international law knows no limitation on the purpose or subject matter of
international agreements, other than that they may not conflict with a peremptory norm of
international law). See generally Malvina Halberstam, A Treaty Is a Treaty Is a Treaty, 33
VA. J. INT'L L. 51 (1992) (discussing and rejecting the so-called "dual treaty" rule that
distinguishes between the domestic and international effects of treaty obligations of the
United States); John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy
Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310 (1992) (exploring policy considerations relating to the
effect of a treaty in United States domestic law and arguing against the direct application
of treaties in the present state of public international law).
Under United States constitutional law, the treaty proper is a product of
executive/legislative collaboration (i.e., the President acts with the advice and consent of
the Senate) under Article II of the Constitution. But the American system has evolved
other forms of what McDougal and Lans called, generically and tendentiously, "the
agreement," including the sole executive agreement and the congressional/executive
agreement. See Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive
or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: 1, 54 YALE
L.J. 181, 186 (1945). A treaty may also emerge as the joint product of both Houses of
Congress and the President, a mixed form that has attracted scholarly support. See Bruce
Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. REV. 801, 802-03
(1995) (arguing that a change in constitutional practice occurred in the aftermath of the
Roosevelt New Deal that conventionalized the idea of a two-House treaty); see also
Stephan, supra note 259, at 723 (concluding that there are no satisfactory candidates for a
constitutional definition of a treaty in determining to which international agreements and
norms the Senate-only rule applies). See generally Jack S. Weiss, Comment, The Approval
of Arms Control Agreements as Congressional-Executive Agreements, 38 UCLA L. REv.
1533, 1535-36 (1991) (describing President George Bush's "four options to bring the
chemical weapons agreement into force"). Notably, despite its ancient provenance, the
treaty gained its widest usage and importance in the late twentieth century. See Stefan A.
Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control over the Conclusion
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the United States Constitution, treaties are different from legislation
in at least three respects: they are approved by only one House of
Congress (the Senate), they cannot be adopted by Congress without
the President's consent,290 and they assume the participation of
foreign countries in the United States law-making process.2 91 These
features give the treaty almost the status of a distinct department of
government-a collaboration of the executive and legislative
branches29 that also requires the consent of a foreign nation.293 To
and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 641 (1991).
290. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Compare this absolute requirement of consent,
which does not allow for a congressional override of presidential authority, with ordinary
legislation, in which Congress has the power to override a presidential veto. See id. art. I,
§ 7, cl. 2 (stating Congress's power to override a presidential veto of legislation by a two-
thirds majority of both Houses).
291. John Jay observed that "a treaty is only another name for a bargain, and ... it
would be impossible to find a nation who would make any bargain with us, which should
be binding on them absolutely, but on us only so long and so far as we may think proper to
be bound by it." THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 378-79 (John Jay) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987).
292. This is one of the paradoxes of the Constitution. If Congress is the recipient of
"all legislative powers herein granted," how do we conceptualize the treaty instrument,
which is "made" by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and
which is (notwithstanding the last-in-time doctrine) functionally co-eminent with laws
made under the Constitution? Is the "President-and-Senate," for purposes of treaty-
making, a co-ordinate legislative branch? Cf Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 720 (MacKinnon, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (observing that the treaty power seems to draw
in equal measure on the presidential strength in negotiations and the legislative strength in
granting the resulting product the status of a law). Steven Calabresi has suggested that
exercises of government power can be characterized among the three departments by their
procedural requirements. See Calabresi, supra note 15, at 1391. In this analysis,
bicameralism and presentment indicate the legislative power, case or controversy litigation
manifests the judicial power, and any government action taken when these procedures are
absent is an exercise of the executive power. See id. But cf supra text accompanying note
165 (arguing that the judicial power is the power least identified by process in the
Constitution). The treaty, with its hybrid executive/legislative form, fits uneasily-if at
all-into Calabresi's scheme. Moreover, this kind of neat partitioning takes little account
of the (constitutional) effects of inter-branch governmental innovation.
293. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 721 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part) (quoting JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, RULES AND PRACTICES, House of
Representatives, 96th Cong., § 599 (1979)). This is a striking feature of the treaty that was
recognized by the Framers: the requirement, by its very nature, that it involves a non-
constituent of the American constitutional order, namely, a foreign nation. Foreign
commerce, for example, "by its nature implies the involvement of another sovereign."
William J. Davey, The Appointments Clause and International Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms: A False Conflict, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1315, 1324 (1992); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 289, at 425 (asserting that these are agreements "between
sovereign and sovereign"). Accordingly, if Congress wants to use its Article I legislative
powers to regulate the conduct of foreign commerce by other nations, it will be limited to
unilateral declarations of "policy," or unilateral exactions of tariffs and tariff equivalents.
International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94 Stat. 35
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1302, 1371-1386, 1482, 1502-1508 (1994)), was
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that precise extent, the Framers did not define the substantive scope
of constitutional treaty-making either by the enumerated powers that
bind Congress under Article I of the Constitution, or by the cloudy
reaches of the executive power under Article II294 Consequently,
much constitutional ink has been spilled in consideration of the so-
called Bricker question-the capacity of treaties to be used for
purposes that might lie beyond the federal government's remit of
attributed powers.295 The Bricker debate is both an expression of the
an example of unilateral, non-prescriptive congressional policymaking in foreign
commerce. Designed to encourage deregulation in the global air transport industry, it
granted permissive authority to the President for a more flexible regime of pricing and
route allocation, but could not follow the domestic deregulation statutes by decreeing a
phased elimination of regulatory control in the international skies. Consequently,
programmatic goal-setting took precedence over hard law. See generally HAVEL, supra
note 23, at 159-60 (noting that Congress was confined to a kind of "unilateral declaration
of deregulation" in the international sphere).
294. The early ratification debates on the treaty power, though nominally guided by
the law of nations, nonetheless disclosed unease that the power's scope as a royal
prerogative had been virtually without limit. See 3 STATE CONVENTION DEBATES, supra
note 146, at 502. Patrick Henry, who argued that treaties would have more force in the
United States "than in any part of Christendom," saw no restraint on using a treaty to
subvert the Constitution itself. Id. at 500, 504. Inevitably, repeated invocation of the more
abstract idea of the "Law of Nations" created the sense that international law, the general
"law of nations," was superior to the individual law of any one nation, and this tension
pervaded the ratification debates. See id. at 502. Perhaps it was to deflect imperial
pretensions that the Framers eventually divided the treaty power dexterously between the
executive and the legislature in Article II. See generally Jack N. Rakove, Solving a
Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause as a Case Study, 1 PERSP. AM. HIST. 233
(new ser. 1984) (discussing the complex and unclear origins of the Framers' decision to
split the treaty power between the Senate and the President). The supermajoritarian
Senate vote "did not affect the scope of the treaty power, but only made ratification of
treaties more difficult." Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(emphasis added). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, § 303, cmt. b
(stating that the scope of U.S. treaty power is limited only by constitutional
considerations). Congressional ambivalence about the scope of the treaty power persists,
however, as shown by the practice of attaching reservations to treaties to indicate that the
Constitution takes precedence. For example, the Senate attached a reservation to the
Genocide Convention of 1948 which states that "[n]othing in the Convention requires or
authorizes legislation or other action by the United States prohibited by the Constitution
of the United States as interpreted by the United States." COVEY T. OLIVER ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 761 (4th ed. 1995).
The Supreme Court, too, has had moments of existential hesitation. See, e.g., United
States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 208 (1926) (mentioning its practice of regarding treaties
as "usually subject to the general limitations in the Constitution" (emphasis added)).
295. In its initial, undiluted incarnation (submitted in 1951), the Bricker Amendment,
sponsored by Senator John W. Bricker, would have amended the Supremacy Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, to provide that no treaty or executive agreement could be made
"respecting the rights and freedoms of citizens of the United States recognized in [the]
Constitution [or] the character and form of government prescribed by the Constitution
and laws of the United States." SJ. Res. 102, 82d Cong. (1951), reprinted in DUANE
TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF EISENHOWER'S
2000]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
enormous potential scope of the treaty power and an admonishment
that legislation by treaty can provoke a possible violation of the deep
structure principle of constitutional integrity.
2 96
Because the treaty is the joint product of sovereign nations, it
requires a form of legal discourse that acknowledges a much wider
field of potential application than governments may enjoy, or be
constitutionally entitled to enjoy, in their domestic law-making.
297
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP app. A at 221 (1988). Later amendments progressed through
more or less restrictive attempts to cabin the reach of the treaty power as a viable
substitute for the domestic constitutional processes of legislation and adjudication. In
1952, for example, a revised version of the proposal would have prohibited the vesting "in
any international organization or in any foreign power" of the legislative, executive, or
judicial powers of the United States. S.J. Res. 130, 82d Cong. (1952), reprinted in
TANANBAUM, supra, app. C at 222. The basic thrusts of the evolving formulas were to
deny the supremacy of treaties or executive agreements over state or federal law
(including the Constitution itself) and to provide that a treaty normally would have no
force in domestic law without implementing legislation. See Barry Friedman, Federalism's
Future in the Global Village, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1441, 1465 (1994); see also Joel R. Paul,
The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 CAL.
L. REV. 671, 703-04 (1998) (detailing reasons for isolationists' support of this type of
legislation in the 1950s).
296. Supporters of the Bricker Amendment tried to demagogue the domestic legal
effects of hortatory global instruments like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
As Duane Tananbaum has recounted, American Bar Association President Frank
Holman warned the Utah Bar Association in 1948 that the Declaration's provisions
proclaiming freedom of residence and freedom of movement "might easily be interpreted
as authorizing some agency of the United Nations like the World Court to nullify our
immigration laws and enable large numbers from the over-populated areas of China,
India, and of Indonesia to move into the United States." TANANBAUM, supra note 295, at
10. Though the issue is far from finally settled, the Supreme Court pronounced obiter
dictum in Reid v. Covert that "the United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution,"
so that "no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress [there, to
provide for non-jury military trial of dependents accompanying United States armed
forces in Britain and Japan] or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the
restraints of the Constitution." 354 U.S. 1, 5-6, 16 (1956). The Court found nothing in the
text of the Supremacy Clause nor any suggestion in the founding debates that intimated
that treaties-and the laws enacted under them-would not have to comply with the
provisions of the Constitution. See id. at 26; S. Candice Hoke, Transcending Conventional
Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the Supremacy Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV. 829,862 (1992);
see also 2 HYDE, supra note 32, § 494, at 9 ("An unconstitutional treaty must be regarded
as void."). Thus, a treaty which purported to unseat a state governor or to alter
substantially the machinery of state government would seem manifestly at variance with
the requirements of the Constitution. See 2 HYDE, supra note 32, § 497, at 12 n.1. For a
recent treatment of these issues, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American
Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REv. 390, passim (1998).
297. See Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 1445, 1475 (1985). Chayes has tried to show that lawyers have been myopic about
international law by focusing too narrowly on court adjudication for every dispute,
including inter-branch constitutional rivalries, that pervades the domestic legal system. In
Chayes's analysis, law as a system of allocating public powers, the stuff of inter-branch
disputes, was by no means a creature of only courts and judges. See Abram Chayes, A
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This expansive view29s looks beyond the enumerated categories of
substantive legislative power, for example, that bind the United
States Congress under Article I of the Constitution. In fact, when the
Framers engineered the treaty power into the superstructure of their
new constitution, but defined it formally rather than substantively as
a competing source of positive law,299 they encouraged a sanguineness
about the scope of law-making under the treaty power 0 The
Framers' implicit understanding of a new legal discourse for foreign
relations, and with respect to the broad scope of treaty-making, is
likewise revealed in their citation to the "Law of Nations" among the
enumeration of powers in Article I.301
Common Lawyer Looks at International Law, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1396, 1413 (1965).
Chayes's intent in his 1965 article, to justify the lack of congestion in the World Court's
docket, appears dated today as the concept of supranational adjudication plants its roots in
the more fertile soil of the post-Communist world trade order.
298. In the precise context of supranational adjudication, the internationalist cast of
the Constitution inspired Thomas Raeburn White, in 1908, to speak expansively of a "very
reasonable assumption that our fathers [sic] intended the grant of judicial power to be
exercised within the limits of the United States to be subject to the great and unlimited
power of making treaties which was to regulate our relations with all the peoples of the
earth." White, supra note 32, at 506.
299. There is no doubt that the Framers intended this result; they wanted treaties to
have "the force of law." THE FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 289, at 425; see Rakove,
supra note 294, at 264,280. Indeed, Rakove explains that this underlying recognition that
treaties were legally binding would alone have prohibited the Convention from nakedly
empowering the President to make them on his own authority. See Rakove, supra note
294, at 266-67,285-86.
300. The fact that the Constitution embraced the treaty even though the Framers were
aware of its inherent frailty compared with the force of domestic statutory law is a
peculiarity in their plan of government. In a Machiavellian mood, Hamilton, for example,
wrote of how compacts between nations, however precise and comprehensive, were
"subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and war, of observance and nonobservance, as
the interests or passions of the contracting powers dictate." THE FEDERALIST No. 15,
supra note 39, at 148; see supra note 283 (discussing the subject of scofflaw states). It was
an "afflicting lesson" for governments, Hamilton reasoned, "how little dependence is to be
placed on treaties which have no other sanction than the obligations of good faith." TiE
FEDERALIST No. 15, supra note 39, at 148. Speaking later of the importance of the
supremacy of the Union's laws, Hamilton argued that supremacy was required because
otherwise the new constitution would be "a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of
the parties." THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 225 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987).
301. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (empowering Congress "[t]o define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of
Nations"). For an interesting account of the law of nations in late eighteenth century
jurisprudence, see generally Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early
American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 823 (1989) (commenting that "[i]mplicit in this
widespread usage was acceptance of the validity of the law of nations as knowable
doctrine"). The existence of a knowable law of nations, divined in large measure through
the work of scholars such as Vattel and Grotius, was displayed vividly in contemporary
judicial opinions. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 224, 226-30 (1796)
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Even more radical, given their discernible skepticism about the
reliability of treaty partners, is the Framers' instruction in Article VI
of the Constitution, dubbed the Supremacy Clause, that treaties are
to be accorded in domestic law a status at least equivalent to
statutes3 2 While both too much and too little can be made of the
mention of treaties in the Supremacy Clause-as Jim Chen points
out, a treaty has no greater constitutional "positivistic value" than a
valid statute3 -nevertheless, it has at least that equivalency, that
coequal status,304 which allows a latitudinarian view of the treaty
(Chase, J.) (addressing the laws of war, including confiscation and restitution of property
between belligerents); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793) (accepting
that the United States, by its place among the nations of the earth, had "become amenable
to the laws of nations"). Despite its archaic flavor, the phrase continues to be used in
modem judicial opinions. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466
U.S. 243, 262 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (confirming that the language of the law of
nations is always to be consulted in the interpretation of treaties).
302. U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2; see also United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 208
(1926) ("The decisions of this Court generally have regarded treaties as on much the same
plane as acts of Congress .... "). There are, however, two doctrines of judicial
interpretation that have upset the legal parity that the Framers must have contemplated.
First, following the opinion of Chief Justice John Marshall in Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829), treaties of the United States either require no further
congressional action (they are self-executing and can be invoked directly as binding
federal law in the domestic courts) or they require implementing legislation (they are non-
self-executing and create no enforceable rights or obligations under federal law). See
Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353, 355-56 (5th Cir. 1981); George Slyz, Note,
International Law in National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 65, 78 (1995-1996)
(distinguishing between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties). The option to
make treaties non-self-executing has proven a boon to Congress in restraining the
domestic force of international commitments such as the WTO and human rights charters.
See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. S8068-72 (daily ed. April 2, 1992) (declaring the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to be non-self-executing); see also Schneider, supra
note 42, at 597 (commenting that the idea that international law might differ from or
exceed the reach of U.S. domestic law "remains anathema to many members of Congress
and other citizens").
A second judicial doctrine, known as the last-in-time principle, also sits uneasily
with the "monist" pretensions of Article VI of the Constitution. Simply put, the principle
states that the latest expression of sovereign authority prevails, so that an international
obligation can be superseded by a later inconsistent federal statute. See The Head Money
Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (denying treaties any superiority over an act of Congress,
"which may be repealed or modified" by acts of a later date). But cf. Vazquez, supra note
41, at 1114 (indicating the existence of strong evidence that the Framers intended that
treaties be "lexically superior" to statutes).
303. Chen, supra note 195, at 1462.
304. So, paradoxically, the last-in-time doctrine, see supra note 302, is a sign of
equivalency with domestic legislation. See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 289, at 591;
see also Jordan J. Paust, U.N. Peace and Security Powers and Related Presidential Powers,
26 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 15, 20-21 (1996) (discussing the implications of the last-in-
time doctrine with respect to obligations of United Nations membership). It should not be
forgotten that a treaty is, by itself, what John Jay called "[a] constitutional act[] of power,"
with as much legal validity and obligation as if it proceeded from the legislature. See THE
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power that otherwise (in a truly dualistic system, for example305 )
would be more questionable. 6
(b) The Constitutional Centrality of Foreign Commerce
The indeterminate contours of the treaty power mirror the
unsettled and unilaterally uncontrollable agendas of foreign relations
and foreign commerce.3 7  But a potentially boundless substantive
scope for the treaty power, while practically efficient, cannot ipso
facto sanction species of inter-sovereign association, such as a set of
supranational aviation tribunals, which are unfamiliar to the
American law-maker.3° Mistrusting a transfer of sovereign judicial
authority to an external tribunal that would directly affect United
States airline corporations and passengers, the law-maker (Congress)
would demand that the transfer be couched as an exercise of ordinary
legislative powers rather than as an emanation of the global reach of
the treaty power. In this political context, the project for
FEDERALIST No. 64, supra note 291, at 378; see also Hoke, supra note 296, at 839
(referring to treaties as a favored class of law and as supreme law under Article VI of the
Constitution).
305. See generally MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 83-
84 (2d ed. 1993) (dividing municipal legal systems into "monist," viewing international and
domestic legal orders as a unity, and "dualist," treating national and international legal
systems as separate, "each with its own power to settle the effect any rule of law might
have within it"). The American constitutional system exhibits elements of both monism
and dualism. See supra note 302.
306. See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 289, at 591-94; supra text accompanying
notes 39-41 (discussing standing of individuals to appear before proposed supranational
aviation tribunals); see also Vazquez, supra note 41, at 1084-85 (arguing that, through the
Supremacy Clause, the Framers gave treaties the status of law to ensure that they would
operate directly on individuals, supplanting the traditional view that treaties, as
international instruments, are operative only on "states as bodies politic").
307. See supra note 293 (discussing the predominantly unilateral effects of American
international air transport competition legislation).
308. Supranational adjudication must also contend with another field of resistance that
lies beyond the purely legal and constitutional issues treated here. As I noted in
introducing the discussion of sovereignty, see supra text accompanying note 259, there has
long been a strong public distrust of adjudication by tribunals made up of non-American
judges, even though the United States has historically accepted this kind of adjudication
(albeit without the absolute prospective bindingness proposed for the supranational
aviation model) in numerous forms. See Strengthening the International Court of Justice:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong. 24-25 (1973) (Sup.
Does. No. Y4.F76/2:In8/42) (discussing the history of United States acceptance of foreign
adjudication beginning with the Jay Treaty of 1794 between the United States and Great
Britain); supra text accompanying note 40 (distinguishing the proposed aviation tribunals
from situations in which the United States "mediates" the presence of individuals before
an international tribunal). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, § 902
(discussing interstate claims for violation of international obligations owed to the claimant
state or resulting in injury to the claimant state's nationals).
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supranational aviation tribunals 3 9 profits from the clear allocation to
the federal government in the surface structure of the Constitution of
both the general treaty power in Article II and the specific
congressional power in Article I "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations. ' 310  As the Supreme Court has indicated, foreign
commerce is "preeminently a matter of national concern,' 31 recalling
the Framers' overriding purpose that "the Federal Government must
speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with
foreign governments.
312
The desire for a single voice, however, while accurate, hardly
captures the centrality of foreign commerce to the mission of the new
nation as a "commercial republic. 313 One of the recurrent themes of
The Federalist Papers was that foreign commerce would not be
facilitated merely by the plan of federation, but ought to be a
309. The global governance of the airline industry is a project of international
economic law, itself a term that the Framers would understand from the revolutionary
ferment caused by adversarial impositions of imposts, customs, and duties. The Framers
hoped to establish a uniform foreign trade policy and to encourage wealthy foreigners to
do business with and emigrate to the United States. See Thomas Michael McDonnell,
Defensively Invoking Treaties in American Courts-Jurisdictional Challenges Under the
U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention by Foreign Defendants Kidnapped Abroad by U.S.
Agents, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1401,1415 (1996).
310. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The foreign commerce power, in this context, would
be aided by the Export-Import Clause, id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2, which prohibits the states from
burdening the federal government's exclusive regulation of foreign commerce by imposing
"imposts and duties on imports and exports" without permission from Congress, Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages, Tax Comm'r, 423 U.S. 276,285 (1976); see also United States v. Guy
W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 659 (4th Cir. 1953) (holding that the power to regulate
foreign commerce is not among the powers incident to the Presidency, but is expressly
vested by the Constitution in the Congress).
311. Japan Line Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979). The indispensability
of powers over foreign trade and diplomacy to the enterprise of nation-building was a
recurrent theme of The Federalist Papers. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 273
(James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (declaring that "[i]f we are to be one nation
in any respect it clearly ought to be in respect of other nations").
312. Japan Line Ltd., 441 U.S. at 449. The Court commented that in international
relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the United States
"act through a single government with unified and adequate national power." Id. at 447
(citing Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933)); see also Michelin Tire
Corp., 423 U.S. at 285 (holding that state tariff power that might affect foreign relations
would conflict with exclusive federal power to regulate commercial relations with foreign
governments).
313. THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at 106 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987). Indeed, as Madison also made clear, the Framers saw regulation of domestic
commerce as a power necessary in aid of the greater objective of regulating foreign
commerce because "without this supplemental provision, the great and essential power of
regulating foreign commerce would have been incomplete and ineffectual." THE
FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 311, at 276.
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galvanizing purpose of unity.314  Thus, foreign commerce was
implicated in (at least) three of the four purposes of the Union
expressed in The Federalist Papers: common defense, preservation of
the public peace, regulation of commerce "with other nations and
between the States," and "the superintendence of our intercourse,
political and commercial, with foreign countries." '315 The axial
position of foreign commerce in the Framers' plan for government,
ranking with war and peace in the litany of government tasks,
suggests that the improvement of foreign trade through supranational
adjudication would not have been viewed by the Framers as an
inherently improper legislative objective of the federal government.
Indeed, a metaphor of the supranational could easily have explained
their own experiment in consolidation, which envisaged the assent of
a number of distinct and independent political societies (the states) to
participation in a larger political society (the federal Union).316
If Hamilton is again our guide, the Framers had an eye to the
circumstances of "remote futurity"3 17 and should not lightly be
branded with the inflexible originalism that became a conceit of later
314. Madison's recitation of the objects of the Union government ranked regulation of
intercourse with foreign nations, including foreign commerce, second only to security
against foreign danger. See THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 267 (James Madison) (Isaac
Kramnick ed., 1987); THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 311, at 273; see also Michelin
Tire Corp., 423 U.S. at 285 (noting that the idea that "the Federal Government must speak
with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments" was one
of three primary concerns that the Framers attempted to address "by committing the sole
power to lay imposts and duties on imports in the Federal Government").
315. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 184 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987) (emphasis added). Alexander Hamilton maintained that no rule existed to measure
the momentum of civil power required to govern any given number of individuals. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 13, at 139 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). The
Framers' task, accordingly, was to design an appropriate architecture for the civil power,
but more deeply to ensure that America's status as a commercial republic would be
enhanced by the new structure. See THE FEDERALIST No. 6, supra note 313, at 106. Since
modern war was most often inspired by commercial cupidity, Hamilton argued that a
central government would be best placed to fend off America's rivals as her commercial
success advanced. See id. at 106-07. Military superiority was only part of Hamilton's
calculus, however. He saw also that unity of government "would enable us to bargain with
great advantage for commercial privileges" from other nations. THE FEDERALIST No. 11,
at 130 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). John Jay, too, advocated a
centralized government that would defend and advance the Union's foreign trading
interests. See THE FEDERALIST No. 4, at 98-99 (John Jay) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
316. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 111, at 256-57 (discussing the bold
innovation of a "consolidation" of the constituent states). Completing the image, the
Framers further arranged for the supremacy of the laws of the Union over its state
constituents. See THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 300, at 225.
317. THE FEDERALIST No. 34, at 227 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987).
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scholarship. 318 Hamilton's words bear quoting at length:
We must bear in mind that we are not to confine our view to
the present period, but to look forward to remote futurity.
Constitutions of civil government are not to be framed upon
a calculation of existing exigencies, but upon a combination
of these with the probable exigencies of ages, according to
the natural and tried course of human affairs .... There
ought to be a capacity to provide for future contingencies as
they may happen; and as these are illimitable in their nature,
so it is impossible safely to limit that capacity.319
This solicitude for futurity occurred precisely in the context of
defending commerce. Hamilton wrote of the flexibility needed by
government as part of the plan Americans must have "if we mean to
be a commercial people."' z Surely, it breaks faith with the Framers
not to read their Constitution in these resilient terms,321 particularly
318. Hamilton explicitly allowed, for example, that what Madison called the "cloudy
medium" of language, THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 245 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick
ed., 1987), however well-expressed, must lead to equivocation in meaning as the phrases of
the Constitution were parsed by succeeding generations and its words divined. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 34, supra note 317, at 227. Strict originalism suffers from retrospection;
if a document has been designed for futurity, as the Constitution evidently was, see infra
text accompanying note 319, unyielding adherence to fixed historical meanings must
frustrate that design (apart from the inherent dangers of relativism and solipsism). See
RAKOVE, supra note 39, at xv (noting the real problems of reconstructing coherent
intentions and understandings from evidence of history).
319. THE FEDERALIST No. 34, supra note 317, at 227. In this signature passage,
Hamilton embraced the idea of novelty in government. Hamilton's emphasis was entirely
proper, given that the object of his polemics was nothing less than the replacement of the
existing form of government. Madison's words, too, still carry resonance for those who
advocate new forms of supranational administration:
Is it not the glory of the people of America that, whilst they have paid a decent
regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered
a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the
suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and
the lessons of their own experience.
THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 144 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). The
absence of an exact model of government, in other words, commended itself to Madison as
a very good reason to invent one. See id. Madison also contemplated "all the possible
changes which futurity may produce" in describing the reach of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 120, at 289. Anchored in these beliefs of
Hamilton and Madison, respect for the innovations of "futurity" lies at the core of the
structuralist approach of this Article.
320. THE FEDERALIST No. 34, supra note 317, at 228. The Constitution reflects these
early preoccupations. The very first enumerated power of Congress is to "lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Constitution also
prohibits export duties by the states, see id. art. I, § 9, cl. 5, reflecting the fears of southern
states that their northern compatriots would tax their profitable exports to Europe. See
Morrison & Hudec, supra note 15, at 102.
321. See supra note 2 (noting the importance of innovation to the Framers'
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when it is the arena of foreign commerce that today hosts most of the
United States government's sovereign engagements with other
nations."'  As international trade scholar William Davey has
remarked, "[lt would be an odd constitution that gave exclusive
power over foreign affairs and commerce to a federal government,
but then so limited its powers in that field that it could not deal as an
equal with other nations. ' '3"
D. Supranational Tribunals as Wielders of Constitutional Judicial
Power
The surface structure of foreign trade in the Constitution
contemplates a broad domain of substantive operation for treaties,
but also a specific congressional license to regulate foreign commerce.
The surface structure further reveals, as we have seen, that the
Framers did not impress an insularist and mercantilist idea of
sovereignty upon their Constitution. In this hardly adventitious
setting, I conclude here that these constitutional precepts, fused with
the Supreme Court's new jurisprudence of public rights, provide the
transformational sequence that maps supranational adjudication from
the deep structure principle of shared judicial power to the surface
structure of Article II.
In Part V, I will consider whether this result comports with the
constitutional project).
322. As Madison himself warned, "[i]f a federal constitution could chain the ambition
or set bounds to the exertions of all other nations, then indeed might it prudently chain the
discretion of its own government and set bounds to the exertions for its own safety." THE
FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 314, at 267; see supra note 293 (explaining conceptual
limitations of U.S. domestic laws encouraging competition in global air transport).
323. Davey, supra note 293, at 1324. Charles Cheney Hyde, in his 1922 treatise on
international law, similarly acknowledged "a general reluctance to impute to the framers
of the Constitution a design to fetter the United States in such a way as to deprive it of the
power to regulate by convention matters so dealt with by other States as a normal and
necessary incident of international intercourse." 2 HYDE, supra note 32, § 496, at 11.
Hyde drew some support for his assertion from the Constitution's open-textured treaty
provisions, at least as far as the federal government is concerned. Article II fails to specify
any prohibited classes of treaty, and he noted that the Constitution otherwise speaks only
to the states when it prohibits them from entering into "any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation," U.S. CONST. art I., § 10, cl. 1, and from entering into "any Agreement or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power," id. cl. 3. See 2 HYDE, supra note
32, § 496, at 11. Nevertheless, a treaty which purports to alter the character of the
government, however we may evaluate the content of that proposition, is simply undoable
under any provision of the Constitution as a matter of substantive law. See id. § 496, at
11-12; see also Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (stating that the treaty power "is
in terms unlimited except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against
the action of the government or of its departments, and those arising from the nature of
the government itself and of that of the states").
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deep structure principle of constitutional integrity. At the present
level of description, however, the proposed specialized supranational
adjudicative system would in no way forebode the fears expressed by
the Supreme Court that Congress might create "a phalanx of non-
Article III tribunals equipped to handle the entire business of the
Article III courts ... without evidence of valid and specific legislative
necessities."324 In this proposed specialized assignment of judicial
power, therefore, I locate the elusive limiting principle required by
Justices Brennan and White.3z
As the Supreme Court indicated in Palmore v. United States, 326
the requirements of Article III, which apply where laws of national
applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake, "must in
proper circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of
power to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized areas having
particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment. '327  Like
324. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986) (plurality
opinion). But see supra note 184 (explaining that the terms "Article I courts" and "Article
III courts" fail to account doctrinally for the sharing of judicial power by legislative
courts-and supranational tribunals-under Article III, Section 2).
. 325. See supra text accompanying notes 213-14 (introducing the search for a limiting
principle as the core of the Court's public rights jurisprudence).
326. 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
327. Id. at 408. In Palmore, the Court approved a congressional reorganization of the
District of Columbia court system that established one set of courts with Article III
characteristics devoted to matters of national concern and a wholly separate court system
designed primarily to apply local law and to serve as a local court system for a large
metropolitan area. See id. at 409. The reorganization was crisis-driven because caseloads
had become unmanageable. The remedy was to relieve the regularly appointed Article III
judges from "the smothering responsibility for the great mass of litigation, civil and
criminal, that inevitably characterizes the court system in a major city." Id. at 408-09. The
proper work of courts with Article III judges, in the Supreme Court's reasoning, was to
"try cases arising under the Constitution and the nationally applicable laws of Congress."
Id. at 409. To that end, the courts created under Article III, Section 1 were divested of
"distinctively local controversies that arise under local law." Id.; see supra note 137. But
cf. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 522 (1933) (holding that some courts in the
District of Columbia were both "Article I" and "Article IlI" courts); Bator, supra note
165, at 240 (describing the D.C. courts discussed in O'Donoghue as "hermaphroditic").
Analogically, it would appear that the Palmore Court's model of analysis-accepting a
system of "divested" courts more narrowly circumscribed for local affairs-could apply
also to a system of supranational tribunals delimited not by the needs of regional
administration but by a substantive relationship to another enumerated power in Article I,
the regulation of foreign commerce. Justice Brennan in Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. preferred to give Palmore a restrictive reading, narrowing its holding to the
proposition that Congress's power to govern the District of Columbia, see U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 17, was "obviously different in kind from the other broad powers conferred on
Congress." 458 U.S. 50, 76 (1982) (plurality opinion). But, as previously noted, Article I
sets no differences in kind or degree among the enumerated powers, and Justice
Brennan's own words-his reference to the "other broad powers" of Congress-vitiated
his premise. Id. at 76 (plurality opinion); see supra text accompanying note 227. Although
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the legislative courts contemplated in Palmore, the supranational
tribunals envisaged in my model would embody the concept of shared
judicial power.328 The sharing, in fact, would have a double
significance with respect to supranational tribunals. Primarily,
through the deep structure principle of a fragmented judicial power,
the Article III judicial power would be shared with courts to which
Article III judges are appointed.329  In addition, however, judicial
power would be shared also with foreign nations. Such sharing is
possible because foreign nations occupy a specialized role in the
United States governmental process that the Framers acknowledged
when they preserved the treaty as a coequal form of law-making in
Justice Brennan claimed that "our reference in Palmore to 'specialized areas having
particularized needs' referred only to geographic areas," this semantic limitation was not
discussed in Palmore and is not present in Article I of the Constitution. Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 76 (plurality opinion) (quoting Palmore, 411 U.S. at 408). But see
id. at 114 (White, J., dissenting) (explaining that Palmore "rested on an evaluation of the
strength of the legislative interest in pursuing in this manner one of its constitutionally
assigned responsibilities-a responsibility not different in kind from numerous other
legislative responsibilities"); Bator, supra note 165, at 245 (asking why Congress's
"exceptional" power over the territories, but not its "exceptional" power over
bankruptcies, should be deemed to carry with it "a power to trump the separation of
powers?").
328. Metropoulos envisaged a draft constitutional amendment vesting the judicial
power of the United States in international tribunals ordained by Congress. See
Metropoulos, supra note 93, at 172. But the issue would not be solely one of transferring
U.S. judicial power to a foreign multilateral agency. In contrast to the proposed aviation
tribunals, which would not apply U.S. law to begin with, see supra text accompanying note
28, Metropoulos's amendment seems to have focused only on the anomalous condition of
the ersatz U.S. law applied by the arbitral panels established under NAFrA. See
Metropoulos, supra note 93, at 172; see infra note 399 (commenting on application of U.S.
law by the NAFTA binational arbitral panels).
329. It has long been thought that the power of the federal government to provide by
treaty for the judicial decision of questions of an international nature is not limited by the
grant of judicial power to the federal judiciary. See White, supra note 32, at 499 (noting
that this proposition recognizes "that there is a judicial power which is international and
may be exercised by one nation only in cooperation with others"). This power, White
argued, would embrace "questions of an international character," and would be exercised
through the agency of international commissions and courts appointed under the treaty
power. Id.; supra note 32 (discussing U.S. sovereign power to assign claims to
international tribunals). While White would evidently be in sympathy with the applied
consequences of the arguments made in this Article, his reasoning (in 1908) did not
appreciate that the sharing of judicial power with other nations actually observed a deep
structural principle of the United States Constitution-an internal logic, as it were-that
would later sanction a similar sharing between courts created directly under Article III
and evolving forms of administrative tribunal rooted in Congress's legislative jurisdiction
under Article I. Surely, the analogy is imperfect; sharing of power with other nations
cannot contemplate that the United States would intrude its own final tribunal of review.
But it may ultimately be the existence of a broader vision of judicial authority that is most
significant, rather than the specific arrangements that the Constitution makes for internal
review of that authority.
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the Constitution.330
Moreover, like Article I courts, the global aviation tribunals
proposed here would adjudicate disputes governed by the public
rights doctrine. They would fit into a public regulatory scheme
occupying its assigned field331 and applying federally created rules of
decision (a body of international competition law for the aviation
industry).332 These rules would support a new corpus of "standing"
rights that not only never existed in the common law, but also
probably never would have developed in the common law.333 Such a
330. This is a recognition, moreover, that the United States manifestly lacks power
unilaterally to establish courts of general or limited jurisdiction in any other sovereign
territory, and equally to do so in the unclaimable juridical space inhabited by
supranational tribunals. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423
(1964) ("[T]he public law of nations can hardly dictate to a country which is in theory
wronged how to treat that wrong within its domestic borders."). Thus, the Supreme Court
in Sabbatino refused to rule that the act of a foreign state to expropriate property within
its borders, if retaliatory, discriminatory, and unaccompanied by adequate compensation,
could dislodge the traditional act-of-state doctrine and thereby suffer challenge in the
United States court system as a violation of international law. Id. at 423-25; supra note 32
(discussing the act-of-state doctrine). The Sabbatino Court thus rejected the argument
that the U.S. courts could make a significant contribution to the growth of international
law in this area in light of the paucity of decisional law by international bodies. 376 U.S. at
434.
331. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 600 (1985)
(Brennan, J., concurring). The power of Congress to devise and juridicize a field of public
law has been illustrated amply by the sequence of congressional action to create review
procedures for United States antidumping and countervailing duty determinations
(compensatory tariffs imposed by the United States on foreign goods sold in the United
States, either below cost or at a price subsidized by a foreign government, in order to
compete unfairly with domestically produced U.S. goods). See generally JACKSON, supra
note 6, at 251, 279. For a detailed history of how Congress gradually expanded standing to
seek review of antidumping and antisubsidy determinations by U.S. agencies, see
COMMITTEE ON INT'L TRADE, ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, THE
UNITED STATES/CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: BINATIONAL REVIEW
PROCEDURES FOR ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES 4-18 (1988).
332. Compare Thomas, 473 U.S. at 601-02 (Brennan, J., concurring) (looking at a
regulatory scheme as a significant congressional case-by-case delegation of its law-making
function to an arbitrator), with Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146
U. PA. L. REV. 687, 753-58 (1998) (arguing that through the U.N. Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods-a treaty-Congress had delegated the
power to make international common law to federal courts in order to "construct
substantive solutions for gaps that emerge in [the Convention's] regulatory scheme").
333. If individual airlines were to assert claims against each other before the Open
Skies Commission described in my model for aviation tribunals, see supra text
accompanying notes 24-31, rather than asserting claims on behalf of or against a
government, these disputes would obviously reflect a condition of "privateness." But, as
Justice Brennan indicated in Thomas, the Supreme Court now views private disputes of
this kind as involving at their core the exercise of authority by the federal government.
See Thomas, 473 U.S. at 600 (Brennan, J., concurring). Such disputes, though they may
ultimately involve determinations of the duty owed one private party by another,
nevertheless must arise within a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme, applying
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system appears consistent with Northern Pipeline Construction Co., in
which the potentiality of the public rights doctrine led the plurality to
conclude that the doctrine could indeed support legislative courts in
the arena of foreign commerce. 4
The system of tribunals proposed here would honor the Framers'
design, perpetuated in the Constitution's deep structure, that
Congress, rather than the judiciary, should shape how the United
States judicial power is distributed.3 35  As the Supreme Court
acknowledged in Glidden, relying on a vintage opinion of Chief
Justice John Marshall, there is "a greater flexibility in Congress to
deal with problems arising outside the normal context of a federal
system. '336  Problems of such magnitude and rarity, including the
challenge of supranationalism, are likely to be presented by the
exigencies of foreign trade. As such, adroit management of global
trade has become a legitimate national policy objective and may in
federal rules of decision. See id. at 600-01 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also supra note
248 (explaining the public law foundation-in treaties-for the proposed assertion of
private rights through the aviation tribunals).
334. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 n.22
(plurality opinion) (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)). The public rights
doctrine is used extensively by commentators who support the jurisdictional mechanism of
the NAFTA dispute panels. The usage obviously has conceptual appeal in a field
(international trade) that bespeaks rights of public origin. Arguably, Congress could
return trade law to its primordial condition of executive administration. See supra note
331 (mentioning the juridicization of antidumping and subsidy regimes). "[A]ntidumping
and countervailing duty" actions were not "the stuff of traditional actions at common law
tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789." Ethan Boyer, Article III, the Foreign
Relations Power, and the Binational Panel System of NAFTA, 13 INT'L TAX & BUS. LAW.
101, 133 (1996) (internal quotes and citation omitted).
335. See supra text accompanying note 145 (discussing the distribution of judicial
power in the United States Constitution). Thus, in Paul Bator's view, Article Ill
contemplated that the extent of federal jurisdiction would mirror Congress's ongoing
political judgments. See Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REv. 1030, 1030-31 (1981-1982). Of course, a treaty
establishing supranational tribunals normally would be ratified only by advice and consent
of the Senate, rather than by the full Congress. See supra text accompanying note 290.
336. 370 U.S. 530, 547 (1962) (citing American Ins. Co. v Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511,
546 (1828)). Recognition of governmental innovation and judicial concurrence in new
ideas for government are core themes of this Article. See supra text accompanying notes
116-18 (discussing this "Hamiltonian" approach to government).
The Court also reflected an empathetic judicial philosophy in Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. National Resources Defense Council, noting that the federal courts have "no
constituency," but have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.
467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984). In the Chevron Court's reasoning, "while agencies are not
directly accountable to the people, the chief executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for
this political branch of the government to make such policy choices." Id. at 865. In this
way, the executive may "resolv[e] the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged
with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities." Id. at 865-66.
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turn inspire an entirely novel constitutional mythos: recognition of an
"allodial" judicial power (in the sense of a power that is not subject to
the feudal overlordship of Article III judges). The Framers did not
contemplate or prophesy such a power in the text of the Constitution,
but it is implicit in their neglect of traditional sovereignty concerns, in
their insistence on recognizing the treaty as a source of federal law, in
their preference for federal control of all aspects of foreign
commerce, and most dramatically in their stationing of dynamic deep
structure principles, including a principle of shared judicial power,
beneath the placid surface of their Constitution.337
337. At least three arguments have been advanced to "constitutionalize" supranational
tribunals using the paradoxical expedient of simply denying them a constitutional
dimension at all-in effect, quarantining them outside the Constitution. These arguments
insist that supranational tribunals are not United States courts, that they exercise a species
of international judicial power, or that their existence is in any event a political decision of
the federal government with which the courts should not interfere. Each of these
arguments betrays a conceptual oversimplification. The argument that supranational
tribunals are not "United States courts," applied literally, would move whole swathes of
domestic jurisdiction into the international arena using only the elemental premise of
ontological novelty. See, e.g., Ilia B. Levitine, Constitutional Aspects of an International
Criminal Court, 9 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 27, 43 (1996) (suggesting "the obvious fact that [the
new International Criminal Court] would not be an Article III court"). The second
quarantining argument holds that supranational courts would exercise only an amorphous
international judicial power that would be the common donation of all participating states
in the global treaty creating the tribunals. The argument is controverted, however, by the
very text of Article III itself. At least three of the so-called "arising under" subject-matter
heads of jurisdiction in Article III, Section 2 would be in question, for example, in a
dispute between the United States and a foreign private party: all cases involving United
States treaties, the laws of the United States, and the United States and foreign citizens as
parties. For a clarification of "arising under" jurisdiction, see supra note 149. The judicial
power in Article III explicitly extends to these three categories of jurisdiction, and all of
them are granted to the federal courts (in original and appellate guise) by acts of
Congress. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 248. Finally, the third argument would
explain the constitutionality of supranational tribunals in the earnest words of the district
court for the Southern District of New York in United States v. Palestine Liberation
Organization, 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), which held that "the question whether
the United States should submit to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal is a
question of policy not for the courts but for the political branches to decide." Id. at 1463.
The flaw in this reasoning is that the courts do not abstain when the principle of
constitutional integrity is implicated, see supra text accompanying note 90 (explaining
derivation of this principle), and advocates of supranational adjudication cannot simply
assume that a purported transfer of judicial power under Article III would not violate this
principle. Although the courts have sometimes applied "the loose shorthand phrase,
'political question,'" to their apparent self-effacement in matters of foreign affairs, Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 278 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), the notion of a true political
question doctrine may be a myth that needs to be dispelled. See generally KOH, supra
note 9, at 183-84,220 (describing the political question doctrine as "a catchall method [to]
avoid[ deciding even straightforward constitutional cases," but noting that courts
nevertheless do issue "rulings that span the foreign policy spectrum and involve
interpretation of virtually all bodies of law"). In no foreign affairs case, in fact, has the
Supreme Court required judicial abstention from the task of constitutional review. See
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E. Conclusion
A deep structure, in Chomskyan linguistics, is a fixed structure.
Using deep structure analogically, I explored in Part IV a series of
dynamic formulations-transformations, in Chomsky's terminology-
that map the fixed idea of shared judicial authority from the
Constitution's deep structure to the surface structure of Article Il.
To provide a dynamic transformational sequence for supranational
tribunals, Part IV presented a coherent vision of an International
Trade Constitution. This vision, blending the new interactive
paradigm of sovereignty, the legislative exceptionalism of the treaty
power, the centrality of foreign commerce, and the modem
jurisprudence of public rights, appears to allow supranational
tribunals to take their place in Article III, alongside the state courts
and legislative courts, as a viable exponent of the Constitution's deep
structure idea of shared judicial power. But one further test of
viability still remains, and that is to assess supranational tribunals in
light of the deep structure principle of constitutional integrity. It is to
that final task that I now turn in Part V.
V. ARTICLE III AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTEGRITY: THE ISSUE OF APPELLATE ACCESS TO ARTICLE III
JUDGES
A. Background: The Independent Article III Judiciary
It is a very large interpretive step to conceptualize supranational
courts as part of the Constitution of the United States. Part IV of this
Article attempted most of that interpretive and assimilative process,
applying powerful structural principles that arguably would permit
supranational courts to wield judicial power, though not necessarily
the judicial power "of the United States,' 3 3 8 under the aegis of Article
III of the United States Constitution. Nonetheless, the assertion of a
potentially shared judicial authority has had a significant caveat from
the outset of my discussion. The difficult pragmatic balance of
independent federal judges and a congressionally controlled
organization of the judiciary is helpful if it means that original
jurisdiction, when denied to courts with Article I judges, could be
assigned to a supranational tribunal. But to conclude that federal
HENKIN, supra note 2, at 145.
338. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also supra note 250 (noting that "[t]he judicial Power
of the United States" authorizes judicial review of the constitutionality of acts of the
political branches).
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cases "arising under" federal statutory or treaty law need not begin in
courts with Article III judges invites the profound question of
whether the Constitution-in its deep structure-requires cases with
a federal provenance always to terminate in an appellate court with
Article ImI judges.3 39
To provide at least a tentative, if not decisive, resolution of this
question, I now offer a postlude to my explication of a deep structure
principle of constitutional integrity. Recalling that discussion,34° I
inquire in this Part of the Article whether the special character of
United States constitutional government, its "hydraulic pressure" of
divided and interacting powers,31 raises an articulable, specific
objection to a putative sharing of the judicial power with
supranational aviation tribunals enjoying both original and appellate
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court pragmatically has staved off a
similar conflict involving legislative courts, possibly convinced that
any issue of real constitutional merit will find its way to ultimate
review by the Article III judiciary.342 But in imagining a novel system
339. As Paul Bator asked, "[h]ow could the Framers have ... designed a system.., to
insulate the independent judiciary ... and also give[] the Legislature carte blanche to
displace that independent judiciary with judges who are ... its creatures?" Bator, supra
note 165, at 258. This is presumably also the burden of arguments by Clinton and Amar,
canvassed earlier, which insisted that the Exceptions Clause, if used to deny appellate
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over any of the enumerated cases and controversies,
would require Congress to transfer that jurisdiction to one of the inferior federal courts
created under Article III, Section 1. See Amar, supra note 148, at 230 (arguing that a shift
of appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court would merely move final resolution "to
any other Article III court that Congress may create" and specifically to a court with a
judge appointed under Article III, Section 1); Clinton, supra note 15, at 781 (same); infra
text accompanying note 364. I see no justification for these arguments, either in the deep
or surface structures of the Constitution. If the appellate power of the paramount
Supreme Court can be removed, pro tanto the appellate power of all courts contingently
established under Article III must also be capable of removal. See infra note 364
(discussing the implications of stripping appellate jurisdiction from the inferior federal
courts). For that reason, I have focused in Part V on the expansive reach of the
Exceptions Clause, rather than on (to my view) misconceived arguments concerning
whether other courts created under Article III might have final appellate jurisdiction if the
Supreme Court were constitutionally denied that jurisdiction.
340. See supra text accompanying note 90.
341. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
342. Congress, in legislation implementing NAFrA, included a fast-track appellate
procedure to allow constitutional challenge to NAFIA's novel (and constitutionally
strange) breed of binational dispute panels. See infra note 399. Thus, in exercise of its
distributive authority over the judicial power, see supra text accompanying note 142,
Congress granted the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit exclusive
original jurisdiction to review all constitutional challenges to the panel structure. See 19
U.S.C.A. § 1516a(g)(4)(A) (1999); see also National Council for Indus. Defense, Inc. v.
United States, 827 F. Supp. 794, 797-800 (D.D.C. 1993) (confirming the exclusivity of the
D.C. Circuit's jurisdiction for NAFTA constitutional challenges).
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of sectoralized supranational tribunals and their certain displacement
of Article III judges in a global setting, we squarely confront a
ranking of constitutional principles. These principles potentially
might require Article I judges, as a condition of the separation of
powers, to remain ultimately responsible for final appellate control of
all of the judicial power that is generated from the deep structure of
the Article under which they are appointed.
B. A Contest of Deep Structure Principles
What precisely are the principles that must be balanced? As I
already have shown, the tenure-salary covenant in the surface
structure of Article III is mapped from a deep structure principle of
judicial independence.343 The independence of the Article III judges
is a conceptually distinct deep structure idea from the principle that
ultimately determines the surface details of how and by whom the
judicial system is organized.34 The latter is solely a surface refraction
of the deep structure principle of shared judicial power, from which
we have mapped the constitutional exercise of Article m judicial
power by state courts, legislative courts, and supranational tribunals.
If the principle of judicial independence were to be supreme in
this contest of principles, final appellate review by judges who
constitutionally possessed the marks of Article III independence
would be required. This outcome would severely constrain the extent
to which judicial power could be transferred to supranational
tribunals. It also would vitiate the jurisdictional supremacy of the
final appellate court of international aviation proposed in Part I. On
the other hand, the question of supremacy may not arise, or may be
mooted, if the fixed imperatives of the principle of independence can
be properly accommodated by the new supranational system.
C. Appellate Review in the Surface Structure: The Exceptions Clause
I begin this final investigation by revisiting another feature of
Article III's complex surface structure, the Exceptions Clause.345 This
Clause awards Congress explicit power to strip appellate functions
343. This may, indeed, ultimately derive from the proto-principle of constitutional
integrity. The federal judiciary itself has identified independence as one of its core values.
See JUDIcIAL PLAN, supra note 143, at 5 (noting that "[f]ederal judges must be able to
decide the cases before them in an atmosphere free from fear that an unpopular decision
will threaten their livelihood or existence").
344. See supra text accompanying notes 150-55 (discussing the distribution of appellate
jurisdiction under Article Ill).
345. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 2.
2000]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
from the Supreme Court.346 Logically, therefore, the Clause suggests
that the deep structure principle of independence does not impose a
requirement of mandatory Article III review by the Supreme
Court 47 It is true that the Supreme Court early on sought to deny
the state courts any escape from federal review, achieved either
through removal before judgment or appeal after judgment.38
Otherwise, according to Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v.
Virginia,49 the construction of the Constitution, laws, and treaties of
the United States would be confided equally to the state courts,
"however they may be constituted. '30  The Court recoiled from the
idea of thirteen independent state courts of final jurisdiction over the
same cause, a veritable "hydra in government. 35 1 At a minimum,
therefore, the Supreme Court, as the national tribunal of final resort,
expected to rank as the trustee of uniformity atop this potentially
ochlocratic mass of sovereign systems3 5  Its claim of superiority,
346. See supra text accompanying note 155 (discussing the stripping of appellate
jurisdiction from the Supreme Court). The Exceptions Clause provides that the Supreme
Court will have appellate jurisdiction (outside its narrow prescribed fields of original
jurisdiction) "with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
347. See supra note 339 (disputing the argument that congressional removal of
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, even if constitutionally legitimate, would require the
award of compensatory appellate power to inferior courts created under Article III,
Section 1).
348. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,415 (1821).
349. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
350. Id. at 415 (emphasis added). The value expressed in Cohens, however, was that of
uniformity, rather than supremacy. Supremacy of federal law is constitutionally imposed
on the state judiciaries by the express words of the Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONsT. art.
VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding."). The Constitution, however, does not appear to treat
uniformity as having the same structural importance as supremacy. Unlike supremacy,
uniformity is not a requirement of the Constitution; in fact, uniformity would have
required a much more complex federal court system. See William S. Dodge, Note,
Congressional Control of Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: Why the Original
Jurisdiction Clause Suggests an 'Essential Role,' 100 YALE LJ. 1013, 1016-17 (1991).
Supremacy without some mechanism for uniformity, however, would disarticulate the
precedential development of federal law.
351. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 415-16; see also Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 506, 518 (1858) (applying the same reasoning to the criminal laws of the United
States).
352. See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 416; Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 517. As
Amar has surmised, the limited size of the Supreme Court has created a de facto exception
to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, "as if Congress had explicitly told the Court that it
could only hear one out of every ten mandatory cases." Amar, supra note 148, at 268
n.213. The likelihood of sheer natural limits to the Supreme Court's capacity to
superintend all state systems did not feature in early opinions, such as Chief Justice
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however, was made with the confidence that Congress had already
instituted a certiorari procedure from the highest state courts to the
Supreme Court.3
Moreover, insofar as it purported to state a rule of general
application, Chief Justice Marshall's claim of superiority in Cohens
was fundamentally in conflict with the constitutional language?5 If
the Court holds true to its opinions assigning organizational
supremacy to the Congress,355 it scarcely can protest congressional
power under the Exceptions Clause to strip the Supreme Court of
even this fundamental review of state decisions. Indeed, forty years
after Cohens, Chief Justice Taney's confidence in Ableman v. Booth
356
that the Supreme Court had authority over state courts was not based
on Article III at all, but on the Supremacy Clause.357 There is no
indication, however, that the supremacy doctrine requires appellate
review from state supreme courts to the United States Supreme
Court, and strong reason, discussed below, to conclude that Article
III does not.
Chief Justice Taney's argument in Ableman, in fact, was
paralogical. If Article III truly meant, as he wrote, that the federal
judicial power extends to "all cases which might arise under the
Constitution,"358 then all state court jurisdiction would necessarily be
ousted and the Supreme Court alone would have original jurisdiction
over all federal cases. Article III, of course, cannot mean that,
Taney's in Ableman, which spoke contradictorily of a single final and conclusive tribunal
to hear "all cases which might arise under the Constitution and laws and treaties of the
United States, whether in a State court or a court of the United States," and a federal
government that must be "supreme, and strong enough to execute its own laws by its own
tribunals, without interruption from a State or from State authorities." 62 U.S. (21 How.)
at 517, 518 (emphasis added). The opinion failed to explain, however, why the
Constitution in Article III adopted a manifestly contingent structure that virtually invited
at least one level of state interruption (in other words, the preservation of original
jurisdiction in the state courts over federal law). Chief Justice Taney's judgment rested,
centrally, on the premise of legal supremacy in Article VI. See id.
353. See supra note 179 (discussing the certiorari procedure in 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994)).
354. The claim, moreover, is defeated by the simple truism of our constitutional system
that unappealed judgments of state courts have the status of procedural finality (res
judicata), even when a federal question is necessarily involved. See supra text
accompanying note 193 (noting this default finality of state judgments).
355. See supra text accompanying notes 159-61 (considering the Supreme Court's
acceptance of the broad distributive powers of Congress under Article III, Sections 1 and
2).
356. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
357. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing inter alia that the "Judges in every State"
shall be bound by the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, which are "the
supreme Law of the Land"); Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 517.
358. Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 518.
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because inferior federal courts are contingent and discretionary and
the Supreme Court is primarily an appellate tribunal under Article
III. If Article III necessarily comprehends original jurisdiction of
federal cases in the state courts, how could Chief Justice Taney
logically have reasoned that it also necessarily includes appeal to the
Supreme Court? If Article III does not exclude the state courts from
original jurisdiction, it cannot be assumed necessarily to include them
for the select purpose of appellate recourse to the Supreme Court.
The Chief Justice's only unequivocal textual support for direct appeal
to the Supreme Court was, as it had been for Chief Justice Marshall in
Cohens, the fact that Congress had ordained it in section 25 of the
first Judiciary Act in 1789.359
As Leonard Ratner has pointed out, "the extent of the
congressional power over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court has never been judicially determined because the jurisdiction
statutes have always allowed the Court to carry on its essential
constitutional functions with reasonable effectiveness. '360  To the
extent that those essential functions may be said to include assuring
the supremacy of federal law when state law is in conflict or is
challenged by state authority, the first Judiciary Act short-circuited
what might have been a much more searching analysis by Chief
Justice Taney.
361
This Article need not explore in detail the outer bounds of the
congressional power, conferred in Article III's surface structure, to
reduce or eliminate the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 62
359. See id. at 522.
360. Ratner, supra note 184, at 184.
361. For Richard Fallon, however, recourse to Article III appellate review is no mere
accident of congressional edict, but a core value of the Constitution. See Fallon, supra
note 179, at 945. In Fallon's analysis, all of the cases that might have been committed to
courts created under Article III, Section 1 must in fact end in those courts, in the form of
an appellate review that is a sufficiently searching review of a legislative court's or
administrative agency's decisions. See id. Fallon's view echoes Hamilton's exposition of
the importance of the federal judiciary power to the interpretation and operation of the
treaties of the United States. It was Hamilton's belief that, in the last resort, treaties must
be submitted to "one SUPREME TRIBUNAL," instituted under the same authority that
formed the treaties themselves, the national government. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra
note 288, at 182. State courts of final jurisdiction, in other words, would disrupt the
uniformity of interpretation that treaties required because of the participation of foreign
nations. See id. at 182-83. Hamilton wrote of "one court paramount to the rest," as other
nations have established, "possessing a general superintendence and authorized to settle
and declare in the last resort a uniform rule of civil justice." Id. at 182. The juridical value
of uniformity, however, provides a far more cogent assessment of the relationship of
federal and state courts than of the nature of the relationship, if any, between federal
courts and supranational tribunals.
362. The Supreme Court, after all, was designed as a department of government in a
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Professor Henry Hart placed a question-begging limitation on this
power, namely, that it should not "destroy the essential role of the
Supreme Court in the constitutional plan. '363 The pliancy of the text
has justified a great deal of free-form scholarly hermeneutics, from
Professor Amar's benign redistribution of appellate power from the
Supreme Court to the inferior federal courts3 4 to calls for the
trinitarian Constitution. As Calabresi and Rhodes have maintained, there might have to
be "'some residuum of jurisdiction' " that would allow the Court to function in that
capacity. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 134, at 1162 (quoting Hart, supra note 142, at
1364) (emphasis added). In their view, it would be absurd to insist upon the independence
of the federal judiciary and then to give them no judicial business in which to apply that
independence. See id. But President Franklin Roosevelt's court-packing plan illustrated
some of the political limits of the Court's jurisdiction, however deftly it may be partitioned
and apportioned in quieter times. See Presidential Message, 81 CONG. REC. 877-79 (1937)
(promoting the packing plan as a means to relieve congestion and asserting that life tenure
had created a "static" judiciary). Roosevelt's words were startling in their ironic disregard
for democratic punctilio: "We must find a way to take an appeal from the Supreme Court
to the Constitution itself." Id. app. at 470; see J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political
Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 126 (1988); see also Cox, supra note 141, at 578
(noting the failure of the court-packing plan because of the nation's "near religious
attachment to constitutionalism and the Supreme Court").
363. Hart, supra note 142, at 1365. Hart's view has received wide homage in the
literature. See, eg., Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 134, at 1162; Dodge, supra note 350,
at 1015-16. Hart noted that the vulnerability of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
to control by Congress had led to "serious proposals of amendment" (for example, to
substitute "the Supreme Court" for "the Congress" in the phrase "with such Exceptions
... as the Congress shall make," U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2). See Hart, supra note 142,
at 1401 n.107. This Article, however, proposes only a limited reduction of federal
appellate jurisdiction that is consistent with the character of the Constitution. Cf. Amar,
supra note 148, at 221 n.60 (explaining that a national tax court from which no appeal
would lie would not affect the supremacy of the high court as the only court whose
jurisdiction derives from the Constitution itself and the only court from which no appeal
can constitutionally lie); Ratner, supra note 184, at 168-71 (discussing the possible
semantic limits imposed on exceptions and regulations by contemporary usage and noting
that, in its historical dictionary meaning, an exception could not nullify the rule or
description that it limited, but must necessarily have a narrower application); Dodge,
supra note 350, at 1014 (arguing that some amount of appellate jurisdiction is needed to
maintain the Supreme Court as "the most important court" in the nation, but concluding
that particular exceptions, such as creation of an abortion court, would not likely defeat
this essential role).
364. See Amar, supra note 148, at 230. Certainly, the Supreme Court could be stripped
of its "arising under" appellate jurisdiction, "thereby allowing the federal courts of appeals
and the highest state courts to become, in their respective jurisdictions, the final
interpreters of federal law." Ratner, supra note 184, at 158; see also Calabresi & Rhodes,
supra note 134, at 1163-64 (discussing Amar's distributive model). That these distributive
alterations are feasible, however, does not refute my contention, see supra note 339, that if
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is excisable by Congress in any respect, as it
appears to be, then Congress certainly has the constitutional capacity to remove the same
appellate recourse from inferior federal courts as well. See Rossum, supra note 163, at 424
(arguing that the greater power not to create lower federal courts must include the lesser
power to create them with limits on their jurisdiction). The only remaining issue,
therefore, would be whether the principle of "judicial independence"-as a deep structure
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annihilation of all federal appellate jurisdiction.65 Importantly for
the present discussion, Congress's jurisdiction-stripping power
confirms the reach of the deep structure principle of shared judicial
authority; removal of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, after all,
seems logically consistent with a deep structure principle that allows
Congress to confer federal judicial power, both original and appellate,
on tribunals that lack Article m judges.
From what has been said already, it would appear constitutional
for Congress to use its Article III exceptions power, backed by the
deep structure principle of shared judicial power, to reshuffle the
heads of appellate jurisdiction and to prescribe in implementing
legislation that an International Court of Air Transportation, for
instance, would be the proper tribunal of final resort under a new
multilateral aviation treaty. 66 Without speculating as to the extreme
limits of Congress's jurisdiction-sapping power, it is at least plausible
to assert that Congress could, as a matter of rational textual
exposition-and actual legislative practice- configure the boundaries
of the Supreme Court's (and, a fortiori, the federal court system's) 367
original jurisdiction and final appellate review.
principle of Article III-would ultimately preclude Congress from any specific jurisdiction-
stripping exercise. See infra text accompanying note 377 (discussing due process
implications of judicial independence).
365. If the Supreme Court's entire appellate jurisdiction were abolished by Congress
and the lower federal courts dissolved, the state court systems would decide virtually all
cases and controversies implicating federal law, outside the Supreme Court's narrow
original jurisdiction, and the highest state courts would serve as a hydra-headed surrogate
for a national Supreme Court. See Hart, supra note 142, at 1401 (contending that state
courts "[i]n the scheme of the Constitution are primary guarantors of constitutional
rights"). As noted, there are several contrary arguments denying that the federal court
system could be minimized in this way, but these arguments often rely on textual sources
outside Article III. Ratner, for example, reasoned that the Supremacy Clause would be a
mere exhortation without an implementing national tribunal that is empowered to
interpret and apply the supreme law in every case, whether state or federal. See Ratner,
supra note 184, at 201. But cf. Amar, supra note 148, at 208-10 (using Article III itself as
the basis for a non-minimalist reading).
366. See Amar, supra note 148, at 258 (describing Congress's power to structure the
federal judiciary as "not trivial" because it includes the power to create unreviewable
Article III tax or abortion courts). The Open Skies Commission, proposed in my model
for supranational aviation tribunals, see supra text accompanying notes 24-31, would enjoy
a secure constitutional status under the deep structure principle of shared judicial power.
See supra text accompanying notes 324-28 (bringing supranational tribunals within the
principle of shared judicial power).
367. See supra note 339 (discussing permissible alterations to the reach of federal
appellate jurisdiction).
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D. Appellate Review in the Deep Structure: Problems of
Essentializing Judicial Power
The principle of constitutional integrity warns that congressional
power over the federal judicial system is not solely a matter of
Congress's distributive and organizational powers in Articles I and
III."3 Organizational flexibility surely permits us to uncover a deep
structure principle of shared judicial power, but this principle is
manifestly not the only deep structure value that underlies Article
]11.369 In this vein, when Chief Justice Marshall ruled in Cohens on
Virginia's claim that the states were exempted from "arising under"
jurisdiction, he appealed to "the spirit and true meaning of the
Constitution, which spirit and true meaning must be so apparent as to
overrule the words which its framers have employed.
3 70
As we have seen, the principle of constitutional integrity is a
more rarefied restatement of a doctrine that Justice Scalia has
described, with some 61an, as "the separation and equilibration of
powers."37' This fundamental deep structure idea, which nowhere
appears in the text of the Constitution,372 generates the surface
lexicon of vesting in Articles I, II, and 1][. 373 Despite its tie to the
368. As Hart has maintained, the primary check on Congress and on the exercise of its
powers to make the judiciary function is "the political check-the votes of the people."
Hart, supra note 142, at 1399.
369. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1982) ("Convenience and efficiency are not
the primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of democratic government .... "). Thus,
convenient and efficient procedures cannot be absolved, even if they facilitate
governmental functions, if they nevertheless violate the constitutional order. See id.
370. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,380 (1821) (finding in the nature of the
Constitution no exception that would exempt a state as a party from federal jurisdiction
when the case involved the general grant of judicial power to decide all cases "arising
under" the Constitution or laws of the United States). Chief Justice Marshall emphasized
a (deep) structural principle of "subordination" in the relationship of the state
governments to the government of the Union and the Constitution. See id. at 382.
371. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
704 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting). For a recent invocation of the doctrine, see Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,449-53 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
372. See E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So
Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 506, 508 (1989) (referring, appropriately, to the
"immanence" of separation of powers principles in the Framers' Constitution).
373. Thus, the principle of separation of powers is implicit in the first section of each of
the first three Articles of the Constitution. Article I, Section I provides that "[a]ll
legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,"
Article II, Section I provides that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America," and Article IH, Section 1 provides that "[t]he judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. III, § 1; see Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697-99 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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vesting clauses, however, the intent of the separation of powers
doctrine is not to set up a cordon sanitaire that divides the powers one
from the other.374 Articulating a deep structure theory, Chief Justice
Hughes opined that the separation of powers theory arose, "not from
Art[icle] Im nor any other single provision of the Constitution, but
because 'behind the words of the constitutional provisions are
postulates which limit and control.' "I
The judicial branch, then, is a component of a tripartite
constellation of governmental powers. The separation of the
branches of government-the principle of constitutional integrity-is
indisputably a deep structure principle that limits and controls.
Moreover, a major part of the understanding that Article III judges
have of their role in the separation of powers is that their exercise of
the federal judicial power offers an independent, neutral, unbiased
domain of dispute resolution to parties in federal causes who
challenge the actions of the political branches-and to the political
branches themselves when they challenge one another.376 That
understanding is underwritten by the explicit assurances of
professional independence given in Article III.
If the virtues of independence, neutrality, and absence of bias
accurately capture the federal judiciary's essential self-image, the
Supreme Court's jurisprudential rationale for this essentialist
perception remains elusive. The Court's rationale, in fact, has shifted
uncertainly between treating the federal judiciary's independence as a
374. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386 (1989) (recognizing "the
constitutionality of a 'twilight area' in which the activities of the separate branches merge"
(quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring in the judgment and opinion)); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S.
425, 443 (1977) (rejecting as archaic a complete division of authority among the three
branches); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05 (1974) (adopting Madison's
flexible approach to separation of powers).
375. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 590-91 (1949)
(quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) (Hughes, C.J.)). Ironically, the
formal plan of Article III itself might have been dispositive on the question of eliminating
Article III appellate review. As earlier noted, see supra text accompanying note 193, the
system of state courts displaces federal judicial review by an Article III judge whenever a
judgment of a state supreme court, implicating a matter of federal law, remains
unappealed. Moreover, the finality of state decisions is confirmed by the powerful effect
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
376. These, after all, were the root principles that apparently animated Justice
Brennan's opinion in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50, 58, 86 n.39 (1982) (plurality opinion). Judicial independence, in Justice Brennan's
reasoning, maintained the checks and balances of the constitutional structure and
guaranteed the impartiality of the adjudication process by ensuring judges who were
"'free from potential domination by other branches of government.'" Id. at 58 (plurality
opinion) (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200,217-18 (1980)).
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part of the separation of powers-in other words, as embedded in the
deep structure of the Constitution-and treating it as a personal and
waivable right of every federal litigant?77 Such ambivalence is hardly
decisive.3
78
An unbending structural requirement of ultimate appellate
review by the Article III judiciary, or specifically by the Supreme
Court, would seem inconsistent with the Court's Article III
jurisprudence after Thomas and the conceptualization of specialized
tribunals adjudicating public rights.3 79  When Justice White, in his
dissent in Northern Pipeline Construction Co., described Article III
appellate review as "go[ing] a long way" to ensuring a proper
separation of powers, 3 ° he came close to suggesting that review by
the privileged judiciary appointed under Article III might indeed be
an integral component of the deep structure principle of
constitutional integrity 81 But Justice White, the parent of the
377. To Robert Nagel, the apparent antinomy of this statement cannot stand. See
NAGEL, supra note 11, at 64-65. Nagel maintains that the Framers expected the structure
of the separation of powers to become itself "the great protection of the individual,"
rather than the "parchment barriers" that were later added as the Bill of Rights. Id.
Calabresi would agree; he has projected a vision of "the Constitution of the Federalist
Papers with its reliance on checks and balances, separation of powers, and federalism to
preserve freedom." Calabresi, supra note 15, at 1401.
378. As further evidence of judicial ambivalence, see infra note 386 (discussing Justice
Brennan's comments on the more "mundane," rights-focused function of judicial
independence).
379. 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985). In Schor, Justice Brennan seemed puzzled that the
Court appeared to have pitted legislative convenience and efficiency against judicial
independence. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 863
(1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's unease was predictable. In Northern
Pipeline, speaking for the plurality, he had cited approvingly to the much earlier decision
in Crowell v. Benson for the proposition that the requirement of de novo review was "not
'simply the question of due process in relation to notice and hearing,' but was 'rather a
question of the appropriate maintenance of the Federal judicial process.' " Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 82 n.33 (plurality opinion) (quoting Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 56 (1932)). Yet immediately thereafter, Justice Brennan repeated words of
the Crowell dissent asserting that "'under certain circumstances, the constitutional
requirement of due process is a requirement of [Article III] judicial process.' " Id.
(quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 87 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). It is difficult to discern'where
Brennan himself might have drawn a distinction between an immutable structural
principle of judicial independence and a personal right of due process, to be invoked only
"under certain circumstances." See infra text accompanying note 387 (considering further
the issue of a due process right of access to the judiciary appointed under Article III).
380. 458 U.S. at 115 (White, J., dissenting).
381. Justice White regarded appellate review of the decisions of legislative courts, like
appellate review of state court decisions, as providing "a firm check on the ability of
political institutions of government to ignore or transgress constitutional limits on their
own authority." Id. (White, J., dissenting). Therefore, a scheme of courts created under
Article I that provided for appellate review by the Article III judiciary "should be
substantially less controversial than a legislative attempt entirely to avoid judicial review
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pragmatic, values-based tests that inspired later Article III
jurisprudence, was careful never to elevate final review by Article III
judges into a sine qua non of the structural principle of constitutional
integrity. Otherwise, the availability of appellate review simply could
not have become subject to a test of congressional intent as it was in
Thomas,382 nor presumably could it have been the object of simple
party waiver, as it was in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor.3l In that sense, the right to Article III appellate review is, at
most, an individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause3 4 rather than a specific, articulable restriction on the
constitutional ability of Congress to map new courts to the surface
structure of Article III using the deep structure principle of the
fragmented judicial power.38 5 Indeed, as Justice White concluded in
in a constitutional court." Id. (White, J., dissenting). That something may be
controversial, however, does not mean that is constitutionally impermissible. Taking
Justice White at his word, he may have meant only that the values expressed in Article III
should not be undermined by whatever legislative alternative to appellate review Congress
might establish.
382. Thomas's holding rested, as the Supreme Court itself declared, on the proposition
that "Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers
under Article I," might allow for the adjudication of so-called private rights within a broad
public regulatory scheme, "with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary." 473
U.S. at 593-94. The Court did not define "limited involvement." In accordance with
Justice White's analysis in Northern Pipeline Construction Co., however, the meaning of
the phrase could be stretched to the full semantic range of the word "limited," including
checked, constrained, and perhaps even minimal. Justice White's argument, after all, was
that Article III, while not to be read out of the Constitution, should be read as "expressing
one value that must be balanced against competing constitutional values and legislative
responsibilities." Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 113 (White, J., dissenting).
When Justice White concluded that "[t]his Court retains the final word on how that
balance is to be struck," id., he was stating a truism of the American constitutional order
that is also a controlling premise of this Article-ultimately, supranational tribunals must
pass muster under the principle of constitutional integrity, and only the Supreme Court
can make that final determination. See supra note 342 (describing a possible mechanism
for special constitutional review of an international treaty system).
383. 478 U.S. at 848-50. Richard Fallon, a stern critic both of Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. and Thomas, has adopted the straightforward position that "appellate
review by article III courts offered sufficient protection for article III values." Fallon,
supra note 179, at 991. A danger in Fallon's approach, however, is that it may confound a
deeper investigation of what those values are and of why they might still be protectable by
other forms of judicial (or even non-judicial) authority.
384. For consideration of relevant implications of the due process protections of the
Bill of Rights, see infra text accompanying notes 387-97.
385. If the requirement of Article III review were a discrete constitutional restriction
on the power of Congress to distribute judicial power, it would not be possible for
individual litigants to correct Congress's misfeasance merely through their right of waiver
of review. Individual actions cannot alter the principle of constitutional integrity. See
Schor, 478 U.S. at 850-51 (accepting that parties cannot by their mere consent cure
constitutional difficulties, because "the limitations serve institutional interests that the
parties cannot be expected to protect"). See generally Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie
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Northern Pipeline, "[h]ad Congress decided to assign all bankruptcy
matters to the state courts, a power it clearly possesses, no greater
review in an Article ImI court would exist.
386
E. Due Process, but Not Article III Appellate Review, as a Personal
Right
Accordingly, I argue that due process-in the specific guise of a
right to final appellate review by Article III judges-is not an
imperative of the deep structure of Article III. In Schor, for example,
the majority held that the guarantee in Article III, Section 1 of an
independent and impartial adjudication by judges appointed under
Article Ill protected "primarily personal, rather than structural,
interests. ''38 In Thomas, the guarantee of independence and
impartiality ultimately was assured through appellate review by an
Article Ill judge of the arbitrators' findings for fraud, misconduct, or
misrepresentation,38 and the Court held that review of constitutional
error was also preserved incident to due process.3 89 The majority in
Crowell v. Benson390 believed that minimum review would include
whether the agency had acted in conformance with its organic statute
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 n.10 (1982) (emphasizing that personal
jurisdiction objections can be waived by federal defendants because due process, rather
than constitutional federalism, is the source of the personal jurisdiction requirement).
386. 458 U.S. at 116 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, in his penultimate
footnote in Northern Pipeline Construction Co., seemed troubled by the abstractness of his
emphasis on the watchdog role of the judicial branch. See id. at 86-87 n.39 (plurality
opinion). Thus, he preferred to interpret the guarantee of judicial independence as
extending to "the mundane as well as the glamorous, matters of common law and statute
as well as constitutional law, issues of fact as well as issues of law." Id. (plurality opinion).
Justice Brennan, in other words, read judicial independence with a strong bias toward
assertion of personal rights rather than solely as a structural principle that puts the
judiciary in the role of constitutional oracle. While he recognized that constitutional
interpretation should be a vital task of the federal judiciary, he was more concerned that
its vaunted independence be used to promote "the quality of judicial decision-making."
Id. (plurality opinion).
387. 478 U.S. at 848. The Court reasoned that the parties would gain protection
"'from the risk of legislative or executive pressure on judicial decision.' " Id. (quoting
David P. Currie, Bankruptcy Judges and the Independent Judiciary, 16 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 441, 460 n.108 (1983)). Significantly, however, Schor rejected the assertion of an
absolute right to the plenary consideration of every claim by an Article III judge. See id.
Fallon, too, is skeptical of assigning primacy to the value of due process, which would
come (in his view) too close "to reading Article III out of the Constitution." Fallon, supra
note 179, at 978 n.371. In Fallon's perspective, the due process inquiry, if it were to
become the only determinant of a general requirement of judicial review (whether of law
or fact), would not be as reflective of separation of powers concerns. See id.
388. 473 U.S. 568,592-93 (1985).
389. Id.
390. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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and the assertion of constitutional rights.391  Justice Brennan,
concurring in Thomas, required that "at a minimum" Congress may
not assign to an Article I decision-maker "the ultimate disposition of
challenges to the constitutionality of Government action. ' '3 92 In his
dissent in Webster v. Doe,393 Justice Scalia injected a strong note of
doubt as to Justice Brennan's claim of an unbreachable minimal
position of constitutional review. Expressing the opinion that
Congress retained discretion to identify claims of constitutional
violation that would not require a judicial remedy (including,
presumably, appellate review by an Article III judge), Justice Scalia
opened up the possibility that claims of that nature might indeed
exist. Justice Scalia seemed to place himself, therefore, squarely
within Justice White's pragmatic tradition. 94
391. Id. at 60. Crowell's assumption of broad judicial supervision of agency powers has
not survived. The Crowell Court addressed as a question of principle whether the
compensation commission's determination of the facts of its own jurisdiction (such as the
locus of the injury in United States navigable waters, and the existence of the employer-
employee relationship) could be disturbed, holding that jurisdictional (or "fundamental")
facts of this kind were "condition[s] precedent to the operation of the statutory scheme"
and implicated constitutional rights because the power of Congress to enact the legislation
depended on them, as well as the exercise of the judicial power of the United States to
police constitutional limitations. Id. at 54. Congress, in other words, could not reach
beyond the constitutional limits that were inherent in the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction. See id. at 54-55. In these circumstances, the federal judicial power had to be
maintained in order to require the observance of a constitutional restriction. See id. at 56-
57. And, to that extent, Congress could not "sap the judicial power" under the federal
Constitution "to establish a government of a bureaucratic character alien to our system."
Id. at 57. But cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837, 865 (1984) (holding that a regulatory agency's interpretations of its governing
statutes, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, is entitled to deference as a legitimate
policy choice to fill any gap left by Congress and should be overturned only if it is
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute).
392. 473 U.S. at 599 (Brennan, J., concurring). Separately, Justice Brennan left open
the possibility that "some eventual review" might be required "in the exercise of its
responsibilities to check an impermissible accumulation of power in the other branches of
[g]overnment." Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). While this assertion is true as a matter of
general principle, this Article offers constitutional legitimization for supranational
tribunals that would overcome objections founded on aggrandizement by the political
branches.
393. 486 U.S. 592, 606-21 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
394. See id. at 614 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Webster concerned the interpretation of the
Administrative Procedure Act, which provides that Congress may preclude judicial review
of administrative action in two categories of cases: when a statute expressly precludes
review and when a decision is committed to agency discretion by law. See Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1), (a)(2); Webster, 486 U.S. at 599-601. The Court
ruled that the termination decisions of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) under the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403(c), were judicially
unreviewable. See Webster, 486 U.S. at 601. The statutory standard for termination,
allowing dismissal where "necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States," 50
U.S.C. § 403(c), in the Court's view "fairly exude[d] deference to the Director" and thus
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Nevertheless, to reclaim the reasoning of Professor Hart, if this
series of propositions is true to any extent, it is not because of
anything in Article I (in either its surface or deep structures). The
source of these propositions must be some other constitutional
provision or even some generative principle of deep structure other
than the principle of constitutional integrity. Hart himself proposed
the Due Process Clause as a possible source of litigants' rights. 95
Without addressing here the deep structure provenance of the due
process principle, I believe that Hart was correct. Article Ill itself,
however, offers no specific textual guarantee of access to judges
appointed under its authority. It may even be read to eliminate all
forms of appellate recourse to any forum created directly under
Article 1]1.396 To that extent, it must affect the content of litigants'
provided no "meaningful judicial standard of review." Webster, 486 U.S. at 600. The
Court refused to read the statute, however, to exclude constitutional claims such as the
respondent's assertion (though not considered by the Court) that there might be a general
CIA policy against employing gays and lesbians. See id. at 604 n.8. Interestingly, both
Justices O'Connor and Scalia saw the case as strongly implicating separation of powers
concerns. See id. at 605-06 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
612-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Justice O'Connor's view, the authority of the CIA
Director "to control access to sensitive national security information by discharging
employees deemed to be untrustworthy flow[ed] primarily from [the] constitutional power
of the President" in international relations, as panegyrized in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,320 (1936). Webster, 486 U.S. at 605-06 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). In that context, Justice O'Connor seemed to
imply, Congress might surely provide that the inferior federal courts could not be used to
infringe on the President's constitutional authority. Justice Scalia's astringent dissent
rejected the majority's dictum that a" 'serious constitutional question' ... would arise if a
federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional
claim." Id. at 611 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion, id. at 603). Unable to
find any "general principle that all constitutional violations must be remediable in the
courts," id. at 612 (Scalia, J., dissenting), Justice Scalia concluded that the issues of foreign
policy and national defense implicated in the case revealed a "textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department." Id. at 614
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
395. See Hart, supra note 142, at 1373. In this sense, Hart contended, "the power to
regulate jurisdiction" was actually a power to regulate rights, including the right to access
the judicial process. Id. at 1372-73. In making this argument, Hart agreed with Justice
Brandeis, who maintained:
If there be any controversy to which the judicial power extends that may not be
subjected to the conclusive determination of administrative bodies or federal
legislative courts, it is not because of any prohibition against the diminution of
the jurisdiction of the federal district courts as such, but because, under the
circumstances, the constitutional requirement of due process is a requirement of
judicial process.
Crowell, 285 U.S. at 87 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
396. See supra notes 346-67 and accompanying text. Because of the uncertainty
surrounding appellate review, Vazquez expressed reluctance, in an article otherwise
punctuated by lapidary pronouncements on the reach of the Supremacy Clause, to assign
definitively the constitutional origin of such a right of appeal either to Article III or to the
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due process guarantees. Thus, if separation of powers concerns are
not otherwise implicated, a federal litigant's due process right to
impartial adjudication does not always mean access to a judge holding
the privileges of appointment under Article III. Separation of powers
principles do not trump the actions of Congress in establishing
tribunals without Article III judges under its treaty and foreign
commerce powers.3 9
F. A Political Accommodation of Due Process Values
The quest for the outer bounds of due process rights lies beyond
the scope of this Article, and I therefore conclude with a much more
tightly drawn proposition. My proposed Court of International Air
Transportation represents the terminal appellate recourse for litigants
before the Open Skies Commission. As this Article has shown, from
the American constitutional perspective these tribunals would
exercise the judicial power granted to the federal government under
the deep structure principle of shared judicial power apparent in the
United States Constitution.
The character of the United States government would almost
certainly be altered if Congress were to attempt a wholesale excision
of domestic judicial authority by a transfer to supranational tribunals
at large.398 In this Article, I advocate only a sectionalized transfer of
federal judicial power to such tribunals.399  Even this narrower
Due Process Clause. See Vazquez, supra note 41, at 1151. Vazquez went so far as to
suggest that the state courts might be an appropriate venue for final vindication of any
putative right to administrative review. See id.
397. Vazquez would appear to agree, at least in a footnoted comment. When rights
flow from a treaty instrument, he maintained, "the power of Congress to limit the
procedures available for the vindication of the treaty right might be thought to be broader,
on the theory that, if Congress has the power to repeal the right entirely, it must have the
lesser power of limiting the manner in which it may be enforced." Vazquez, supra note 41,
at 1151 n.288. Such an attribution of congressional discretion is entirely in keeping with a
broad theory of public rights in the international trade context.
398. In the precise context of transferring U.S. constitutional power to supranational
institutions, George Bermann has recently emphasized that "treaty regimes [are] subject
to the procedural and substantive requirements of the United States Constitution."
George A. Bermann, Constitutional Implications of United States Participation in Regional
Integration, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 463, 479 (Supp. 1998). But cf. Heifer & Slaughter, supra
note 7, at 287 (suggesting that supranational, strictly speaking, has no "canonical"
definition).
399. NAFrA, for instance, has been a Procrustean menace for constitutional
interpretation: under the doughty diplomatic compromise that allowed the agreement, the
various United States, Canadian, and Mexican laws on antidumping and countervailing
duties, see supra note 331, were pressed into service as a kind of ersatz "common" law of
the treaty, a fiction that failed to satisfy either internationalists or sovereigntists. See
Richard Bilder et al., The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: New Directions in Dispute
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proposal, however, contemplates a transfer of constitutional judicial
power, and as such the transfer must respect other principles in the
Constitution's deep and surface structures that determine the proper
exercise of that power. The political branches, accordingly, would
have to ensure compliance by supranational tribunals with the
principles of due process and fairness that the Constitution also
mandates."0 Achieving these ends is complicated because the United
States must work with other countries to establish the proposed
supranational tribunals.4°1  Consequently, accommodation of the
Settlement, 83 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 251, 266 (1989). NAFTA's assignment of
authority to what Chen "most charitably" has labeled an "executive tribunal," Chen, supra
note 195, at 1478-79, inevitably led to the suspicion that Congress may have" 'inten[ded]
... to transfer jurisdiction from constitutional to [non-Article III courts] for the purpose of
emasculating' the federal judiciary." Id. at 1479 (quoting National Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582,644 (1949) (Vinson, CJ., dissenting)). The NAFTA
construct may have been so poorly conceived that it justified Metropoulos's lament that it
set "too dangerous a precedent, in too sensitive an area of law, for too wrong a reason."
Metropoulos, supra note 93, at 168. Chen, notwithstanding his chiliastic comparison of
NAFTA to "the battle of Gettysburg in the struggle to define separation of powers,"
Chen, supra note 195, at 1457-58, did not foresee that NAFTA would unleash a doomsday
scenario of "a phalanx of non-Article III tribunals" brutally suppressing the business of
Article III judges. Id. at 1479.
Commentators have identified other constitutional infirmities in the NAFTA
agreement. It is arguable, for example, that the appointment of Canadian members of the
binational panels reviewing United States law violates the Appointments Clause, which
requires that inferior officers of the United States must be appointed by the President
upon the advice and consent of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. But an
Appointments Clause objection would hardly prevail against the proposed supranational
aviation tribunals, which would not exercise authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States, but rather according to the special requirements of a U.S. treaty and in conformity
with a code of international competition law. See supra text accompanying notes 24-31
(discussing the proposed structure of aviation tribunals); see also Kim, supra note 94, at
985-86 (presenting arguments against the application of the Appointments Clause to the
NAFTA panel system). See generally Davey, supra note 293, at 1327 (noting that the
Appointments Clause has rarely been implicated in foreign affairs, especially when the
political branches, which are the objects of the Clause's protection, take united action);
Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution, Privatization, and Globalization: Separation of Powers
Limits on Congressional Authority to Assign Federal Power to Non-Federal Actors, 50
RUTGERS L. REV. 331, 344 (1998) (concluding that "[tihe Appointments Clause simply
does not speak to the issue of whether Congress may assign significant authority pursuant
to federal law, without more, to nonfederal actors").
400. Similar concerns have been raised by the federal judiciary with respect to due
process protections to be offered by an international criminal court. See JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 13-14.
401. The constitutional provenance of these tribunals, created by the treaty instrument
and directly exercising the judicial power of Article III, should overcome any potential
objection that they would represent an unlawful delegation of constitutional power to
nongovernmental parties or to private citizens. See generally Melcher v. Federal Open
Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510, 523 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding that Congress may use its
Article I, Section 8 powers to vest private persons with the responsibility of open market
trading, a tool used by the Federal Reserve Board's Open Market Committee in setting
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interests of due process could never be achieved by the mere ipse dixit
of Article III judges.4°  In negotiating the treaty to establish
supranational tribunals, the political branches would have to seek the
protection of private American constitutional interests.4 °  The
executive would have to ensure that the Open Skies Commission and
the Court of International Air Transportation each were comprised
of independently selected judges applying standards of forensic
fairness that would accord with developed United States
constitutional practice.4 °4  If these rights could not be assured, the
United States ultimately might choose to withdraw from the
establishing treaty.
But the forensic inadequacies of the global aviation tribunals, in
contrast to their compliance with the principle of constitutional
integrity, would not be for the United States federal courts to
supervise.405 The United States Constitution, through its Bill of
monetary policy), affd in part, vacated in part, 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The recent
constitutional challenge to NAFTA by the American Coalition for Competitive Trade-a
challenge that failed solely on standing grounds-was premised in part on the argument
that the NAFTA binational panels, in purporting to exercise Article III judicial power,
unlawfully "aggrandized" foreign citizens. Brief of Petitioner at 27, American Coalition
for Competitive Trade v. Clinton, 128 F.3d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (No. 97-1036). But cf.
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686-87 (1981) (upholding the general authority
of the President to delegate the power to settle claims of U.S. citizens to an international
arbitral body).
402. It is a major premise of this Article, however, that a constitutional challenge to the
supranational tribunals would be framed only as a systemic challenge to the compatibility
of these tribunals with the Framers' conception of judicial power. I believe this is
consistent with the form of accelerated challenge inserted by the Congress in the NAFTA
implementing legislation. Specific challenges to the fairness of the tribunals' forensic
procedures would be resolved before the tribunals themselves and, ultimately, by the
Court of International Air Transportation. Here, however, Congress would presumably
retain a political veto over continued participation in the treaty.
403. See generally FRANCK, supra note 20, at 327, 468 (noting, inter alia, due process
concerns raised by the International Court of Justice). As to the due process protections
intended for the new International Criminal Court, see Marquardt, supra note 32, at 110-
11.
404. This is the precise dialectical moment that might encourage proponents of the
International Criminal Court to retool their analytical thinking. They have argued, in my
view incorrectly, that U.S. constitutional judicial power would not be implicated by their
new tribunal because the International Criminal Court would exercise only the judicial
power of the international community. I have attempted to show, to the contrary, that the
judicial power that is specified in Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution
would be implicated and would be exercised by any supranational tribunal acting within
specialized and particularized spheres under statutory or treaty grant from the political
branches of the United States government.
405. Supranational law, in this sense, carries what one scholar of European Union
integration has recently called an "unavoidable legal-constitutional consequence,"
consisting of "limiting the power of the Constitutional Courts to examine conformity of
[European Union law] with the Constitutions of the Member States." Brewer-Carias,
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Rights and the jurisprudence of its Supreme Court, would stipulate a
necessary juristic baseline for participation in global adjudication:
that the proposed aviation tribunals, wielding judicial power that
ultimately derives from the deep structure imperatives of the
Constitution, would satisfy the United States constitutional standards
of due process.'
VI. SYNTHESIS
The premise of this Article is that supranational tribunals can
exercise federal judicial power, not by delegation from our existing
federal courts, but by a limited transfer of the federal judicial power
contained in Article III of the United States Constitution.' As I
indicated at the outset, I use three interpretive devices to argue this
evidently startling premise. First, I hypothesize a system of
supranational tribunals governing a specific trade sector, the global
air transport industry. These hypothetical tribunals, enjoying both
original and appellate jurisdiction, depart from the usual state-to-
state paradigm of international dispute settlement because they could
hear disputes among private parties and disputes among states and
private parties. The Article explores whether sectoralized tribunals
with this kind of obligatory jurisdiction are compatible with Article
III of the Constitution.
I examine the text of Article IlI using a second interpretive
device, a set of analogical principles derived from the insights of
supra note 15, at 99. The body of law contemplated in the main text as explicitly
unreviewable by the domestic United States courts would be an international legal code.
This legal code would be largely comprised of common principles of competition law
appended to the proposed global aviation treaty.
406. Moreover, to whatever extent independent appellate review in the domestic
setting comprises an element of due process, it is satisfied implicitly in supranational
adjudication because the tribunals operate separately from the political branches of the
federal government. See supra note 399 (discussing implications of the Appointments
Clause).
407. In constitutional doctrine, a delegation differs from a transfer in that a delegation
may be withdrawn by the delegating body. Cf. Daniela Obradovic, Community Law and
the Doctrine of Divisible Sovereignty, LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION, No. 1 1993, at 1,
6-9 (1993) (discussing the transfer of sovereignty in the European Community structure).
The transfer of judicial power that I propose, however, could not be withdrawn-and
certainly not by the Article III judiciary-unless the United States were to withdraw from
the establishing treaty. Cf. Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transp. en Expeditie
Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963
E.C.R. 1,12 [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. 105,129 (1963) (explaining the European Court of Justice's
view that the European Union "constitutes a new legal order of international law for the
benefit of which the [member] states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within
limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their
nationals.").
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Noam Chomsky's structural linguistics. Deep structure principles, in
Chomskyan terms, are the fixed base of the Constitution, the
fundamental postulates that limit and control the text, which is the
surface structure. The text, as Chomsky would put it, is a
performance arranged initially by the Framers, but capable of
extended or enhanced performances whenever dynamic operators,
called "transformations," are applied to the deep structure. I argue
that the surface structure of the federal judicial power, with its
parsimonious taxonomy of a single named court and a contingent
system of inferior tribunals, reveals a controlling deep structure
principle that allows Congress to distribute that power to tribunals
other than those constituted directly under Article III. The judges
appointed under Article III have immense professional security (in
the surface structure), and therefore an assured independence (in the
deep structure), but they do not monopolize the judicial power itself.
The distribution, or sharing, of the power is most apparent with
state court systems, which are plainly implicated by Article III's
frugal scheme for federal courts. In addition, legislative or Article I
courts exercise the federal judicial power through transformations
based on Congress's legislative power under Article I and the
Supreme Court's public rights jurisprudence. The modem public
rights doctrine postulates areas of governmental activity, such as
foreign trade, that the government can make justiciable by waiving its
ordinary sovereign immunity. So long as Congress uses the public
rights doctrine to create only sectoralized legislative courts, these
courts may share exercise of the Article III federal judicial power. To
provide a transformation that allows supranational courts also to
exercise this power, I blend the public rights doctrine with the
Constitution's expansive foreign commerce and treaty powers and the
emergence of a purposive, transactional view of national sovereignty.
In a third analytical device, I seek to lend ballast to the entire
argument by proposing a deep structure principle of constitutional
integrity. The rationale for this principle is that all interpretive
techniques bear the risk of corrupting the basic character of the
Constitution, and some ultimate limiting principle must eventually be
applied. The limiting principle of constitutional integrity is a
restatement of the doctrine of separation of powers. This resolving
"proto-principle" is needed because two deep structure principles of
Article III-Congress's authority to create tribunals that share the
Article III judicial power, and the independence of the Article III
judiciary-may be in conflict if Congress can use the sharing principle
to eviscerate the courts recognized explicitly in Article III using
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tribunals that lack appellate review by judges appointed under Article
III. This will be especially true of an at-large transfer of power to a
supranational tribunal system, which necessarily would have an
appellate structure wholly outside the Article III framework. Thus, if
the creation of new federal or supranational tribunals offends the
principle of constitutional integrity, by threatening the survival of an
independent Article III judiciary co-equal to the political branches,
then the transfer of power under the sharing principle will be blocked.
To foreclose this contest of principles, I draw on the
congressional power to limit or remove the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction, and again on the transformation of the
jurisprudence of public rights. I conclude that final review by an
Article III judge is not mandated by the deep structure principle of
constitutional integrity when Congress creates highly specialized
tribunals, such as global aviation tribunals, in areas that Congress has
not previously made justiciable. I also emphasize that
accommodation of due process rights, which in a domestic setting
might sometimes require appeal to a judge appointed under Article
III, is not a deep or surface structure imperative that limits the
creation of tribunals that share judicial power under Article III.
Nevertheless, because a constitutional judicial power is being
transferred to supranational tribunals, the political branches must
arrange the transfer to comport with other relevant principles of deep
and surface structure within the Constitution, including the values of
fairness and due process.
CONCLUSION
Some readers may be uncomfortable that a supranational
exercise of judicial power would take precedence, in the
constitutional mythopoesis at work in this Article, over the
individual's expectation of traditional judicial review by Article I
judges. To ease that discomfort, I invoke once more the conceptual
specificity insisted upon by Louis Henkin.4°  The supranational
aviation tribunals proposed here would adjudicate novel rights
conceded by the pooled sovereign wills of the global community.
These would be truly public rights.409 Within the domain of
international trade, of which aviation is a highly visible but rather
408. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
409. The assumption that trade disputes should be part of a public rights discourse has
been well-illustrated by the history of congressional juridicization of these disputes. See
supra note 331; see also Morrison & Hudec, supra note 15, at 124-28 (discussing nature of
judicial review under major United States trade statutes).
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modest component, the individual's right to judicial review has always
been acknowledged to be contingent. 410 Thus, the United States
courts have been unwilling to impose due process of law or, for that
matter, a guarantee of a right to trade as justiciable constitutional
restraints on the foreign commerce power.
411
410. Professor Andreas Lowenfeld was much less circumspect, testifying in
congressional hearings that "I don't think there is a constitutional requirement for judicial
review." U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary on the Constitutionality of Establishing a Binational Panel to Resolve Disputes in
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, 100th Cong. 96, 120 (Sup. Docs. No.
Y4:C73/7:S.Hrg.103-823) (statement of Professor Andreas Lowenfeld, New York
University School of Law). Trade lawyers have been aware that there is some American
customs authority holding that "there is no generally available, protectable interest to
engage in foreign trade." Sacilor v. United States, 613 F. Supp. 364, 370 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1985), vacated and remanded by 85 F.2d 1488 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Norwegian
Nitrogen Prods. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294,318 (1933) ("No one has a legal right to the
maintenance of an existing rate or duty.").
411. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Limited Government and Unlimited Trade Policy
Powers? Why Effective Judicial Review of Foreign Trade Restrictions Depends on
Individual Rights, in 8 STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 15, at
537, 544. An assertive school of international relations theory, championed by
Petersmann, has sought perfection of the logic of free trade at the level of the individual
citizen by advocating recognition of a right to trade within the scheme of ordered liberty,
protecting both process and property, that comprises the Bill of Rights of the United
States Constitution. Thus, Petersmann has argued that "[t]he 'collective liberty' of the
government to tax, restrict or prohibit transnational economic transactions is considered
more important than individual liberty and 'private sovereignty' of US [sic] citizens." Id.
at 545. This critique, which Petersmann has also applied to the external trade policies of
the European Union, see id. at 547-48, has been animated by the neoliberalist sensibility
of the post-war global trade regimes. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, National Constitutions
and International Economic Law, in 8 STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW,
supra note 15, at 8 [hereinafter Petersmann, National Constitutions]. The claim of a right
to trade may appear overly dogmatic, however, when set against the backdrop of
congressional and judicial precedent since the establishment of the Republic. In a ruling
that is typical of this tradition, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that
economic injury to an importer when Congress bans importation of a product was
"nonredressable" because the injury was to "a nonexistent right to continued importation
of a Congressionally [sic] excluded product." Arjay Assocs. Inc. v. Bush, 891 F.2d 894, 898
(Fed. Cir. 1989). In the court's opinion, "[w]hen the people granted Congress the power
'To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations' ... they thereupon relinquished at least
whatever right they, as individuals, may have had to insist upon the importation of any
product Congress has excluded." Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). If Congress
were to act from considerations of public policy to exclude certain products from
importation, it would not thereby violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. See
id. at 896 (quoting Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 493 (1904)); see also American
Ass'n of Exporters & Importers v. United States, 751 F.2d 1239, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(holding that a "prerequisite for due process protection is some interest worthy of
protecting" and that "[n]o one has a protectable interest to engage in international
trade"). For a recent, very broadly articulated opinion on the perilous linkage between
international trade and foreign policy involving the compression of constitutional rights
under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, see Abrahim-Youri v. United States, 139
F.3d 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Clevenger, J., joining the opinion of the court).
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Transposing trade matters to the care of supranational judges,
accompanied by the required incidents of due process fairness, would
have the salutary-and ironic-effect for the individual litigant of
promising a greater degree of accountability over government action
than has heretofore been possible in the making of international trade
policy.412 To a large extent, it would diminish the "black box"
phenomenon of policymaking that has placed so much unchecked
discretion in the executive as to whether a specific complaint against
foreign governments will ever be pursued.413 It would open trade
issues to a new transparency, exposing the manner in which certain
What accounts for this sustained judicial deference to use of the foreign commerce
power? A major part of the reason is contextual: foreign commerce inevitably
intermeshes with considerations of foreign policy, what one court has described as "the
political side of foreign affairs." American Ass'n of Exporters, 751 F.2d at 1248; see also
South P.R. Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. United States, 334 F.2d 622, 630 (Ct. Cl. 1964)
(noting that, "[i]n the intercourse of nations, changes in economic relationships have many
an important political corollary"). Nevertheless, whatever these reasons may be,
Petersmann's thesis surely deserves renewed attention in the context of an evolving
international integration within which rule of law procedures displace state adversarial
diplomacy (and even war). This proposal would focus on treating the private citizen as
part of the global legal order, the beneficiary of rights and the object of obligations that
are created, without state intermediation, by the rulings of a supranational tribunal.
Ironically, the historical insistence on a privilege, in contrast to a right to trade, see
Petersmann, National Constitutions, supra, at 17, vindicates the argument developed in
this Article that the right to trade-as a public right-is susceptible to supranational
adjudication, and therefore to invocation against discriminatory or disproportionate
governmental foreign trade restrictions. It is partly the very contingency of the right to
trade domestically, in fact, that facilitates its transfer out of traditional Article III
courtrooms and its assertion, newly invigorated, in a supranational setting.
412. In this sense, access of private parties to international dispute settlement is, in
itself, a guarantee of due process. See American Bar Ass'n, Section of Int'l Law and
Practice, Dispute Settlement Under a North American Free Trade Agreement, 26 INT'L
LAW. 855, 858 (1992) (noting that private party access would allow disputes to be dealt
with on a more technical level, avoid forcing citizens to rely upon the attention and
backing of their home states, and remove disputes from the state-to-state context, "where
considerations extraneous to the particular dispute may be injected into the process"); see
also Schneider, supra note 42, at 603 (noting that the role of private actors, in the absence
of treaty standing, is necessarily limited to lobbying their governments to protect their
interests and industries).
413. As Andreas Lowenfeld has remarked in the context of the GATT panels, for
example, "there usually is some kind of a private dispute behind these... cases." Andreas
F. Lowenfeld, Transcript of Discussion Following Presentation by Kenneth W. Abbott,
1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 151, 161. And the complex trade sanctions enforcement
apparatus of the American government (the so-called "Section 301" power, see JACKSON,
supra note 6, at 129) can only be invoked by executive discretion, with private party
involvement limited to submission of petitions that may (or may not) lead to
investigations. See generally Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2412 (1994) (setting
forth procedures for and determining the scope of the mandatory and discretionary
authority of the U.S. Trade Representative when the rights of the United States under
trade agreements have been infringed).
2000]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
interest groups use the secretive processes of trade policy to impose
their protectionist agendas.1 4
At another time in our history, caring about how the
Constitution would treat supranational adjudication might be
dismissed as mere law professors' folderol.4 5 Now, on the threshold
of a century of globalization, this Article has attempted to show, using
the insights of Chomskyan linguistics and the Framers' own structural
vision of their Constitution, that new forms of global adjudication
could become an integral element of our evolving constitutional
order. These new tribunals may prove to be the most stimulating
innovation in the future of the federal judicial power.
414. See Robert E. Hudec, The Role of Judicial Review in Preserving Liberal Foreign
Trade Policies, in 8 STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 15, at 503
(discussing Jan Tumlir's critique of the constitutional structure under which democratic
governments make foreign trade policy); see also Patti Goldman, The Democratization of
the Development of U.S. Trade Policy, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631, 648 (1994) (criticizing
the absence in U.S. trade policymaking of the core principles of "openness, public
participation, neutrality, and accountability of both the decision-makers and the decision-
making process").
415. Laurence Tribe resuscitated this venerable medieval English nonce word (which
does, literally, mean "nonsense") during testimony to a Senate committee considering the
implementing legislation for the WTO. See Uruguay Round Senate Hearings, supra note 8,
at 334 (statement of Laurence H. Tribe). Tribe, dueling with Yale's Bruce Ackerman on
the propriety of using a congressional-executive agreement in lieu of the treaty procedure
in Article II of the Constitution to adopt the massive WTO trade reform package, feared
that the grinding of professorial axes might simply encourage Senators to shrug off their
responsibility (in Tribe's view) to comply with Article II's treaty-making protocol. See id.
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